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“Der Philosoph trachtet, das erlösende Wort zu finden, das ist
das Wort, das uns endlich erlaubt, das zu fassen, was bis jetzt/dahin/immer, ungreifbar,
unser Bewusstsein belastet hat.”
Ludwig Wittgenstein1
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Ludwig Wittgenstein, “The Big Type-Script,” Philosophical Occasions (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1993) 165.
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Introduction

In an end-of-the-century survey of philosophers in Canada and the United States,
Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus was ranked the fourth most important
work of philosophy in the twentieth century, and his Philosophical Investigations was
ranked first.2 Wittgenstein was perhaps nowhere more influential than in the Vienna
Circle, under whom Broch pursued his university studies in the late 1920s. The
philosophers and scientists of the Vienna Circle were world-renowned in their fields, and
saw in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus a promising way to end the metaphysical and ethical
speculation that had preoccupied philosophers to no avail for millennia, and which they
believed had prevented philosophy from progressing commensurate to the sciences. New
and powerful mathematical logic seemed to offer the means through which language
could be made more precise, and philosophical confusions avoided and dissolved. But
Wittgenstein objected to the manifesto of the Vienna Circle and the ethos that inspired it.
Upon invitation of the Vienna Circle to attend their private meetings, Wittgenstein
appeared, but refused to discuss philosophy, instead recited poetry as he defiantly turned
his back.
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Douglas P. Lackey, “What are the Modern Classics? The Baruch Poll of Great Philosophy in the
Twentieth Century,” The Philosophical Forum. Vol. XXX, No. 4 (1999): 331.
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This dissertation has two primary aims. The first is to show the
intellectual/historical context in which Wittgenstein’s thoughts influenced, or have
parallels, to Broch’s. The second is to address the substantive question that preoccupies
much of Broch’s literary and philosophical works; namely, what are the complementary
roles of literature and philosophical logic in revealing the ethical and volitional
necessities that guide our actions and shape our moral sensibilities, more specifically,
whether anything can be done by means of literary or philosophical exploration that
might yield in our minds greater confidence in the viability of our ethical discernment.
Broch’s position on this latter question is inconclusive; he turns to literature in hopes of
finding a better ethical vehicle than the philosophy of his era, but then despairs and turns
to psychology and political science. Wittgensteinian theories will help illuminate some
of the more obscure aspects of Broch’s thought.
This dissertation will maintain a prima facie affirmative position to the thesis that
ethical questions, broadly conceived, are not resolutely answerable through either
philosophical argument alone, or through literary/artistic contemplation and analysis
alone, but that each of these activities has important contributions to make to the
construction of our web of ethical beliefs. I qualify my affirmation of this thesis because
of the diversity of the psychologies across our species, which may very well consist of
incorrigible personalities not affected by literature, or rational persuasion, in the same
way as Broch and Wittgenstein.
The importance of acknowledging differences in personality is stressed in an
influential article, “Against Narrativity” (2004), in which Galen Strawson shows how
pervasively—across many academic disciplines—scholars view personal narrativity as an
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essential ingredient to living a good and meaningful life. Strawson objects, and argues
against the belief that all of us live our lives only as a part of an autobiographical context,
and that all new events we experience are only given meaning as they are perceived in the
context of our personal narratives. Strawson makes a persuasive argument for the notion
that some of our psychic experiences are given full meaning by the discrete moment
alone in which our experience occurs (without narrative context), and that our past is
imbedded in our psychic structure in a way that makes it unnecessary to appeal to
narrative context as the frame for a particular phenomenon. The inner ‘self’ that
experiences a moment is not in all cases the same ‘self’ of one’s past or future; some
people have what Strawson calls an “episodic” self-experience in which one resists
viewing one’s ‘self’ as continuous or enduring: “[t]he past can be alive – arguably more
genuinely alive – in the present simply in so far as it has helped to shape the way one is in
the present, just as musicians’ playing can incorporate and body forth their past practice
without being mediated by any explicit memory of it” (432). He further argues against
the normative claim, made by many, that we ought to live our lives as if they were
narratives of our own creation: “It’s just not true that there is only one good way for
human beings to experience their being in time. There are deeply non-Narrative people
and there are good ways to live that are deeply non-Narrative” (429). Strawson points
out that he does not structure his experiences into a narrative, and that this does not cause
him to be superficial, or to miss out on the full depth of human experience.
On both of Strawson’s objections to narrativity, namely, that we do and ought to
perceive our ‘self’ in the context of an autobiographical narrative, Broch’s arguments
remain resilient. Broch argues that our ‘repository’ of beliefs and memories of past
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phenomena contributes to our new experiences, in the same way as Strawson’s episodic
personalities. Broch does not imply that we should impose upon our experience a
narrative frame, but that in the moment of perception, a multitude of diverse psychic
elements, beyond merely the empirical sense data, contribute to our judgments; his Tod
des Vergil uses parataxis to achieve this effect. Broch sees the experience of reading a
novel as making important psychic contributions to our moral judgments, and equally
important, he sees modal logic—the logic that governs inferences regarding necessities
and possibilities—as having an essential role in bringing coherence to these psychic
elements as we reflect upon their implications.
In consideration of the psychological implications of this dissertation’s thesis, I
concede the inability of research in the humanities to give a comprehensive answer
without input from scientific research, which I do not offer here. But such a research
agenda is active in the U.S. and Germany, for instance, at the Berlin School of Mind and
Brain at Humboldt University philosophers and scientists are working together to show
how our moral psychology affects our ethical judgments, and what evolutionary forces
weigh on them. Further research is being done showing how reading novels fires the
neuronal connections in our brains very similarly to the way our direct experience with
the world does.3
Alas, while science and philosophy might explain how our moral psychology
operates, how literature stimulates it, and how logic ensures valid reasoning, science and
philosophy do not give us answers to the very individual and private question that each of
us must continually answer: ‘how should I live?’ To answer this question, Broch’s
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Jeffrey M. Zacks and Thomas F. Shipley, eds., Understanding Events: From Perception to Action
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).
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philosophy shows remarkable parallels to Harry Frankfurt’s Tanner Lectures given at
Stanford University in 2005: “Taking Ourselves Seriously & Getting it Right.” Broch
argues that in discovering our moral and volitional necessities, that is, the things about
which we feel an inner “must” pressing us to value or to do, we discover the ‘absolutes’
that provide the structure for our moral lives. Similarly, Frankfurt argues that
recognizing our volitional necessities is essential for living life according to stable and
appropriate norms. These necessities don’t always manifest themselves as conclusions
drawn from a well-defined set of premises; nor do they invariably emerge in our
consciousness as we read a novel. But, in so far as our species can do anything at all to
improve its situation in the world, logical argumentation and aesthetic/literary
contemplation offer two potentially fruitful and cooperative paths for providing the
relevant practical knowledge, according to Broch.
Wittgenstein influenced Broch significantly. In a letter to Franz Blei in 1931,
Broch insists that he should read Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, and praises it as the great
philosophical work of the age:
Übrigens solltest Du immer wieder Wittgenstein anschauen: das ist der einzige
Mensch in der deutschen und wahrscheinlich auch sonstig europäischen
Philosophie. Wenn ich mit den Schlafwandlern fertig bin, schreibe ich ein Buch
über die philosophischen und literarischen Ausdrucksformen der Zeit (HBM 29).4
By the way, you should again look at Wittgenstein: that is the only person in
German, and probably also European, Philosophy. When I’m finished with The
Sleepwalkers, I’ll write a book on the philosophical and literary form of
expression of the time (my translation).

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Lützeler explains that the context of this statement is in reference to the seemingly insurpassible
achievements of Kafka and Joyce in literature. See Hermann Broch und die Moderne: Roman,
Menschenrecht, Biografie. (München: Wilhelm Fink, 2011) 28-9.
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Broch’s novels are representative of modernism’s attempt to re-assemble an
existential foundation for one’s experience in a world in which the old foundations had
been shown to be faulty and in collapse. Robert Musil’s Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften
[The Man without Qualities], written between 1930 and 1942; and Karl Kraus’s Die
Letzten Tage der Menschheit (1918) [The Last Days of Mankind] are two important
Austrian works that contain some of the same themes as Broch, especially Die
Schlafwander (1931-32) [The Sleepwalkers] and Der Tod des Vergil (1945) [The Death
of Virgil]. But Broch’s view of fin de siècle Austria emerges not as much in response to
these important contemporary writers, but to the common conditions and Zeitgeist that
inspired them. Broch’s literary influence comes rather from James Joyce’s Ulysses
(1922), Hugo von Hofmannsthal’s Brief des Lord Chandos an Francis Bacon (1902)
[The Letter of Lord Candos], and to a lesser extent Marcel Proust’s À la recherche du
temps perdu (1913-1927) [In Search of Lost Time]. Broch discusses the significance of
these works in extensive detail in Hofmannsthal und seine Zeit (1948) [Hofmannsthal and
his Time] and elsewhere.
As exiles from their native Austria, Broch and Wittgenstein glean insights from
intellectual trends beyond Vienna, and as Lützeler points out, have the unique position of
maintaining critical distance from the culture with which they are most intimately
acquainted: “exiled authors […] [have] the opportunity to question the conventions and
conformities of the host country […] [and] profit from the widening of his or her
intellectual horizon through confrontation with other traditions and different ways of
thinking” (VIE 68). Broch’s exile in the U.S.A. began in 1938 and lasted until his death
in 1951; it included lengthy stays at Princeton and Yale, which gave him the company of
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many prominent intellectuals, both American and European. While Broch’s exile was in
response to the push factor of Nazi terror, Wittgenstein’s exile from his home in Vienna
was at first in response to the pull factor of Bertrand Russell, the professorship offered to
him in England, and at various times the search for rural solitude in Norway and Ireland.
Both Wittgenstein and Broch maintained connections with Vienna; Wittgenstein returned
regularly to visit family; Broch was preparing to move back to Vienna when he died in
1951. Life as exiles left its existential mark in the consciousness of both thinkers.
In chapter one of this dissertation, I explain the origin of analytic philosophy,
particularly from the original works that Broch read as a student in Vienna.
Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1921) and Bertrand Russell’s Our
Knowledge of the External World (1914) were both pivotal in the development of
analytic philosophy, and in Broch’s philosophical leanings. But neither of these would
have been possible without Ludwig Boltzmann’s atomic theory in physics, and Gottlob
Frege’s development of modern logic in his Begriffsschrift (1879). The Vienna Circle
drew inspiration from these figures, especially Wittgenstein. The analytic movement in
philosophy flourished due in part to the attractiveness of its precision of expression and
its congeniality with the natural sciences. But the positivism to which analytic
philosophy was attached in its early days, was struck a fatal blow by the second
generation of analytic philosophers that found faulty assumptions in the epistemology
and philosophy of language of the positivists. Torn asunder from its empirical dogmas,
analytic philosophy—as a style of doing philosophy—flourished and opened a breadth
and depth of intellectual avenues unmatched in the history of philosophical movements,
engaging topics as diverse as love, friendship, formal logic, education reform, good beer,
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poetry, as well as considerable attention to philosophical traditions beyond analytic
philosophy, and self-reflexive evaluation of itself.
In chapter two, I detail Broch’s experience as a student under the Vienna Circle
during the peak of its influence. Broch’s ambivalence towards his studies consisted of
two poles, on the one hand a respect for the technical rigor and scientific progressivism,
on the other hand a resentment towards the diminished value the Vienna Circle placed on
understanding the human spirit and the realms of thought beyond the reach of empirical
verification or conceptual analysis. I argue that Broch was the first ‘post-analytic’
philosopher because he was trained in analytic philosophy, but already circa 1930 was
writing critical essays on central assumptions made by the logical positivists that would
only be challenged, at least in published print, two decades later by Willard Quine, a
fellow student of the Vienna Circle in 1932-33, and Ludwig Wittgenstein’s magnum
opus: Philosophical Investigations (1953). Broch argues that philosophy is done great
harm if narrowed to the confines and methods as defined by Bertrand Russell and the
Vienna Circle.
In the third chapter, I discuss Broch’s early novel Die Unbekannte Größe (1933)
and Wittgenstein’s Über Gewissheit (1951). Broch parodies the hypertrophic rationality
of a young physicist, Richard Hieck, whose tremendous acumen in scientific matters
leads to an over-dependence on scientific method to resolve all of life’s problems. Hieck
is perplexed by his emotions, and unable to cope with the uncertainty of his relationship
with a woman. Wittgenstein’s pragmatist conception of certainty offers a theoretical
vantage point through which some light can be shed on Hieck’s predicament.
Wittgensten argues against skeptics who believe it is impossible to have certainty
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regarding anything; he explains that certainty comes in degrees, and is validated by its
force and influence on our actions. Extreme forms of doubt are shown to be ludicrous
when their pragmatic implications are considered. I argue that Broch’s novel suggests
that ‘subjective certainty,’ completely unverifiable through Hieck’s scientific methods,
plays a fundamental role in knowing how to act and reciprocate in relationships, and that
the rational scrutiny that Hieck habitually applies to all thoughts leaves him emotionally
eviscerated until a mystical encounter with love changes him.
In the fourth chapter, I explore the notion of seeing the world sub species
aeternitatis as it relates to Broch’s Der Tod des Vergil (1945) and various selections from
Wittgenstein’s repertoire.5 As death approaches, Virgil is able to gain a view of life’s
circularity, its beginning and end. The particular instances of his life are given fuller
meaning as their fit within the whole is perceived. The style of Broch’s novel is unique
in evoking a sense of simultaneity of perceptions towards the same direct object. This
allows an agent to make more discerning apperceptive judgments, which for Broch and
Wittgenstein, are essential in many ethical judgments.
While Broch’s and Wittgenstein’s thoughts emerged from, and are most relevant
to, a specific era in European history, some of their insights transcend their
social/historical context and remain relevant to anyone wanting to understand what
inspires human action, how to express feelings and thoughts in language, and how logic
and literature might aid one’s efforts in coming to terms with one’s own conception of a
good life.
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Broch’s Der Tod des Vergil would fit well into Martin Klebes’ analyses of the “Wittgensteinian novel.”
In Wittgenstein’s Novels, Klebes analyzes four contemporary novels, explaining that the “novels are
Wittgenstein’s as well as those of their authors because philosophy has here invaded the novel, and vice
versa […]” (5). He goes on to tease out the Wittgensteinian elements of each novel.
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Chapter 1

Frege, Russell, Wittgenstein and the Birth of
Analytic Philosophy

Philosophy aims at the logical clarification of thoughts. Philosophy is not a body of
doctrine but an activity.
Ludwig Wittgenstein6
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Analytic philosophy today is a very diverse philosophical tradition that has many
competing theories and widely divergent opinions about even the most fundamental
assumptions of philosophy.7 It is the mainstream approach to philosophy in Englishspeaking universities, and has played the central role in philosophy in Scandanavia and
Poland, is in the “ascendancy in Germanophone countries” (Glock 1), and “is showing
every sign of becoming global” (Burge 1). It contrasts with the philosophy analytic
philosophers often referred to as ‘continental philosophy’ in its historical lineage,
canonical figures, and geographical predominance.8 Though the division still exists,
some now believe labels ‘analytic’ and ‘continental’ are obsolete (Glock 1; Glendinning
201-18; Bieri 355). Michael Dummett, for example, prefers to characterize the difference
as one between analytical and phenomenological philosophy (Dummett ix).
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One significant difference of opinion among analytic philosophers in recent decades is between the
quietists and naturalists. Quietists believe that the aim of philosophy is a therapeutic or remedial one. The
goal is to ‘quiet’ the mind of its deep philosophical turmoil and confusion caused by a misuse of language.
The later Wittgenstein, Rorty, and Austin are quietists, as were non-analytic philosophers Schopenhauer
and Gandhi. Naturalists on the other hand strive for a theoretical understanding of the universe. They
often assume the natural sciences are the most informative for this endeavor. It is the naturalistic
philosopher’s aim to test for consistency, criticize, or extrapolate upon scientific findings. Willard Quine is
the most prominent advocate of naturalism in contemporary philosophy, though Aristotle, Marx, and Freud
could perhaps be considered naturalistic philosophers, too, though not belonging to the analytic tradition
per se.
8

There are many different, often competing and overlapping schools of thought in continental philosophy;
including German idealism, Marxism, existentialism, neo-Kantianism, phenomenology, hermeneutics,
structuralism, and post-structuralism.
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Analytic philosophers today work in universities across continental Europe9;
likewise many of the books published in recent years on Hegel,10 Marx,11 and
Heidegger12 were written by analytic—or analytically trained—philosophers attempting
to vindicate some aspects of these continental philosophers’ thoughts (Glock 17; Leiter
15). Analytic and continental philosophies often merge or overlap when philosophers’
interests cross back and forth between the two traditions. In the continental tradition,
prominent figures such as Alain Badiou or Ernst Tugenthat frequently cite analytic
philosophers; in the analytic tradition, prominent figures such as Charles Taylor or
Richard Rorty are more similar to their continental counterparts. Even the continental
philosopher par excellence, Jacques Derrida, claimed to be an analytic philosopher in
response to a paper written by an analytic philosopher:
At the beginning of your paper, when you were defining conceptual philosophy,
or analytic philosophy as conceptual philosophy, I thought: well, that’s what I am
doing, that’s exactly what I am trying to do. So: I am an analytic philosopher […].
I say this very seriously. I am not simply on the ‘continental’ side. Despite a
number of appearances, my ‘style’ has something essential to do with a
motivation that one also finds in analytic philosophy […]. (Derrida 382)
Labeling the two schools is not only problematic, it is un-helpful when
considering the non-philosophical prejudices that such partisanship inevitably rouses. As
the analytic philosopher Michael Dummett explains, “Philosophy, having no agreed
methodology and hardly any incontrovertible triumphs, is peculiarly subject to schisms
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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According to the ‘European Society for Analytic Philosophy’ there are active analytic philosophers in
virtually every country in Europe. See http://www.dif.unige.it/esap
10

Allen Wood, Hegel’s Ethical Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).

11

J. Roemer, ed., Analytical Marxism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986); or Jonathan Wolff,
Why Read Marx Today? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).
12

Hubert Dreyfus, Being-in-the-World: A Commentary on Being and Time, Division I (Cambridge, Mass.:
MIT Press, 1990).
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and sectarianism; but they do the subject only harm” (Dummett xi). Likewise, as the
continental philosopher Peter Bieri explains, the distinction between ‘analytic’ and
‘continental’ philosophy is only an “annoyance” (Bieri 355).13
So what is analytic philosophy today? The former president of the Gesellschaft
für analytische Philosophie, Ansgar Beckermann, explains that what characterizes
analytic philosophy today is the acceptance of two beliefs: first, philosophy consists of
the pursuit of answers to substantive rather than historical questions, systematically aided
by the universal standards of rationality, and secondly, philosophical questions are best
pursued when concepts and arguments are made as clear as possible (Beckermann 2).
Essential to these goals is a precise use of language, as Dummett explains, “For Frege, as
for all subsequent analytical philosophers, the philosophy of language is the foundation
of all other philosophy” (Dummett 441).
While analytic philosophy today is doctrinally diverse, this was not as much the
case in its early decades. Modern philosophy from Descartes to Kant was dominated by a
concern with the nature of human knowledge; Gottlob Frege continues this interest with a
narrow focus on the power of logic to clarify the structure of language and express
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Bieri’s full statement: “Und die Sache mit der „analytischen“ und der „kontinentalen“ Philosophie? Nach
allem, was ich bis hierhin geschrieben habe, wird es niemanden wundern, wenn ich sage: Diese
Unterscheidung ist ein Ärgernis, einfach nur ein Ärgernis, und man sollte damit absolut keine Geduld
haben. Die beiden Etikette haben nicht und hatten nie eine sachhaltige Unterscheidung hinter sich. Auf
beiden Seiten hatten sie von Anfang an nur die Funktion von Kampfparolen, und vielfach ist das heute
noch so. Was die Europäer angeht, so entwickelte sich eine unselige Spaltung zwischen denjenigen, die die
Geschichte der Philosophie und ihre Auslegung hochhielten, und den anderen, die auf die philosophischen
Care-Pakete aus der angelsächsischen Welt warteten und auch dann Englisch redeten, wenn sie Deutsch
redeten. Und vielfach besteht diese unheilige Allianz von Eiferern auch jetzt noch. Was die Kollegen
englischer Zunge angeht, so sind sie nicht unschuldig an dieser Situation. Ihre oft mangelnde historische
Bildung verführt sie nicht selten zu verzerrenden Diagnosen und zu einem herablassenden Gebaren uns
gegenüber, das mich wortlos sauer macht, weil es zeigt, wie schlicht provinziell die analytische Philosophie
manchmal ist.”
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meaning.14 Frege’s development of modern logic and philosophy of language often earn
him the status as the founder of analytic philosophy, and the tradition owes more to Frege
than anyone else.15
While Frege’s work in logic and philosophy of language was essential to analytic
philosophy, a broader trend in Germanophone positivistic philosophy was preparing a
receptive audience to Frege’s innovations. Although analytic philosophy became
dominant in English-speaking universities, and not in German universities, its
Germanophone origin is often overlooked. Dummett explains: “The sources of analytical
philosophy were the writings of philosophers who wrote, principally or exclusively, in
the German language; and this would have remained obvious to everyone had it not been
for the plague of Nazism which drove so many German-speaking philosophers across the
Atlantic” (Dummett ix). Among the influential proto-analytic philosophers are prominent
names such as Franz Brentano, Alexius Meinong, Ludwig Boltzmann, and Rudolf Carnap.

The History of Logic and the Precursors to Modern Logic
In the preface to the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason (1787),
Immanuel Kant claims that logic is a completed science and that nothing new can be
added to it:
[…]since Aristotle, [logic] has been unable to advance a single step, and thus to
all appearance has reached its completion. For if some of the moderns have
thought to enlarge its domain by introducing psychological discussions […]
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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metaphysical […] or anthropological discussions […] this attempt, on the part of
these authors, only shows their ignorance of the peculiar nature of logical science.
(Kant 12)
In his four volume work Geschichte der Logik im Abendlande (1870), the German
historian of logic Karl van Prantl agrees with Kant and tries to vindicate him by showing
the failed attempts to improve Aristotelian logic. Prantl and Kant imply that Aristotle’s
logic is as good as it gets, and there can be no improvements.
While many philosophers throughout two millennia of western philosophy found
Aristotelian logic useful, a few tried, with limited success, to create a formal logic via
mathematics. In the seventeenth century, Gottfried Leibniz made discoveries in algebraic
logic but abandoned his efforts and did not publish his work (Jolley 226-40). His
discoveries pre-dated the same made two hundred years later. Leibniz’s approach to
logic was brilliant in its recognition of mathematics as a field with fruitful logical
ramifications.
Later there were attempts to view logic in terms of a metaphysical assumption
about the universe, not as a study into the nature of consistency or inference. Hegel’s
view of logic, according to Stephen Houlgate, is almost indistinguishable from ontology,
and consists largely of exploring the way the mind categorizes its experiences (9-28).16
This had immense implications for his philosophical system and was adopted by many of
his followers. But Hegel’s view of logic, according to Harry Gensler, is entirely different
from what logicians today understand about logic (Gensler xviii). Contemporary
philosophers generally view logic, according to Dale Jacquette, as any variety of formal
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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systems that can be used to delineate the formal inferential structure of language
(Jacquette 1).
Ironically, it was only a few years after Prantl finished his work on the history of
logic that logic was to undergo a radical transformation. Modern logic as it is studied and
practiced by philosophers, mathematicians, and computer scientists today builds largely
on Gottlob Frege’s predicate logic articulated first in Begriffsschrift: Eine der
arithmetischen nachgebildete Formelsprache des reinen Denkens (1879). In the
twentieth century, according to Glock, Frege’s logic became the “prime even exclusive
tool for the analysis of language and thought” (226).
Similar to Leibniz, from whom he draws inspiration, Frege looked to mathematics
in pursuit of an understanding of logic. Frege, a mathematician by trade, was as much
concerned with providing a theoretical foundation to mathematics as he was with creating
a logical tool for philosophers. He attempted, unsuccessfully,17 to show that all
mathematics is built upon, and hence reducible to, logic and set theory, a project known
as logicism. Though his ultimate ambition failed, his logicist project forced him to make
profound revisions to the Aristotelian logic still used in Frege’s day.
Frege believed that the ordinary use of language often distorts the reality it
purports to represent. In many philosophical problems precision and accuracy of
expression are crucial for bringing to light what is problematic. Other confusions arise
not merely due to the meanings of words, but by the logical implications of grammar.
These confusions hinder philosophers in their thinking, either because the words and
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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grammar are too vague, are distorted and misrepresented, or keep the logical form of a
sentence from clear view because of some stylistic preference of the community using the
language.
In Phänomenologie des Geistes, Hegel committed one notorious example of
grammatical confusion that drew the scorn of analytic philosophers and did irreparable
damage to Hegel’s reputation. Russell’s commentary on Hegel’s philosophy is
illuminating:
Hegel’s argument in this portion of his ‘Logic’ depends throughout upon
confusing the ‘is’ of predication, as in ‘Socrates is mortal’, with the ‘is’ of identity,
as in ‘Socrates is the philosopher who drank the hemlock.’ Owing to this
confusion, he thinks that ‘Socrates’ and ‘mortal’ must be identical. Seeing that
they are different, he does not infer, as others would, that there is a mistake
somewhere, but that they exhibit ‘identity in difference’. Again, Socrates is
particular, ‘mortal’ is universal. Therefore, he says, since Socrates is mortal, it
follows that the particular is the universal—taking the ‘is’ to be throughout
expressive of identity. But to say ‘the particular is the universal’ is selfcontradictory. Again Hegel does not suspect a mistake but proceeds to synthesize
particular and universal in the individual, or concrete universal. This is an
example of how, for want of care at the start, vast and imposing systems of
philosophy are built upon stupid and trivial confusions, which, but for the almost
incredible fact that they are unintentional, one would be tempted to characterize
as puns. (KEW 49)
To combat such mistakes, Frege develops a lingua characterica, borrowing this term
from Leibniz, consisting of formal symbols (v, &, !, !" #$" %$) that is simultaneously a
calculus ratiocinator.18 Or in other words, a “formal language,” employing symbols void
of any rhetorical adornments,19 modeled on “arithmetic,” that is, operating according to
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definite rules. Frege explains in the Begriffsschrift that such a language has the potential
to counteract the ambiguity of ordinary language:
Wenn es die Aufgabe der Philosophie ist, die Herrschaft des Wortes über den
menschlichen Geist zu brechen, indem sie die Täuschungen aufdeckt, die durch
den Sprachgebrauch über die Beziehungen der Begriffe oft fast unvermeidlich
entstehen, indem sie den Gedanken von denjenigen befreit, womit ihn allein die
Beschaffenheit des sprachlichen Ausdrucksmittels behaftet, so wird meine
Begriffsschrift, für diese Zwecke weiter ausgebildet, den Philosophen ein
brauchbares Werkzeug werden können. (Vorwort vii)
If it is one of the tasks of philosophy to break the domination of the word over the
human spirit by laying bare the misconceptions that through the use of language
often almost unavoidably arise concerning the relations between concepts and by
freeing thought from that with which only the means of expression of ordinary
language, constituted as they are, saddle it, then my ideography, further developed
for these purposes, can become a useful tool for the philosopher. (Preface 7)
The two most significant innovations Frege makes in the Begriffsschrift are the
analysis of propositions into function and argument, rather than subject and predicate,
and, secondly, quantification theory. Distinguishing between subject and predicate is
often grammatically suitable for an ordinary language, such as English or German, but is
inadequate for mathematical statements, explains Frege (Begriffsschrift 3). Since Frege’s
concern was, among other things, providing a logical foundation for mathematics, Frege
is forced to conceive of a different way of distinguishing between parts of a sentence that
is capable of expressing mathematical sentences. Frege thus analyzes sentences into
function and argument by considering the component of a sentence that can be replaced,
while retaining meaning for the whole sentence, the argument. The stable component of
the sentence, on the other hand, is the function. In mathematics, the sentence ‘x!+2’
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symbolizes a function of x; the value of x!+2 is determined by what we replace with the
argument x.20
Frege does not clearly define ‘function’ and ‘argument’ in the Begriffsschrift; this
comes only in later works by Frege. Instead Frege gives a brief explanation of how a
function and argument analysis of a sentence in ordinary language works and then gives
some illustrations. What is important for the sake of this dissertation is that Frege applies
the mathematical notions of function and argument to any objects whatsoever.
Frege begins his analysis of functions in section 9 of the Begriffsschrift. He asks
the reader to assume that “Wassergasstoff leichter als Kohlensäuergas ist” [hydrogen is
lighter than carbon dioxide] (15). When formalized into notation, hydrogen may be
substituted for oxygen or nitrogen, explains Frege. The place occupied in the sentence by
the changeable variable is function, whereas “is lighter than carbon dioxide,” is the
argument. But the function and argument, suggests Frege, can change places by inverting
the sentence to say that ‘being heavier than hydrogen’ is the argument, and carbon
dioxide is the function. What matters is not the grammar of the sentence, but the
“begrifflichen Inhalt” [conceptual content] (3), which remains identical in either
formulation of the sentence. By analyzing the sentence into function and argument, the
various relations between the function and its argument can be demonstrated explicitly,
and inference rules derived from calculus become applicable.
Frege’s introduction of quantification into the realm of logic was equally as
revolutionary to the subject. Aristotelian logic was incapable of expressing sentences
that contained two or more quantifiers such as ‘all’ or ‘some.’ Frege’s theory of
quantification in the Begriffsschrift resolved the ‘problem of multiple generality’ by
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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analyzing a sentence into a single-place function-name, ‘if x is an electron, then x is
negative,’ and a quantifier that binds the variable x, in this case a universal quantifier ‘for
all x,’ according to Glock (29). Hence it becomes possible to express sentences in which
both existential and universal quantifiers apply, such as, ‘For every natural number, there
is a greater number’: (!x)("y)(y#x).21 The result of Frege’s innovations is a logic that is
capable of achieving much greater expressive power than Aristotelian logic.
Frege considers his formal language analogous to the “Sprache des Lebens”
[language of life] in the same way that a microscope is to the naked eye, both to point out
the limitations and illustrate the usefulness of the formal language (Vorwort v). The
human eye, Frege explains, is ‘far superior’ to a microscope because of its ability to
adjust readily to diverse circumstances, but if circumstances demand great precision, the
eye alone will often not suffice. Similarly, explains Frege, the Begriffsschrift is like a
microscope in that it allows for the mind to penetrate ordinary language, revealing what
is otherwise beyond clear comprehension, yet at the same time Frege confesses that for
other purposes the formal language is “unbrauchbar” [inapplicable] (Vorwort v).
Together with his later work, Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik: Eine logischmathematische Untersuchung über den Begriff der Zahl (1884), Frege provides the first
axiomatization of first-order logic and showed that mathematical induction is an
application of logical law. Frege’s approach to logic has become universally adopted
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among logicians thanks in large part to the work of the German logicians David Hilbert
and Kurt Gödel in the 1920s.22
Frege’s work then shifts to the philosophy of language in “Über Sinn und
Bedeutung” (1892) and “Begriff und Gegenstand” (1892). Frege’s philosophy of
language is meant to accompany his system of logic by showing how ordinary language
can be used in the new logic.
Frege’s predicate logic has far reaching implications in the sciences, mathematics,
and formal logic. As Hermann Broch, in his essay “Hofmannsthal und seine Zeit” (1948),
points out, “... wer z.B. wusste damals etwas von der Umwälzung, die sich für alle
wissenschaftliche Grundlagenforschung infolge der Arbeiten eines Gottlob Frege …
vorbereitete?-, geschweige denn dass derartiges zur Kenntnis breiterer Kreise dringt”
(KW 9/1, 36) […who, for example, was aware at the time of the revolution in scientific
axiomatics being prepared in the work of Gottlob Frege … not to mention the fact that
work of this kind penetrates a wider circle of knowledge] (HHT 53). Frege’s logic, as
studied by Wittgenstein and Broch, and taught at universities today, is not only important
for logicians, but is fundamental to academic philosophy, computer science, and serves as
one of the foundational pillars of modern mathematics.
Since logic is concerned with valid reasoning, it is most often limited to the use of
propositions, that is, sentences that claim that something is or is not the case, true or false.
Since many of our sentences used in ordinary language have metaphorical meanings,
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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include some corollary meaning not explicitly stated, are not indicative, or include words
such as colors, which are hopelessly vague, logical notation has its limitations, according
to L.T.F. Gamut (6).23 Wittgenstein admits that his early work, which was heavily
influenced by Frege’s Begriffsschrift, overlooked the diverse ways in which ordinary
language is used in any given culture:
All this, however, can only appear in the right light when one has attained greater
clarity about the concepts of understanding, meaning, and thinking. For it will
then also become clear what can lead us (and did lead me) to think that if anyone
utters a sentence and means or understands it he is operating a calculus according
to definite rules. (PI §81)
Wittgenstein’s point here is that ordinary communication contains more than what a
pristine formal use of language does; and one of the mistakes of the Tractatus,
Wittgenstein suggests, was in failing to see the importance of how a given culture uses
language in common practice. However, when careful, a philosopher trained in logic and
techniques for semantic clarification can use language as a calculus according to definite
rules. This becomes clear not only to those who are trained in employing formal logic,
but also to anyone who has familiarity with the different ways in which formal logic is
applied in telecommunications and computer science.
The British Reception of Analytic Philosophy
Frege’s works received little attention when they were published; it was not until
Bertrand Russell discovered them nearly two decades later that Frege became known
internationally. In “On Denoting (1905)” and Principia Mathematica (1910), Russell
draws heavily from Frege, continuing Frege’s project of reducing mathematics to logic
and relating symbolic logic to ordinary language. Russell, however, discovers a paradox
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in Frege’s concept notation, appropriately named “Russell’s Paradox,” which showed that
some of Frege’s work was flawed. Russell’s work in philosophy of language and logic
elevated Russell to the summit of world reputation among professional philosophers and,
together with Frege, is credited for having invented modern formal logic widely used by
philosophers today.
While Frege may be its founder, Russell and G.E. Moore were the most vocal
early proponents of analytic philosophy. In 1898, Moore presented a paper at a
conference that challenged the then dominant Hegelian and neo-Kantian24 view of
judgment. He argued against a proponent of British idealism, Francis Herbert Bradley,
who believed that the mind-independent world is illusory and a product of our mental
faculties. The idealists believed that conceptual schemata contributed something (it was
not agreed what this something might consist of) to sense perception.
The first analytic philosophers were trained in this tradition of philosophy but
rejected it. Russell was perhaps the most outspoken about his conversion away from
idealism:
It was towards the end of 1898 that Moore and I rebelled against both Kant and
Hegel. Moore led the way, but I followed closely in his footsteps. I think that the
first published account of the new philosophy was Moore’s article in Mind on
‘The Nature of Judgment’. Although neither he nor I would now adhere to all the
doctrines in that article, I, and I think he, would still agree with its negative part -i.e. with the doctrine that fact is in general independent of experience. (MPD 54)
Moore, and later Russell, favored of a form of realism which holds that the world
of our sense data impressions is intimately related to, and more or less corresponds to, the
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mind-independent world.25 Russell would later recall in My Mental Development, that
“with a sense of escaping from prison, we allowed ourselves to think that grass is green,
that the sun and stars would exist if no one was aware of them […]” (4). Russell explains
that his and Moore’s turn in philosophy was an un-doing of Kant’s self-proclaimed
‘Copernican Revolution’26 articulated in the Critique of Pure Reason (1781) and a break
from the Hegelian tradition. Russell introduces a new philosophical schema in the
Principia Mathematica (1910) and Our Knowledge of the External World (1914) that he
believed to be on par with the advancement that Galileo brought to physics.
In a similar empiricist spirit, many analytic philosophers assumed some variant of
another important doctrine forming their conceptual schema, namely, physicalism.
According to this belief, all phenomena and all things that exist do so in physical space.
Yet they are not necessarily material things, since ‘physical’ includes relations between
objects, waves and particles, and forces generated by particles, which are not composed
of matter. Bertrand Russell later describes the empiricist leanings of analytic philosophy,
and the relevance of logic to it, as such:
Modern analytical empiricism [...] differs from that of Locke, Berkeley, and
Hume by its incorporation of mathematics and its development of a powerful
logical technique. It is thus able, in regard to certain problems, to achieve definite
answers, which have the quality of science rather than of philosophy. It has the
advantage, as compare with the philosophies of the system-builders, of being able
to tackle its problems one at a time, instead of having to invent at one stroke a
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block theory of the whole universe. Its methods, in this respect, resemble those of
science. I have no doubt that, in so far as philosophical knowledge is possible, it is
by such methods that it must be sought; I have also no doubt that, by these
methods, many ancient problems are completely soluble. (HWP 834)
Meanwhile, in 1906, the seventeen-year-old Ludwig Wittgenstein enrolled in the
engineering program at Berlin’s Technische Hochschule in Charlottenburg upon the
encouragement of his father. In 1908, Wittgenstein transfers to the University of
Manchester, in England, where he reads Russell’s Principia Mathematica and Frege’s
Die Grundlage der Arithmetik. Wittgenstein’s curiosity about airplane propellers and
engines shifts to finding an answer to Russell’s Paradox and to the foundations of
mathematics and logic.
In 1911, Wittgenstein travels to Jena, Germany, to speak with Frege about Frege’s
work. After some correspondence, Frege suggests that Wittgenstein study with Russell in
Cambridge. Wittgenstein goes to Cambridge in October of that year and shows up unannounced at Russell’s office while Russell is having tea with a friend. Russell describes
the encounter in a letter:
[…] an unknown German appeared, speaking very little English but refusing to
speak German. He turned out to be a man who had learned engineering at
Charlottenburg, but during his course had acquired by himself, a passion for the
philosophy of mathematics and has now come to Cambridge on purpose to hear
me. (Schroeder 1)
The next day: “My German engineer, I think, is a fool. He thinks nothing
empirical is knowable - I asked him to admit that there was not a rhinoceros in the room,
but he wouldn’t” (Schroeder 1).
Russell and Wittgenstein were to develop a close, but at times, contested
friendship. According to Russell, Wittgenstein was the
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most perfect example of a genius traditionally conceived, passionate, profound,
intense, and dominating. […] He used to come to see me every evening at
midnight, and pace up and down the room like a wild beast for three hours in
agitated silence. Once I said to him: 'Are you thinking about logic, or about your
sins?’ ‘Both’, he replied, and continued his pacing. I did not like to suggest it was
time for bed, for it seemed probable both to him and to me that on leaving me he
would commit suicide. (ABR 329)27
Though Wittgenstein and Russell worked productively together, their
disagreements were frequent sources of tension. Wittgenstein’s criticism of Russell’s
epistemology in an unpublished rough draft of The Theory of Knowledge led Russell to
the brink of suicide. Wittgenstein’s criticism was relentless and led Russell to doubt
whether he (Russell) was competent enough to do fundamental work in philosophy ever
again. In a letter to Ottoline Morel, 1916:
Do you remember that at the time when you were seeing Vittoz I wrote a lot of
stuff about the theory of knowledge, which Wittgenstein criticised with the
greatest severity? His criticism, tho’ I don't think you realised it at the time, was
an event of first-rate importance in my life, and affected everything I have done
since. I saw that he was right, and I saw that I could not hope ever again to do
fundamental work in philosophy. My impulse was shattered, like a wave dashed
to pieces against a breakwater. I became filled with utter despair, and tried to turn
to you for consolation. (ABR 282)
Although Russell was to abandon his work on The Theory of Knowledge he, in
consultation with Wittgenstein, was to write Our Knowledge of the External World in
1914, the year Wittgenstein left Cambridge, which became very influential in the Vienna
Circle and which Broch read closely.
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The philosophical agenda of “logical atomism,” which Russell introduced and
promoted for two decades before denouncing some of its core tenets, was incorporated
(though modified in important ways) into the Wittgenstein’s Tractatus. Logical atomism
was both a methodology for doing philosophy and a set of metaphysical assumptions.
According to logical atomism the world consists of a plurality of independent facts
consisting of objects (or “particulars”) that stand in relation to one another; these facts are
complexes composed of more “atomic” facts. Atomic facts, according to Russell and the
logical positivists of the Vienna Circle, though not necessarily Wittgenstein (see next
page), are the smallest pieces of possible sense data that are not constructed by more
essential constituents. The goal of logical atomism as a method of philosophical inquiry
was to provide the most basic vocabulary for all of the sciences by using wholly
determinate nouns that denote the most basic (atomic) impressions of sense data, and
their properties and relations; then to reconstruct complex facts from this precise
language by using the logical inference rules of formal logic.
So, ‘Bob’ is not a fact, but ‘Bob drinks Guinness’ is; it shows what relation Bob
has to Guinness; such facts are atomic facts. Atomic facts can be combined by a logical
operator to form a molecular proposition. If we combine the atomic fact ‘Bob drinks
Guinness’ with a second atomic fact ‘Michael drinks Hefeweizen,’ we have the
molecular proposition ‘Bob drinks Guinness and Michael drinks Hefeweizen’. Thus the
metaphysics of logical atomism is sometimes referred to as ‘Lego-metaphysics,’
emphasizing the various ways in which Legos can be combined with another to create
more complex structures, or, on the contrary, reduced into simpler structures.
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The problem that plagues logical atomism is determining what exactly the
“simples” are that comprised the fully analyzed atomic sentence. Russell speculates at
one point that they are the smallest possible sense data impressions. Wittgenstein,
however, did not endorse this view and instead left it to physicists to determine; his
concern was only with the structure of atomic and molecular propositions, not the nature
of their constituents. Under pressure from criticism, Russell later acknowledges that
there need not be an ultimately simple object, but rather a “relatively simple” object,
gleaned only by contrasting the simpler atomic proposition against a more complex
proposition from which it was reduced: “This conception can be applied without
assuming that there is anything absolutely simple. We can define as ‘relatively simple’
whatever we do not know to be complex. Results obtained using the concept of ‘relative
simplicity’ will still be true if complexity is afterwards found, provided we have
abstained from asserting absolute simplicity” (HKSL 259). Vital to this endeavor was the
rejection of the subject-predicate syllogistic logic inherited from Aristotle and still
employed by all other schools of philosophy (besides logical positivism), which Russell
calls “trivial nonsense” and which he credits for leading to all of the metaphysical
confusions of the philosophical idealism of Kant and Hegel (KEW 43, 45).
In the preface, Russell credits his “friend Mr. Ludwig Wittgenstein” for revealing
to him “vitally important discoveries […] in pure logic [which are] not yet published” as
of 1914 (KEW 9). These “discoveries” appear in Wittgenstein’s notes on logic, which he
later develops into the Tractatus. Russell adopts Frege’s system of formal notation and
pursues the philosophical implication of it beyond Frege’s original conceived usage of it.
By no longer having to treat the surface grammar of a sentence as the sole indication of
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the statement’s real form, Russell sees the task of philosophy as re-expressing statements
into logical notation which allows the philosopher to see what is ‘really’ at stake in a
statement. By doing so the philosopher can analyze away pseudo-philosophical problems
and “clear away incredible accumulations of metaphysical lumber” (Russell KEW 42).
Russell’s style of analysis, as decompositional and transformative, is demonstrated most
famously in his theory of descriptions.28
Bertrand Russell’s Our Knowledge of the External World (1914)
Similar to his heroes Spinoza and Leibniz, Russell attempted to construct a
system of the world. Unlike the earlier empiricists who relied on sensory experience to
build their theoretical understanding of the world, or the rationalists who began their
reasoning with metaphysical doctrines and deduced general principles, Russell chose a
middle ground that accounts for both. Russell believed that neither sensory experience
nor a priori reasoning should provide philosophers with their starting point but instead
physical sciences; for these areas of thought, although corrigible and susceptible to
falsification, are nonetheless the most epistemologically secure, according to Russell.
In the first chapter of the book, Russell delineates three trends current in
philosophy in his day. The first he refers to as the classical tradition of philosophy which
traces its origins back to Plato, but whose primary advocates in modern philosophy were
the idealists Kant and Hegel. Russell explains that his contemporary advocates of this
tradition “are, in the main, those whose extra-philosophical knowledge is literary, rather
than those who have felt the inspiration of science” (15). Russell is implying that the
idealists are not well-read in serious topics, and, further, that their world-view was
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fanciful, a product of their fruitful imaginations and intuitions, but incapable of
accounting for the facts of observed phenomena.
Russell explains that the classical tradition is still prevalent in his day, but is
beginning to wane. This decline is not only because there are “reasoned arguments,”
which according to Russell, call into question its validity, but also “certain general
intellectual forces against it--the same general forces which are breaking down the other
great syntheses of the past” (15). The impulse for this tradition, according to Russell,
was originally the “naïve faith” of the Greek philosophers in the “omnipotence of
reasoning.” The apparent universal application of geometry, which the Greeks
discovered, inspired them to “prove” that the world of sense data is illusory, and that all
reality is one, explains Russell. The confidence the Greeks had in these surprising
conclusions was derived from their unshakable trust in the process of their reasoning.
In the middle ages, the classical tradition was continued by theological
philosophers who often appealed to the authority of tradition to reinforce their arguments.
In modern philosophy, beginning with Descartes, explains Russell, philosophers in the
classical tradition became independent of the authoritative figures of the past, but
nevertheless remained committed to the same Aristotelian logic used since antiquity.
Besides the British empiricists (Locke, et al.), philosophers were still confident that a
priori reasoning could bring to light unknown secrets (a reality) about the world that were
altogether different from what our direct perceptions of objects would seem to indicate.
Russell identifies this as the central belief of the classical tradition and the main
hindrance of promoting a “scientific attitude in philosophy” (16).
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To illustrate his point, Russell gives an example of an argument from a leading
contemporary British representative of this tradition, Francis Herbert Bradley. In
Appearance and Reality (1893), Bradley dismisses all that he refers to as appearance-this includes objects, relations between objects, space and time, etc.--as unreal, in favor
of what alone is real, which is a timeless, indivisible, whole, which Bradley calls the
‘Absolute.’ The Absolute is not comprised of souls or thoughts, but is nevertheless
something mystical. Bradley arrives at his conclusion by, according to Russell, “abstract
logical reasoning professing to find self-contradictions in the categories condemned as
mere appearance and to leave no tenable alternative to the kind of Absolute which is
finally affirmed to be real” (20). Russell responds to Bradley’s argument first by
suggesting that its aim is to cause “bewilderment” rather than genuine philosophical
conviction because there is a greater possibility for error in Bradley’s method of “subtle,
abstract and difficult argument” than for error concerning such a commonsensical fact as
the “interrelatedness of things in the world” (18). Russell is implying here that while it
may be possible that our perceptions of the interrelatedness of objects are erroneous, our
reasons for accepting our sensory perceptions at face value are more persuasive, at least
to Russell, than the murky arguments in favor of their illusory nature.
Rather than sustaining a detailed argument against the classical tradition of
philosophy, Russell instead appeals to the history of science which, according to Russell,
“with our methods of experiment and observation, our knowledge of the long history of a
priori errors refuted by empirical science, it has become natural to suspect a fallacy in
any deduction of which the conclusion appears to contradict patent facts” (18). Hence
Russell appears to have some sympathy for what he refers to as the “mystical impulse,”
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which he says inspires the idealist, but points out the unreliability of its methods of
inquiry. Russell makes this explicit a few pages later:
On the reality or unreality of the mystic’s world I know nothing. I have no wish
to deny it, nor even to declare that the insight which reveals it is not a genuine
insight. What I do wish to maintain […] is that insight, untested and unsupported,
is an insufficient guarantee of truth. (31)
What is a sufficient guarantee of truth for Russell is empirical verification; this
‘scientific outlook,’ Russell believes, has for most educated people become a ‘habit of
mind.’ It is this materialistic viewpoint or attitude, rather than argument, which is
leading to the demise of the classical tradition of philosophy, according to Russell.
The second school of philosophy current in Russell’s day is what Russell calls
Darwinism, which Herbert Spencer initiated by extrapolating on Darwin’s scientific
theory of evolution. This school was promoted with greater effectiveness, according to
Russell, by Spencer’s successors William James and Henri Bergson than Spencer himself.
Russell explains that evolutionism is the “prevailing creed of our time,” infusing politics,
literature, and philosophy (21). According to Russell, the phases of its development in
philosophy are represented by Nietzsche, pragmatism, and Bergson, but its widespread
acceptance outside of academia shows that evolutionism resonates with the “spirit of the
age.” By founding itself upon natural science (particularly biology), philosophical
evolutionism sees itself, according to Russell, as the cure for the “dogmatic authority” of
medieval philosophical systems, likewise for the dependence on “ratiocinative authority”
of the Greeks. While Russell suggests that it is easy to sympathize with such a
philosophical system, it overlooks what is “vital to a true understanding” of the world
(21).
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Russell’s primary objection to this school of philosophy is that it takes biology as
the model for science. Evolution shows that species are in flux and that there is not a
clear boundary between categories of life since one species can trace its gradual
development from some prior, more primitive, life form. By accepting biology as the
science upon which to model philosophy, the philosopher falsely assumes, according to
Russell, that there are no stable generalizations and fixed principles, and that there is a
“law of development” towards an ideal (22).
The attitude of the evolutionist philosophers was shaped by the impressions of the
flux and change of biological life to such an extent that they rejected any kind of
“mechanical view of the course of nature” which, according the Russell, the physical
sciences, particularly physics, seem to impose (23). The error of the evolutionist
philosophers lies then, according to Russell, in their sweeping rejection of the laws of
physics, and the “apparatus of logic, with its fixed concepts, its general principles, and its
reasonings which seem to compel even the most unwilling assent” (23). Russell’s
objection consists of two points; the first is that this evolutionistic philosophy is not
corroborated by the “facts of evolution” which have been observed scientifically. The
second of Russell’s objections is that this kind of philosophy is not really philosophy as
Russell conceives it because the “motives and interests” that serve as its impetus are
exclusively practical and the questions with which it is concerned are contingent instead
of general. Hence this school of philosophy ‘never really touches’ on any of the
problems that constitute genuine philosophy. It is thus on the one hand “not
philosophical, but only a hasty generalization” and on the other “not scientific, but a mere
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unsupported dogma, belonging to philosophy by its subject-matter, but in no way
deducible from the facts upon which evolutionism [as a science] relies” (27).
In replace of these two schools of philosophy which Russell describes, he
advocates taking a different posture towards philosophical questions than what has
previously been taken. Instead of following the mystical impulse of classical (idealist)
tradition, or the self-interested and partial attitude of the evolutionists, Russell suggests
that philosophy should become “scientific” which consists of a “disinterested intellectual
curiosity” which characterizes the person of science. Russell is explicit in his
endorsement of this scientific/mathematical turn in philosophy and compares it favorably
to the advance that “was introduced into physics by Galileo” which consists of
“piecemeal, detailed” analysis with “verifiable results” instead of “large untested
generalities recommended only by a certain appeal to imagination” (14). Russell is
implying here that our imagination and intuition are useful in supplying us with a sense
of knowledge of certain aspects of our contingent experience with the world, but when
this intuitive knowledge is allowed to encroach into our dispassionate and intellectual
deliberations of theoretical truths, our vision becomes blurred. Just as a biologist or
physicist may examine questions pertaining to their fields of inquiry without considering
what their personal attitude toward a particular finding may be, or whether a contingent
arrangement of facts is beautiful or has ethical implications, so too the philosopher must
leave aside these considerations if philosophical progress is going to be made, according
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to Russell. Feelings and attitudes, he maintains, should not be elevated to the status of
philosophical creed.29
Russell proceeds in his next chapter, “Logic as the Essence of Philosophy,” to
describe what he believes should be the aims and methods of philosophy by emphasizing
the role the new mathematical logic plays in analysis. He first explains the syllogistic
logic of Aristotle continued among some in his day is obsolete and that “all vigorous
minds that have concerned themselves with inference have abandoned” syllogistic logic
and have broadened the scope of logic (33). The first extension was the inductive method
of investigation developed by Bacon and Galileo, which, according to Russell, remains
important as it relates to investigation but should play no role in a “perfected science”
other than as the means that enables deduction to occur (34). The method of induction, in
the sense in which Russell is referring to it, consists of observing empirical events and
inferring from that experience a conclusion that is supported by the observation. But
since the empirical evidence alone is used in support of the conclusion, the inference
made in light of the evidence cannot be proven to be true aside from an appeal to the
evidence. That is to say, Russell explains, that there exists no non-circular way in which
the inductive conclusion is to be proven, since appealing directly to the evidence is how
the inductive conclusion was drawn in the first place. Hence there exists no logical
principle upon which inductive conclusions can be guaranteed to be valid. And since
observations of past events do not ensure continued occurrences of those same events, the
inductive method is only useful in providing a degree of probability of its conclusion
which increases with a greater number of observations of the same event (such as the
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Russell suggests this in his essay “Mysticism and Logic,” Mysticism and Logic: and other essays (New
York: Longmans, Green and co., 1918). His exact words: “[…] mysticism is to be commended as an
attitude toward life, not as a creed about the world” (11).
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high probability of the sun rising tomorrow which is inferred from the numerous times
this has occurred in the past). Knowledge of logic, explains Russell, is not derived from
experience alone, as the empiricists would have it, instead it must be derived a priori
from mathematics (37).
After dispelling, in Russell’s view, the fallacious philosophy of logic of Hegel and
his followers, who, though claiming to reject traditional subject/predicate logic,
nonetheless assumes it in much of their theorizing, Russell begins a discussion of the
origins of a modern logic. He credits Leibniz, and later Boole, for seeing the importance
of mathematics for logic, but little was achieved in mathematical logic, according to
Russell, until Frege and Giuseppe Peano. Their work showed the traditional view that the
propositions “Socrates is mortal” and “All men are mortal” were of the same form to be
false. Instead, with an understanding of mathematical logic these propositions can be
shown to have a different form from one another. Failure to recognize this difference led
many philosophers, according to Russell, to develop fallacious theories on the “whole
study of the forms of judgment and inference, […] the relations of things to their qualities,
of concrete existence to abstract concepts, and of the world of experience to the world of
Platonic ideas” (50).
Russell begins his discussion of the philosophical application of mathematical
logic by distinguishing between various forms of propositions. Every proposition has a
form, a way in which it is put together. The forms of the propositions “Socrates is
mortal,” “The sun is hot,” or “Jones is angry” are the same, explains Russell. Their form
is preserved by the word “is,” even though their constituents change in each case. By
contrast, explains Russell, the propositions “Socrates was an Athenian,” “Socrates

!

&+

married Xantippe,” and “Socrates drank hemlock,” have different forms even though the
constituent ‘Socrates’ remains in all three. What is important to philosophy, according to
Russell, is not the constituents, but the forms of propositions, which can be known apart
from knowing the truth of the constituents. It is the task of philosophical logic to make
the logical form of sentences explicit and pure, since it is the form alone that is important
in inference. For instance, Russell gives an example, in the sentence “Socrates was a
man, all men are mortal, therefore Socrates is mortal,” the general form which underlies
this sentence is “If a thing has a certain property, and whatever has this property has a
certain other property, then the thing in question also has that other property” (53).
But before a study of inference from one proposition to another can be conducted,
an understanding of a single proposition itself must be attained. It is at this point that
Russell most adamantly rejects the traditional (Aristotelian) logic, which fallaciously
holds that all propositions are of the subject-predicate form. Assuming that all
propositions are of the subject-predicate form, that is, that every “fact consists of some
thing having some quality,” has rendered “most philosophers incapable of giving any
account of the world of science and of daily life” (55). Instead most philosophers of the
day, explains Russell, were more determined to dismiss the real world as an illusion in
favor of some kind of higher Reality that is only conceived of while one is in a mystical
mood. But once this mystical mood subsides, according to Russell, these philosophers
will search for a rational defense of their mystical insight. Their search is not in a candid
and dispassionate way, but in a way that already assumes the truth of the matter in
question, preventing them from accepting the reality of relations, that is, of propositions
not of the subject/predicate form (56).
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Russell explains that the view of logic that admits of only subject/predicate
propositions can be refuted in a number of different ways. One way is by admitting of
asymmetrical relations. In explaining the significance of relations, Russell distinguishes
between two classifications in order for this problem to be made clear.
The first classification is between symmetrical, asymmetrical, and nonsymmetrical relations. The second classification is between transitive, intransitive, and
non-transitive. After making these classifications Russell explains their significance as it
relates to refuting the philosophy of logic held by the other traditions of philosophy:
But when we come to asymmetrical relations, such as before and after, greater
and less, etc., the attempt to reduce them to properties becomes obviously
impossible. When, for example, two things are merely known to be unequal,
without our knowing which is greater, we may say that the inequality results from
their having different magnitudes, because inequality is a symmetrical relation;
but to say that when one thing is greater than another, and not merely unequal to it,
that means that they have different magnitudes, is formally incapable of
explaining the facts. For if the other thing had been greater than the one, the
magnitudes would also have been different, though the fact to be explained would
not have been the same. Thus mere difference of magnitude is not all that is
involved, since, if it were, there would be no difference between one thing being
greater than another, and the other being greater than the one. We shall have to
say that the one magnitude is greater than the other, and thus we shall have failed
to get rid of the relation “greater.” In short, both possession of the same property
and possession of different properties are symmetrical relations, and therefore
cannot account for the existence of asymmetrical relations. (59)
After Russell makes his argument for the existence of relations that are not of the
subject/predicate form, and for the non-illusory nature of the external world, Russell
proceeds to introduce some of the fundamentals of logical atomism.30 Russell first
defines a proposition as a “form of words which must either be true or false” (62). A
proposition that asserts that a thing has a certain property, or stands in a certain relation to
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Russell calls his philosophy ‘logical atomism’ in the first chapter of Our Knowledge of the External
World. Logical atomism is developed and expanded in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus and later by Rudolph
Carnap in Der logische Aufbau der Welt: Scheinprobleme in der Philosophie (1928), (Hamburg: F. Meiner,
1961), both of which Hermann Broch read closely.
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another thing, is called an “atomic proposition” (62). Atomic propositions may have an
infinite number of forms since the atomic facts to which the proposition refers are
likewise capable of being an infinite number of things. An atomic proposition—the
examples given by Russell are “this is red” or “this is before that”—can only be known
empirically. Hence it is through sense perception that we come to know atomic facts, and
at this stage of knowledge logic is of no use. The two poles that present themselves in
this view, according to Russell, are pure logic, known a priori, and atomic facts, known
empirically.
Russell uses the term “atomic” because atomic propositions fit into what Russell
calls “molecular propositions” in the same way that atoms fit into molecules. These
propositions use conjunctions such as “if, and, or, unless, etc.” Russell uses the example
“If it rains, I shall bring my umbrella.” In this sentence two propositions are connected
together and it is only by doing this, explains Russell, that an inference is possible (63).
Thus if we confirm the first proposition empirically, that is, we see that it is raining, we
can infer the second proposition.
The next kinds of propositions that Russell discusses are “general propositions.”
These kinds of propositions include those that begin with ‘all’ or ‘some.’ Russell
already explained that from atomic facts it is possible theoretically to infer all possible
truths so long as one knew that there existed no other atomic facts than the ones he knows.
But it is not possible to know universal propositions such as “All men are mortal” from
logical inference from atomic propositions since it is not possible to know all men and
that there are no men which are unknown to you. Hence general truths cannot be known
through inference but must instead be taken as “self-evident,” according to Russell.
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Since all particular truths are contingent upon empirical evidence, knowledge of general
truths (if there is to be such a thing) must exist independent of empirical evidence, that is,
sense data (67).
Russell concludes that the old empiricists’ belief that all knowledge is derived
from experience is false, instead that some general truths exist which are not inferred
from sense data, but that are “primitive” (68). Russell believes that many logical truths
are of this kind; he appeals to the aforementioned example: “If anything has a certain
property, and whatever has this property has a certain other property, then the thing in
question has the other property” (69). The truth of this proposition lies wholly in its form
and has no basis in empirical experience, according to Russell. A “truly scientific”
discussion of philosophical problems is now possible, according to Russell, when logical
investigation is conducted in two ways. The first is by examining the actual propositions
which we form through sense perception and inference, the second is the investigation
into the general forms of logical truths.
Traditional philosophers have failed, according to Russell, by not having an
appropriate inventory of logical forms. According to Russell, “the old logic put thought
in fetters, while the new logic gives it wings” (68). We are now, Russell explains, able to
see what problems are capable of being solved by philosophers, and which ones remain
indissoluble.
In the following chapters, Russell offers a more thorough refutation of those
philosophies, which deny the existence of the mind-independent world, or assert that it is
illusory. Then Russell proceeds to explain the role of physics and sense data in
philosophy.
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Russell’s book became very influential among analytic philosophers and defines
much of what is often thought of by contemporary analytic philosophers as ‘early-stage’
analytic philosophy.31 As we will see in chapter two of this work, the qualification
‘early-stage’ is necessary to distinguish between analytic philosophy before the blow in
the 1950s delivered to Russell’s logical atomism and the logical positivism of the Vienna
Circle which Russell inspired by the analytic philosophers Willard V.O. Quine and
Ludwig Wittgenstein, changing the course of analytic philosophy. While Frege and
Russell are the two most prominent figures in the development of predicate logic and its
connection to language and sense data, Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus
(1921) explores the implications of these discoveries for philosophy more generally.
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1921)
The Tractatus has been accepted into the philosophical canon in spite of the fact
that it was rejected by all the publishers Wittgenstein originally submitted it to for nearly
four years before it was published in 1921 (Schroeder 22). These rejections were likely
because of the abstruse style in which it is written.
A short book of fewer than one hundred pages, the Tractatus contains seven
primary statements, of which six are followed with truncated statements relating back to,
or expanding upon, a prior statement. The truncated style of Wittgenstein’s writing
provided enough of a hermeneutical difficulty that even Frege and Russell, those most
learned in the subject matter of the Tractatus, did not grasp Wittgenstein’s thoughts
clearly. Wittgenstein sent a copy of the manuscript to Frege, but complained that Frege
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did not ‘understand a word of it’ (CL 124). Likewise, Wittgenstein’s response to
Russell’s introduction to the Tractatus, was one of derision, “I’m afraid you haven’t got a
hold of my main contention” (CL 71). Though critical of Frege’s and Russell’s readings
of the Tractatus, Wittgenstein nonetheless credits them in the preface for having
influenced it: “To the great works of Frege and the writings of my friend Bertrand
Russell I owe in large measure the stimulation of my thoughts” (TLP 4).
One of the ways in which Wittgenstein’s philosophy is different from that of
Russell’s is Wittgenstein’s conception of logical atomism. The atomic theory in physics
showed that matter was divisible into discrete units (atoms) that function together in
forming larger objects; instead of applying this notion to epistemology, as Russell did,
Wittgenstein applies it to language and meaning. Wittgenstein’s task in the Tractatus
was to show how the meanings of words and sentences are divisible into atoms analogous
to the way in which physical objects are.
Like Frege and Russell, Wittgenstein was a critic of those still relying on
Aristotelian logic (Sorrell and Rogers 9). Yet, according to Thomas Ricketts,
Wittgenstein also dismisses the universalist conception of logic32 held by Russell and
Frege (PLW 59). The universalist position holds that all objects, properties, and relations
fall under the domain of logical inference rules when given the appropriate vocabulary.
In this view there is only one world of discourse and any varying interpretations of a
statement are either confusions about the semantics of the statement or should be reexpressed as a distinct statement separate from the competing interpretation. Frege
thinks this because the very notion of quantification (‘for all x,’ or ‘for at least one x’)
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already implies a discrete meaning of the subject and predicate to which the quantifier
applies. The framework of predicate logic, according to Frege, encompasses all factual
thought, and there are no truths but factual truths, hence all truths fall under the scope of
logical analysis (“PLW” 60-61). Frege’s work, then, was to find a way in which all
statements of premises were made entirely explicit in order to show the inference rules
that lead to any particular conclusion; symbolic notation was his way to do this. Thus the
limit of predicate logic, in the universalist view of Frege and Russell, is only the limit of
our possible sense data (i.e., phenomena) upon which we formulate our sentences.
Frege and Russell believed that logical axioms themselves were a science, known
to be true by virtue of their general application, and were rooted in the sentence as a
rendition of reality (“PLW” 60-61). Wittgenstein rejects this position in an early letter to
Russell; “Logic must turn out to be of a totally different kind than another science” (CL
15). Wittgenstein states in the Tractatus that the sentences of logic communicate nothing
other than tautologies (6.1). This is a dismissal of Frege’s and Russell’s view that logical
truths—e.g., all bachelors are single men—are derived from clearly defined axioms and
do in fact add to our knowledge. Instead of representing a general principle that can
apply to sentences, logical axioms merely show, according to Wittgenstein, the way in
which parts of a sentence relate to other parts of a sentence in order for the sentence to be
coherent by virtue of a mental picture being possible that represents the sentences
(6.13).33
Thus logic, in the Tractarian picture theory, amounts to the arrangement of
atomic facts in a mental picture, which corresponds to the arrangement of atomic
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statements in a sentence. Yet Wittgenstein agrees with Frege that “Nur der Satz hat Sinn;
nur im Zusammenhang des Satzes hat ein Name Bedeutung” [“Only the proposition has
sense; only in the context of a proposition has a name meaning.”] (3.3). This is a denial
of Russell’s notion of a direct correspondence between a name and the object that the
name denotes, independent of context. Thus it is only when the arrangement of words
within a proposition coordinate in such a way as to evoke a mental picture that conveys
some possible arrangement of facts, that a statement can be said to have a valid logical
structure; this is Wittgenstein’s version of referentialism: “Was jedes Bild, welcher Form
immer, mit der Wirklichkeit gemein haben muss, um sie überhaupt—richtig oder
falsch—abbilden zu können, ist die logische Form, das ist, die Form der Wirklichkeit”
[“What every picture, of whatever form, must have in common with reality in order to be
able to represent it at all—rightly or falsely—is the logical form, that is, the form of
reality.”] (2.18).
Hence atomic statements and the logical structure of a sentence, according to
Wittgenstein, are imposed upon the sentence by the limitations of our ability to conceive
mental pictures and communicate them meaningfully. While names symbolize objects,
logic symbolizes the form of a proposition. Thus, logic limits thought and speech to
phenomena, because only phenomena have sense; it is the guiding limitation of
meaningful discourse that demarcates the boundary between what can be said in
proposition and what cannot; it is the “Form der Abbildung” [“pictorial form”] and the
form of the sentence that represents that ‘picture’ (2.17). Logic is the symbolic
representation of the form of the picture, whereas the picture shows its form (4.041).
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This explains why Wittgenstein’s conception of logic is not universalist, as Frege
and Russell see it, namely, because the form of representation is not itself a fact (2.0),
which the universalist conception of a logical axioms purports it to be. Wittgenstein
further suggests that our language is capable of expressing all conceivable facts.
Prima facie it appears as if Wittgenstein envisions the work of the philosopher as
that of giving a general description of the facts, and the relations between facts, that make
up the world:
Die richtige Methode der Philosophie wäre eigentlich die: Nichts zu sagen, als
was sich sagen lässt, also Sätze der Naturwissenschaft - also etwas, was mit
Philosophie nichts zu tun hat -, und dann immer, wenn ein anderer etwas
Metaphysisches sagen wollte, ihm nachzuweisen, dass er gewissen Zeichen in
seinen Sätzen keine Bedeutung gegeben hat. (6.53)
The correct method in philosophy would really be the following: to say nothing
except what can be said, i.e. propositions of natural science--something that has
nothing to do with philosophy--and then, whenever someone else wanted to say
something metaphysical, to demonstrate to him that he had failed to give a
meaning to certain signs in his proposition. (6.53)
If we carry 6.53 to its logical conclusion, the philosopher is one who either speaks about
scientific things only, or criticizes people for not restricting their speech to scientific
language. The attentive reader will now see the contradiction in Wittgenstein’s
reasoning; on the one hand he is claiming that non-scientific propositions are “unsinnig”
[nonsense], yet in saying this he too is saying nonsense. Scholars widely disagree on
what the ramifications of Wittgenstein’s conception of ‘nonsense’ are.
According to one group of scholars the Tractatus should be read as having a body
that is composed of nonsense, surrounded by a preface and final remarks that serve as a
frame conveying Wittgenstein’s genuine thoughts. One of the passages cited in defense
of this view is not from the Tractatus, but a letter written by Wittgenstein to the editor of
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the Tractatus published posthumously: “I would recommend to you to read the preface
and the conclusion, because they contain the most direct expression of the point of the
book” (CL 111). The nonsensical body, in this interpretation, intends to show what must
be disregarded as unintelligible; this interpretation was coined by Cora Diamond, one of
its proponents, as the ‘resolute’ interpretation.34 ‘Resolute,’ in the sense used here,
suggests Wittgenstein’s assertion that the propositions in his Tractatus are nonsensical is
to be taken literally, meaning that they are ridiculous, not to be taken seriously. The
resolute interpreters emphasize Wittgenstein’s ladder analogy in the final comments of
the Tractatus:
Meine Sätze erläutern dadurch, dass sie der, welcher mich versteht, am Ende als
unsinnig erkennt,wenn er durch sie - auf ihnen - über sie hinausgestiegen ist. (Er
muss sozusagen die Leiter wegwerfen, nachdem er auf ihr hinaufgestiegen ist.) Er
muss diese Sätze überwinden, dann sieht er die Welt richtig. (6.54)
My propositions serve as elucidations in the following way: anyone who
understands me eventually recognizes them as nonsensical, when he has used
them--as steps--to climb up beyond them. (He must, so to speak, throw away the
ladder after he has climbed up it.) He must transcend these propositions, and then
he will see the world aright. (6.54)
According to the resolute interpretation, Wittgenstein’s intent is to show what
philosophy would amount to if it were to be restricted to merely the propositions of
science, the main point being that philosophy cannot be done when it is delimited by such
stringent means. The doctrines the Tractatus appears to endorse at first glance, would, in
this interpretation, be exposed as nonsense, and the attentive reader of the Tractatus is
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relieved, therapeutically, of any illusions of rigor the body of the Tractatus has
(Schroeder 106).
But the resolute interpretation of the Tractatus is a minority viewpoint and
appears to be contradicted by other statements Wittgenstein makes in the Tractatus and
elsewhere. The traditional, or mainstream interpretation,35 whose case I find more
compelling, is that even though a sentence may not have a ‘sense’ according to the
picture theory (4.031) it still may be useful, not mere gibberish as the resolute interpreters
believe. Hence we can take Wittgenstein’s propositions regarding language and logic as
genuinely ‘elucidatory,’ as he calls them in 6.54, therefore worthy of being taken
seriously, or ‘climbing up.’ But if we are to discover anything about ethics, religion,
metaphysics--things that are of great philosophical interest--we must look elsewhere
other than in the language of scientific propositions, according to the Tractatus.
Wittgenstein appears to endorse this position in a letter to Russell:
Now I’m afraid you haven’t really got hold of my main contention, to which the
whole business of logical propositions is only a corollary. The main point is the
theory of what can be said by propositions --i.e. by language--(and, which comes
to the same, what can be thought) and what cannot be expressed by propositions,
but only shown; which, I believe, is the cardinal problem of philosophy. (CL 124)
Russell wrote the introduction to the Tractatus which emphasizes the implications
Wittgenstein’s picture theory of language and logic have for the sciences, making it seem
as if restricting philosophy to the clarification of scientific propositions was
Wittgenstein’s primary concern. But Wittgenstein rejects Russell’s interpretation. In
Vermischte Bemerkungen [Culture and Value], Wittgenstein appears to compensate for
Russell’s emphasis on restricting language to scientific propositions: “Scheue Dich ja
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nicht davor, Unsinn zu redden! Nur mu"t Du auf Deinen Unsinn lauschen” [“Don’t for
heaven’s sake, be afraid of talking nonsense! Only don’t fail to pay attention to your
nonsense”] (64). And even more so: “In den Tälern der Dummheit wächst für den
Philosophen noch immer mehr Gras, als auf den Kahlen Höhen der Gescheitheit” [“The
valleys of foolishness have more grass growing in them for the philosopher than do the
barren heights of cleverness”] (92). Wittgenstein’s criticism of Russell and his refusal to
identify himself with the philosophy of the Vienna Circle suggest that he views
positivistic philosophy as un-interesting or ill-conceived, and that his interest is more for
existential philosophy and the life of the mind.36
The strict bipolarity of language suggested by the picture theory of meaning has
important implications for ethics. Wittgenstein calls ethical propositions nonsensical,
since no picture can be formed that corresponds to them. What is good or right can only
be shown by virtue of consequences, not stated explicitly: “In der Welt ist alles, wie es ist,
und geschieht alles, wie es geschieht; es gibt in ihr keinen Wert - und wenn es ihn gäbe,
so hätte er keinen Wert” [“In the world everything is as it is, and everything happens as it
does happen: in it no value exists—and if it did exist, it would have no value”] (6.41).
Wittgenstein, however, should not be read as a nihilist; value may not exist in the
world, that is, in physical space, but this does not mean that value does not exist
elsewhere. Wittgenstein explains that ethical value is known only solipsistically, not
expressible in any statement of fact. Further, he maintains, that it becomes clear only in
light of actions the consequences of which affect the mind in various ways:
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One might object by pointing out that Wittgenstein devotes considerable attention to the philosophy of
mathematics upon his return to Cambridge. Nonetheless, Wittgenstein’s interest in the mind and ordinary
life permeate much of his future work.

!

(-

Der erste Gedanke bei der Aufstellung eines ethischen Gesetzes von der Form
»Du sollst....« ist: Und was dann, wenn ich es nicht tue? Es ist aber klar, dass die
Ethik nichts mit Strafe und Lohn im gewöhnlichen Sinne zu tun hat. Also muss
diese Frage nach den Folgen einer Handlung belanglos sein. - Zum Mindesten
dürfen diese Folgen nicht Ereignisse sein. Denn etwas muss doch an Jener
Fragestellung richtig sein. Es muss zwar eine Art von ethischem Lohn und
ethischer Strafe geben, aber diese müssen in der Handlung selbst liegen.
(Und das ist auch klar, dass der Lohn etwas Angenehmes, die Strafe etwas
Unangenehmes sein muss.). (6.422)
When an ethical law of the form, “Thou shalt…”, is laid down, one’s first thought
is, “And what if I do not do it?” It is clear, however, that ethics has nothing to do
with punishment and reward in the usual sense of the terms. So our question
about the consequences of an action must be unimportant. --At least those
consequences should not be events. For there must be something right about the
question we posed. There must indeed be some kind of ethical reward and ethical
punishment, but they must reside in the action itself. (And it is also clear that the
reward must be something pleasant and the punishment something unpleasant.).
(6.422)
After writing the Tractatus, Wittgenstein claimed to have dissolved all of the
problems of philosophy and gave up philosophy for over a decade to devote himself to
gardening, architecture, and teaching at an elementary school in rural Austria. During
this time the implications of the Tractatus on logic, language, and scientific philosophy
were adopted by a very prominent group of Germanophone philosophers and scientists in
Berlin37 and more importantly in Vienna38; together these philosophers started the journal
Erkenntnis, which for decades has been a leading journal for (now post-positivistic)
analytic philosophy.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

37

The group called themselves Die Gesellschaft für empirische Philosophie, and was composed of Hans
Reichenbach, Kurt Grelling, Walter Dubislav, C.G Hempel, David Hilbert, and Richard von Mises.
38

The group called themselves Verein Ernst Mach, in memory of Ernst Mach, and was composed of
Marcel Natkin, Otto Neurath, Olga Hahn-Neurath, Theodor Radakovic, Rose Rand, Friedrich Waismann,
Gustav Bergmann, Rudolf Carnap, Herbert Feigl, Philipp Frank, Kurt Gödel, Hans Hahn, Victor Kraft, Karl
Menger, Richard von Mises, and Moritz Schlick.
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Chapter 2

Broch, the First ‘Post-Analytic’
Philosopher
“Metaphysics, or the attempt to conceive the world as a whole by means of thought, has
been developed, from the first, by the union and conflict of two very different impulses,
the one urging men towards mysticism, the other urging them towards science. Some
men have achieved greatness through one of these impulses alone, other through the
other alone: in Hume, for example, the scientific impulse reigns quite unchecked,
while in Blake a strong hostility to science co-exists with profound mystical insight.
But the greatest men who have been philosophers have felt the need both of science
and of mysticism: the attempt to harmonize the two was what made their life, and what
always must, for all its arduous uncertainty, make philosophy, to some minds, a greater
thing than either science or religion.”
Bertrand Russell, “Mysticism and Logic”
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I. Introduction:
This chapter focuses on two general aspects of Broch’s philosophy. The first is
concerned with the significance of Broch’s philosophy of language and epistemology,
especially as it rejects logical positivism and anticipates the later work of Wittgenstein
and Willard Quine. The second part of this chapter is concerned with Broch’s attempt to
show the grounds that can be given to support various beliefs that one may possess about
what action is right or wrong. My analysis in this part focuses on Broch’s theory of
normativity as derived from Kant, Plato, and Aristotle, and the implications this theory
has for his view of practical reason (i.e., the ability of the mind to decide what counts as a
reason for action). Broch’s Kantian ethics will be shown in contrast to the utilitarianism
of Russell, and the meta-ethical view of emotivism held by Russell, some in the Vienna
Circle, and Wittgenstein.
The two sections of this chapter may appear to be discrete, each deserving a
separate chapter. But there is an important thread connecting them: Broch’s appeal to
Aristotle’s conception of the logos. In it, Broch finds the theoretical substratum that
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engenders a holistic view of the human and its preoccupations with the world; such a
view is given greater illumination when seen in light of Wittgenstein’s conception of
Lebensform.
Broch’s epistemology and philosophy of language, both of which are tied to his moral
theory, deserve, I will argue, to be considered the first ‘post-analytic’ philosophy39 in that
they were born out of the analytic tradition, maintain respect for the conceptual tools of
logical analysis, yet broaden the scope of philosophical inquiry into language games unconstrained by the normative rules of reasoning.40
An inescapable feature of our lives as humans is normativity. When a teacher
assigns a grade, or our conscience tells us something is wrong, or we stop to ask for
directions, we appeal (at least implicitly) to a standard or norm that we hope will give us
guidance. Yet it is often unclear what the source, or sources, of our normativity are.
Leading figures in the Vienna Circle, under whom Broch was a student, denied that intersubjective ethical normativity could be given any justification, that is, they believed that
ethical norms are mere expressions of the subjective attitudes of a given person, hence
reducible to emotive mental states. Bertrand Russell--a significant influence upon the
Vienna Circle--believed ethical statements to be non-cognitive expressions of feelings or
desires, therefore failing to meet the verificationist standards of knowledge, and
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Paul Michael Lützeler alludes to Broch’s status as a ‘post-analytic’ philosopher in Hermann Broch und
die Moderne: Roman, Menschenrecht, Biografie, (München: Wilhelm Fink, 2011) 134.
40

By this I mean the inference rules of classical logic. Broch uses the novel, in addition to arguments, as a
way to conduct inquiry. Language in narratives is not susceptible to the same logical scrutiny as language
used in arguments. In Erz! hlen zwischen Hilbert und Einstein: Naturwissenschaften und Literatur in
Hermann Brochs “Eine methodologische Novelle” und Robert Musils “Drei Frauen”, Ruth Bendels
explains Broch’s view of the unique ability of literary language to elicit phenomenological thought: “Das
besondere Potenzial literarischer Sprache, die ihre verschiedenen Strukturmomente auf unterschiedliche
Weise zur Bedeutungskonstruktion einsetzen kann, spielt dabei sowohl bei Broch als auch bei Musil eine
entscheidende Rolle für die Form möglicher Erkenntnis: eine Wahrnehmungsform, die über das rein
Begriffliche, auf eindeutige Bestimmbarkeit hin Orientierte hinausgeht” (17).
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incapable of being shown to be right or wrong. Broch rejects this position and, like Kant,
attempts to ground the source of ethical normativity in practical reason, yet unlike Kant,
Broch extends ethical normativity beyond ‘duty’ or ‘obligation’ and into the aesthetics of
living.41 The most urgent and pressing question facing Broch’s philosophical ruminations
is ‘how should one live?’; hence the attempt made here is to maintain the centrality of
this question and not to remain exclusively upon the ladder of theoretical philosophy.
This being said, the aim of this chapter is a synoptic one. I will not test the merits
of the philosophies discussed, rather merely explicate what I believe to be the central
issues and arguments. Thus this chapter is not a work of philosophy, but a work about
philosophy. The conscientious reader is advised to read more systematic and sustained
engagements with the arguments sketched here.
II. Historical Background
Hermann Broch was born in Vienna, three years prior to Wittgenstein, in 1886.
Like Wittgenstein’s, Broch’s family was Jewish, led by an authoritarian business
entrepreneur father. The family owned and managed a mid-size textile factory. Upon
finishing secondary school, Broch was encouraged by his father to attend two technical
colleges for the textile industry in Vienna and in a town close to Strasbourg. Broch
attended these colleges for four years, from 1904 to 1907. Upon finishing his studies,
Broch was awarded a diploma in weaving, and a second diploma in engineering. At the
same time, Wittgenstein was pursuing a similar academic route by attending the
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I first heard the expression ‘aesthetics of living’ in the context of Heidegger, specifically in reference to
the conference held at the University of Sydney titled “Heidegger and the Aesthetics of Living” in 2005. I
do not claim that Heidegger and Broch have the same view of what the aesthetics of living entail. I will go
into more detail on Broch’s conception of the aesthetics of living in chapter 3.
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Technische Hochschule in 1906-07, an engineering school in Berlin Charlottenburg,
where he helped design plans for an airplane propeller.42
During these years, Broch attended lectures and seminars at the University of
Vienna, including courses such as ‘Practical Philosophy,’ ‘Aristotle,’ ‘Algebra,’ ‘Aspects
of Differential and Integral Calculus,’ and most notably ‘Principles of the Philosophy of
Natural Science’ taught by Ludwig Boltzmann, a world renowned physicist with whom
Wittgenstein later expressed an interest in studying, had he not committed suicide in
1906.43
Though drawn to philosophy and mathematics, Broch was dissatisfied with the
ethos to which the disciplines at the university adhered. Broch explains,
Als ich 1904 die Wiener Universität bezog, um Mathematik und Philosophie zu
studieren, erfuhr ich -- wie so viele andere -- bestürzt und enttäuscht, dass ich
nicht berechtigt sei, irgendeine all der metaphysischen Fragen zu stellen, mit
denen beladen ich gekommen war; ich erfuhr, dass es keine Hoffnung auf
irgendeine Beantwortung gab. Es war die erste Blütezeit des ‘wissenschaftlichen’
Positivismus. (KW 10/2, 195)
When I enrolled at the University of Vienna in 1904 to study mathematics and
philosophy I learned with shock and disappointment that, like so many others, I
was not entitled to ask all--or even any--of the metaphysical question I had come
with. I learnt that there was no hope of any kind of answer. It was the first
flowering of ‘scientific positivism.’
Broch was to abandon his studies at the university after only one semester, likely in
response to the demands of the textile college that he was attending at the same time.
Broch’s brief exposure to academic philosophy and mathematics sowed in the
fertile soil of his imagination a seed that was to grow for two decades. During these
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One should note that Wittgenstein’s engineering aptitude led to the successful patent of an airplane
propeller. See Susan Sterrett, Wittgenstein Flies a Kite (New York: PI Press, 2006) 83.
43

!

Sterrett says Wittgenstein admired Boltzmann and hoped “to study physics with him” (xxi).
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twenty years, Broch worked in the textile industry by day, and by night he studied
philosophy, especially that of Schopenhauer,44 Nietzsche, and Weininger45 (Lützeler 33).
Broch wrote on social and cultural topics, and approached Ludwig von Ficker,46 the
founder and editor of the journal Der Brenner, in 1913. Ficker agreed to publish Broch’s
essay “Philistrosität, Realismus, Idealismus der Kunst (1913).” Within a month Broch
submitted a second essay to Der Brenner, “Notizen zu einer systematischen Ästhetik
(1913),” but Ficker refused to publish the article because it was too critical of other
contributors to the journal (Lützeler 34). Ficker then invited Broch to contribute to a
collection of statements on the works of Karl Kraus. Prominent literary figures including
Richard Dehmel, Frank Wedekind, Thomas Mann, Georg Trakl, Else Lasker-Schüler,
Peter Altenberg, Franz Werfel, Adolf Loos, Stefan Zweig, Alfred Mombert, Willy Haas,
and Oskar Kokoschka also were invited to contribute statements on Kraus (Lützeler 34).
Their ideas were published in the following issues of the Der Brenner in 1913, a year
before Wittgenstein was to put Ficker in charge of distributing nearly all of his massive
inheritance to Viennese poets and artists, including Georg Trakl, Rainer Maria Rilke,
Oskar Kokoschka and Adolf Loos (Schroeder 21).
Broch’s first poem, “Mathematisches Mysterium” (1913), was published in the
Der Brenner. The poem reiterates points from Broch’s earlier essay arguing that artistic
creativity manifests itself through competing aspects of idealism (‘judgement,’ ‘concept,’
‘the divine,’ ‘the infinite’) and realism (‘form,’ ‘appearance,’ and ‘the world’), explains
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Wittgenstein was deeply influenced by Schopenhauer. Broch’s worn copy of Schopenhauer’s Die Welt
als Wille und Vorstellung, suggests Broch studied the work very closely (Lützeler 33)
45

Weininger also influenced Wittgenstein.

46

Ficker was also Wittgenstein’s publisher.
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Lützeler (34). Broch’s final contribution to the Brenner was a brief essay titled “Ethik:
Unter Hinweis auf H. St. Chamberlains Buch ‘Immanuel Kant’” in 1914. This essay
marks Broch’s turn from the philosophy of Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, and Weininger,
towards neo-Kantianism, particularly in regard to Kant’s ethics and theory of cognition
(35).
In the decade to follow, Broch develops many of his philosophical positions that
were to influence later works. He explains in “Autobiographie als Arbeitsprogramm”
(1941), that the development of his philosophy occurred in three phases, corresponding to
his realization of three things: first, that moral philosophy must be done with the aid of
logical analysis, “mit streng kritischen Methoden, also eben mit denen des kritischen
Positivismus” [with rigorous critical methods, even with those of critical positivism] (KW
10/2, 198), in order to achieve the “Strenge” [rigor] and “Eindeutigkeit” [clearness] on
par with that of a science; yet not from the standpoint of empiricism, but of the subjective
mind.47 Secondly, that such work must be directed toward the phenomenology of value,
that is, the mind’s construction of value as it interacts with the phenomena of its
consciousness; from this interaction comes the psychological raw materials that serve as
axioms (or sets of assumptions) from which logical inferences can be made.48 Thirdly,
that a model must be conceived through which events of ethical significance may
systematically be shown to cohere and operate according to rules of cause and effect.
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Broch calls this the “idealistische Ausgangspunkt,” yet I avoid using the word idealism here because it
is a loaded and ill-defined word.
48

Broch explains elsewhere that phenomenology gains validity only when done with the rigor of logic:
“die phänomenologischen Bestrebungen erst dann […] ihre Gültigkeit erweisen werden, wenn man daran
gehen wird, sie sprachpositivistisch und logistisch zu interpretieren” (KW 13/3, 33) [the phenomenological
movement will only become valid once it is interpreted using the aid of the tools of modern logic] (my
translation).
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In order to achieve this difficult task, according to Broch, the distinction between
knowledge ascribable to the sciences and that of the humanities must be shown to be a
pseudo-distinction based on “Scheingründen” [pseudo-reasons] (PSB 89). Knowledge is
not reducible to discrete types that are of a qualitatively different character, but is instead
composed of beliefs that can be shown merely to possess different degrees of epistemic
security due to the different types of justification that count as the reason for the
particular belief. This leads Broch to see art as having potential to engender within us
knowledge of our ethical commitments in light of our conscience’s response to social
phenomena represented in art.49
Finally, in 1926, after selling the family factory, Broch devoted himself full-time
to his ethical and epistemological questions. He enrolled at the University of Vienna and
studies philosophy and mathematics with prominent figures in the very influential Vienna
Circle, including Moritz Schlick and Rudolf Carnap. The philosophers of the Vienna
Circle met weekly from 1924 to the mid-1930s until a Nazi murdered Moritz Schlick, and
several of them fled to the United States. These thinkers were interested in the
philosophical ramifications of modern logic and the sciences, and were attempting to
create a ‘unified science’ that reduced all scientific knowledge to statements about one’s
experience, or physical states of affairs in the world. Following what they believed to be
Wittgenstein’s instruction, they regarded ethical, and metaphysical propositions as
nonsense, not capable of expression in scientific language; from this they concluded that
ethics and metaphysics were not worthy of the dignity of serious philosophical inquiry.
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Moral philosophy consists of more than merely probing one’s conscience. As we will see later, in
Broch’s view, a particular value must be coherent with a web of values.
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Their criterion for meaning was verification, which meant that a concept or sentence must
be analyzable into atomic sentences referring directly to the sense data of an experience.
In Der logische Aufbau der Welt (1928), Rudolf Carnap, a leading figure in the
Vienna Circle, articulates this doctrine of verificationism and develops Russell’s logical
atomism from Our Knowledge of the External World (1914). Carnap’s magnum opus
was published at roughly the same time that Broch was attending Carnap’s philosophy
course and public lectures. In this influential work, Carnap attempts to elaborate a
system of language with which a scientific reality can be constructed from the “ground
level” up, as it were (Puchner 290). The building blocks of this structure are
Protokollsätze [protocol sentences], which serve as the basic type of sentence upon which
other sentences build. Carnap attempted to develop a method of reduction that could
reduce more complicated sentences into the simple axiomatic form of a Protokollsatz.
Carnap believed that all sciences could be unified in such a system with the help of the
new logic developed by Frege and Russell.
The Vienna Circle’s ‘logical positivism,’ as it became known, was influential
among many Anglophone philosophers from 1930-50, but is no longer an active research
agenda, though some of their insights in the philosophy of science are still relevant to
philosophical discussions today. Logical positivism is different from the logical atomism
of Russell and the Tractarian Wittgenstein, though together the two positions comprised
the beginnings of the analytic tradition of philosophy.
The Vienna Circle’s influence on Hermann Broch was profound and its traces can
be found in most of his works. Broch’s philosophy and theory of the novel were in large
part a response to his academic training in mathematics and analytic philosophy from
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members of the Vienna Circle at the University of Vienna. His second stint at the
university lasted nine semesters from 1925 to 1930. Some of the philosophy courses he
took were ‘Logic and the Theory of Cognition,’ ‘Philosophy of Mathematics,’ ‘The
System of Philosophy,’ ‘Philosophy of Science,’ ‘Logic,’ and ‘Philosophy of History.’
Broch took courses from Carnap on ‘The Philosophy of Space,’ ‘Basic Principles of
Mathematics,’ and ‘Theoretical Philosophy.’ He also attended ‘A Preparatory Course in
Philosophy,’ ‘Kant,’ ‘The History of Modern Philosophy,’ and ‘The History of
Philosophy.’ His mathematics courses included ‘Mathematical Exercises,’ ‘Theory of
Numbers,’ ‘Introduction to Algebra,’ ‘Algebraic Equations,’ ‘Differential and Integral
Calculus,’ ‘Theory of Function,’ ‘Set Theory,’ ‘Differential and Integral Calculus,’
‘Analytical Geometry,’ ‘Function of Sets,’ and ‘Theory of Curves,’ ‘Elementary
Geometry,’ ‘General Metric Geometry,’ and ‘Set Theory in Geometry.’ Broch was also a
member of one of Moritz Schlick’s private seminars and frequently attended lectures
Schlick was holding. In addition to these courses he was reading Ernst Cassirer’s
Einstein’s Theory of Relativity (1929), Bertrand Russell’s Our Knowledge of the External
World (1914) and, later, The Analysis of Matter (1929) (HBB 63).
In the last years of his studies at Vienna, Broch begins writing a series of
philosophical essays titled “Positivismus-Kritik” (1928-34). One of these essays, “Die
sogenannten philosophischen Grundfragen einer empirischen Wissenschaft” (1928),
appears to be the early workings of a doctoral dissertation in the philosophy of
mathematics, according to Lützeler (HBB 99). In this essay, Broch explores the potential
philosophical applications of Cantor’s and Russell’s work in set theory, and its relation to
Frege’s predicate logic. Broch’s innovation lies in his recognition of the significance of
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set theory in reconciling the opposing positivistic and idealistic philosophical agendas,
and for critiquing the deficiencies of positivistic philosophy.
The “wissenschafliche Weltauffassung” [“scientific world-view”] that Carnap and
the Vienna Circle were advocating was best represented—according to the Vienna
Circle’s manifesto—by Albert Einstein, Bertrand Russell, and Ludwig Wittgenstein. But
their manifesto included the proviso that one should consult Waismann’s adaptation of
the Tractatus rather than reading the Tractatus directly since it is too “difficult to
understand” (Puchner 291). The Vienna Circle was selective with regard to which
sections of the Tractatus they found most compelling; the final sentence “Whereof one
cannot speak, thereof one shall remain silent” became the “rallying cry of the most
militant wing of the Vienna Circle” (Puchner 292).
Broch, however, rejected the reductionism of some of the positivists,50 especially
Carnap’s, and began to develop ideas that would later be associated with ‘post-analytic’
philosophy, particularly Wittgenstein’s later ideas of Lebensform and meaning-as-use
thesis.51 Before we look directly at Broch’s response to Wittgenstein and the emotivism
of Russell and some in the Vienna Circle, we must begin with a sketch of a philosophical
problem central to Broch’s philosophy regarding the role of logic in ethics.
III. The Problem
What is it about logic that makes us, at least on occasion, endeavor to make use of
it? And what is it that we hope to achieve or acquire through its appropriate application?
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Though some in the Vienna Circle were not reductivists; Otto Neurath held to a coherence theory of
truth. See Otto Neurath, “Physicalism (1945),” Logical empiricism at its peak: Schlick, Carnap, and
Neurath. ed. trans. Sahotra Sarkar (New York: Garland, 1996).
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Willard Quine’s philosophy is also relevant, not only because he shares a coherence theory and semantic
holism similar to Broch’s, but also because he attended the Vienna Circle’s meetings (he was the only
American invited) as he studied in Vienna for a year. His coherence theory of truth is articulated most fully
in The Web of Belief (New York: Random House, 1970).
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There are many statements that we hold as true without subjecting them first to the
scrutiny of logical analysis. Often this is not due to oversight, intellectual laziness, or
negligence, but rather because some statements do not seem to require sophisticated
scrutiny to satisfy our intelligence’s demand for justifying belief in the statement. If
asked what kind of coffee is best, I blurt out an answer without much, if any, reflection.
Or if I say, “there is a desk in this room,” the affirmation of the statement is self-evident
to me. It seems altogether unprofitable to subject these beliefs to rigorous, investigative
inquiry, at least in my circumstances. This is either because I do not sense the urgency to
justify them, or because the justification I have for these beliefs is not particularly logical
in its structure.
But then there are statements that seem to carry much greater importance and that
demand painstaking attentiveness to their justification. Their importance is derived in
part from the apparent gravity of the correlative commitments that accompany belief in
the statement. For instance, if a legislator were to make a statement such as, “for persons
to be judged legally culpable for an action, their action must not have been the result of
an antecedent, determining cause exterior to their own willing,” the same legislator is
then compelled to consider whether in fact there are any actions which do not ultimately
follow from some exterior, antecedent, determining cause. If not, then, considering the
logical inference, no persons could be judged legally culpable for any action. If so, on
the other hand, then some conceptual clarification must take place to delineate the border
between a caused and uncaused action, since the exacting of punishment hinges upon
such clarity.
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The usefulness of logic52 is that it allows me to see what I am committed to when
I believe a statement, to bring into clear view that which might add gravity to the
commitment, and to provide some confidence that a conclusion derived through
reasoning is sufficiently warranted. But the statements of the first kind (my favorite
coffee is X, etc.) are more primitive than the one facing the legislator above; some
statements, or attitudes towards statements, are given their strongest justification through
the perception of our intuitive sense alone. If I see a small child fall from a dock into a
lake and scream for help, I do not need to supply my action of pulling the child out of the
water with a logical warrant. I *know* that I should do it because of the decisive force
this perception exudes on my volitions, and because not pulling the child out of the water
is unthinkable to me. In this case my action may be justified without any conscious act of
reasoning; the need for philosophizing is thus obviated.
Discerning which statements require logical validation, how best to apply logic,
and determining what exactly the nature of logic is are at the crux of the problems facing
Wittgenstein’s and Broch’s philosophy of logic. The great advancements made in
modern logic by Frege and Russell were only concerned with the formal structure of
logic and how it functions, they were not accompanied with a detailed and sustained
inquiry into its broader implications for philosophical thought; Russell himself admits
this about his Principia Mathematica. Broch and Wittgenstein are among the first to pick
up this arduous task.
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I am referring here to classical logic (which is deductive). Most of our uses of logic are inductive,
though often arguments will consist of both inductive and deductive logic. For instance, if I say that I like
the smell of roses, I am inducing that because I liked the smell of every rose I have ever smelled, I probably
like the smell of all roses. But then I can go further using deduction by saying that if I like the smell of red
roses, and red roses smell the same as white roses, then I like the smell of white roses. In the latter case I
am using a deductive inference. See Harry Gensler, Introduction to Logic, (New York: Routledge, 2010).
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IV. Emotivism and Language
In Broch’s day, emotivism was endorsed by many influential academic
philosophers, especially among empirically oriented philosophers who shared
Wittgenstein’s strict criteria for truth as communicated in the Tractarian correspondence
theory in which only sentences that have a correspondence relation to our representation
of empirical sense data can be considered true. Emotivism is a meta-ethical view that
holds ethical statements to be non-cognitive expressions of emotions. The most
prominent figures advocating an emotivist view of ethics were Bertrand Russell and
logical positivists (including some of the Vienna Circle).53 The most explicit and direct
endorsements of emotivism came from the logical positivists A. J. Ayer54 and C.L
Stevenson55 in the 1930s. For this work I will ignore Ayer and Stevenson since Broch’s
focus is on Wittgenstein and Russell. I will begin first with some of the reasons
Wittgenstein and Russell were led to endorse an emotivist view of ethics.
The strict criteria that Wittgenstein and Russell had for meaning and truth exclude
either to the realm of psychological or optative utterances (which cannot be verified as
true or false) any statement that is not expressible in formal logic and in direct
correspondence with sense data (or those reducible after analysis to statements of sense
data). Though Wittgenstein eventually abandoned this picture theory of meaning and the
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Not all of the Vienna Circle were emotivists. According to Stephen Satris, “Utilitarian, rationalist and
cognitivist positions are in fact maintained by the members of the Vienna Circle who wrote in the fields of
ethics, social theory and value theory, namely, Moritz Schlick, Otto Neurath, Viktor Kraft and Karl Menger”
(23).
54

See A. J. Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic (New York: Dover Publications, 1937)
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C.L Stevenson articulated emotivism most directly in his essay “The Emotive Meaning of Ethical
Terms” (1937) which he expanded upon in his book Ethics and Language, in which he credits Hume: “Of
all traditional philosophers, Hume has most clearly asked the questions that here concern us, and has most
nearly reached a conclusion that the present writer can accept” (273).
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correspondence theory of truth that is tied to it, he still adhered to the position when he
returned to Cambridge. In “Lecture on Ethics” (1930), Wittgenstein explains that “[o]ur
words used as we use them in science, are vessels capable only of containing and
conveying meaning and sense, natural meaning and sense. Ethics, if it is anything, is
supernatural and our words will only express facts” (7). Hence he concludes, “the verbal
expression which we give to these [ethical] experiences is nonsense!” (8).56
In the case of sentences that appear to make absolute ethical claims, Wittgenstein
says that these sentences do not actually say what they appear to say, and that ethical
language is misleading. When a person makes a normative claim such as ‘that is wrong!,’
according to Wittgenstein, the person is not stating something that is true or false, rather
is expressing an attitude.57 The attitude from which an assertion is made regarding
whether an act is right or wrong is done in view of the end at which the action aims: “no
reason can be given why you should act like this, except that by doing so you bring about
such and such a situation, which again you have to accept as an aim” (C&V 23). The
acceptance of an aim, according to Wittgenstein, is done not so much as a result of
rational deliberation but in the affirmation of one desire or impulse over an alternative.
In modern philosophy, David Hume is often cited as an exponent of this emotivist
view: “The approbation or blame which then ensues [after witnessing a murder], cannot
be the work of the judgment, but of the heart; and is not a speculative proposition or
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Rudolf Carnap, whose work was read closely by Broch, held a similar view as Wittgenstein regarding
the nonsensicality of ethical language. Carnap says, “In the domain of metaphysics, including all
philosophy of value and normative theory, logical analysis yields the negative result that the alleged
statements in this domain are entirely meaningless” (EOM 117).
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Wittgenstein’s ethics was most likely influenced by Otto Weininger’s Über die letzten Dinge (1904).
Weininger believed ethics could not be explained, nor given rational grounds. See Schroeder 13.
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affirmation, but an active feeling or sentiment” (Hume 217). Wittgenstein says
something remarkably similar: if
we read the description of a murder with all its details physical and psychological,
the mere description of these facts will contain nothing which we could call an
ethical proposition. The murder will be on exactly the same level as any other
event, for instance the falling of a stone. Certainly the reading of description
might cause us pain or rage or any other emotion, or we might read about the pain
or rage caused by this murder in other people when they have heard of it, but
there will simply be facts, facts, and facts but no Ethics. (“Lecture on Ethics” 6)
Russell argues similarly: “[e]thical metaphysics is fundamentally an attempt, however
disguised, to give legislative force to our own wishes” (ROE 78) and further: “What is
valuable (in ethics) is the indication of some new way of feeling towards life and the
world, some way of feeling by which our own existence can acquire more of the
characteristics which we must deeply desire” (ROE 110). Russell sees ethics as important,
yet not worthy of the dignity of philosophy.
Russell’s emotivism is an attempt to explain ethics merely in terms of what he
calls ‘propositional attitudes,’ that is, attitudes towards propositions, involving
intentionality, similar to that in the phenomenological tradition of philosophy beginning
with Brentano and Husserl. What makes ethics—traditionally conceived, that is, as an
attempt to clarify our moral commitments—un-philosophical according to Russell is that
the epistemic rigor of logic and empirical verification does not have an appropriate
language with which to communicate normative claims. Ethics turns into guesswork.
Wittgenstein and Russell take a Humean perspective in seeing the will as
independent of the world of facts. Our willing has no bearing on what actually happens
in the world, the fact that I will x, does nothing to cause the instantiation of x; thus the
will is metaphysical, according to Wittgenstein (TLP 6.373). Here Wittgenstein
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distinguishes between our will as studied by psychology, and the will as we have it
ourselves (TLP 5.641). The latter is known only solipsistically, and is the ‘bearer’ of the
ethical, which Wittgenstein later suggests can only be spoken of in the first person (LVC
117).
Since the Tractarian Wittgenstein limits meaningful language to descriptions of
sense data of the world, and insists the will is ‘outside’ of the world (i.e., metaphysical),
the mental processes through which I make a choice, or deem something valuable, cannot
be articulated. Broch credits Wittgenstein for showing exactly “wie weit der legitime
‘wissenschaftliche’ Ausdruck überhaupt reichen kann, reichen darf” [how far the
legitimately ‘scientific’ expression is able to reach] (KW 10/2, 170), but suggests that
such a restriction on language leads to a “Stummheit” [muteness] in philosophy regarding
its central task, which is to articulate how the human relates to the world, not merely a
theoretical interpretation of the world. What follows such a restriction, Broch explains, is
at best “eine empiristische Aufklärerei, wie sie von Russell in seinen außerlogistischen
Büchern eben betrieben wird, eine Popularethik” [an empirical enlightenment, as is the
case with Russell’s non-logical books, a popular ethic (170)].
In “Logik einer zerfallenden Welt” (1931), Broch criticizes what he sees as a
dehumanizing mode of reasoning that attempts to remove or isolate the human element
from interfering with formally verifiable philosophical conclusions. This tendency is
endemic to his generation, yet his criticism is aimed more specifically at Russell and the
Vienna Circle. In a private letter, Broch goes so far as to connect Russell’s method of
philosophy to the rise of Nazism: “der Positivismus, zu dem die Russellsche Einstellung
letzlich gehört, ist ein integrierender Teil eines Weltzustandes, der einen Hitler

!

*&

hervorgebracht hat” [positivism, to which Russell’s attitude belongs, is an integrated part
of a world condition that gave rise to Hitler] (KW 13/3, 42). In Russell’s defense, he was
an outspoken critic of Hitler from the beginning and one of the more prominent
philosophical pacifists of his generation.
Broch’s objection is directed against Russell’s sentiment in Our Knowledge of the
External World (1914) in which Russell argues that if philosophy is to progress,
philosophers must assume the outlook of the scientist, which is an impartial and objective
state of mind, without self-interest in the results of philosophical work, and that
philosophical problems should be approached in generality, removed from contingent
affairs. In the same way that a biologist may examine a species without deeming it good
or bad, Russell argues, philosophers should approach philosophical questions without
making value judgments.
Broch instead argues that the contributions of the “Geist” [mind] and “Logos” are
essential to philosophical understanding, at least to ethics and philosophy of mind (the
area of philosophy examining mental events, such as choosing or willing, and mental
states, such as attitudes, etc.). Broch’s criticism of Russell reveals Broch’s concern about
the inability of positivistic methods of reasoning to accomplish the most vital tasks of
philosophy, which is, according to Broch, to provide cogent explanations of how the
subjectivity of human experience, in all its complexity, relates to the objectivity of the
physical world (including the physical human).
Russell’s, and the other positivist’s, efforts to reduce everything into
naturalistically explainable isomorphemes, lead to a false sense of ‘unity,’ Broch explains.
Rules that apply only to specific domains of thought end up being applied to all thought
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in general. Broch sees this mode of philosophizing as procrustean. The analytic methods
of Russell and the Tractarian Wittgenstein could reduce concepts into their smallest
conceivable parts, but by doing this the philosopher is able to analyze away much of what
we experience into prior causal statements. While this kind of philosophy has its place in
certain domains of thought, according to Broch, it is incapable of accounting for the
complexity of human experience, which is a conglomerate of disparate domains of
thought.
Wittgenstein would fall under Broch’s criticism of positivism if it were not for
Wittgenstein’s acknowledgment of the limitations of positivism in the Tractatus, which
Broch suggests are revealing: “Wittgensteins Haltung, die dem Positivismus nicht
zugänglichen Gebiete kurzerhand als mystische Region erklärt, über die nicht legitim
geredet werden darf, ist hier noch vorbildlich zu nennen. Am Bestande der Ethik
gemessen, ist die positivistische, ‘wissenschaftliche’ Philosophie keine Philosophie mehr”
[Wittgenstein’s attitude, which declares the region inaccessible to positivism the mystical
region, about which one may not legitimately speak, is exemplary to mention. In regards
to ethics, positivistic, ‘scientific’ philosophy is no longer philosophy] (KW 10/1, 170).
Broch, however, disagrees with the Tractarian criteria for meaning, hence he is not
committed to the same stringent restrictions entailed by logical atomism.
According to Broch’s philosophy of language, a sentence derives its meaning not
only from the direct experience the sentence represents, but also from the paragraph,
chapter, book, and so on, in which it is embedded. This is because of the role, according
to Broch, of apperception in the generation of meaning. When reading a narrative, a
reader’s memory of past sentences contributes to the significance of each new sentence in
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the narrative. A sentence such as ‘The cat is on the mat’ (to use Russell’s famous
example) may be a positivistic fact verifiable by empirical method, but the meaning
should not be limited to the mental picture of a cat lying on a mat. For imagine how the
significance of the sentence changes when the cat happens to be one that I care deeply for,
that I rescued from a flood, or the one my friend tripped over when pouring my hot coffee.
In these cases the role of the sentence ‘The cat is on the mat’ takes on a different
significance or meaning; it may in fact be ‘my dear cat’ or ‘my damn cat!’ Such
variations of meaning are not limited to narratives in which context is crucial, but also in
scientific and philosophical discourses. Apperception unites our sense data
representations (past and present) with the psychological attributions of our mind. To
consider a sentence in isolation may have its place in some instances, but is not congenial
to philosophical inquiry, according to Broch, because the mind’s relation to the sentence
is then obscured. This is Broch’s primary complaint against positivism, and the
‘Verwissenschaftlichung’ [scientification] of philosophy, namely, that the subjective
mind’s contributions to language, and thus thought, are excluded to the furthest degree
possible.
But Broch does not propose an abandonment of logic, or a mystical journey into
fantasy or obscurantism. What is needed, according to Broch, is an application of logic
different from the approach of positivism. His argument can be summarized as the
following:
i. The empirical facts of the world can only be described; the relations of facts to one
another correspond to the logical form of a description (positivism).
But,
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ii. It is the task of philosophy to show the relations of facts to human experience.
iii. ‘Explanations’ (Erklärungen) relate the facts of the world to human experience.
iv. First-person human experience, though occurring in physical space, does not adhere
to the same form as physical facts.
So,
v. Explanations do not always adhere to the same logical form as description.
And,
vi. Philosophy is in need of a different application of logic than that of positivism.
What then is different about an explanation such that its form is different from a
description? And how is a fact about the world shown to relate to human experience?
Broch rejects the notion that the distinction between a description and an explanation is
analogous to the distinction between the sciences and the humanities (PSB 89).58 An
explanation maintains a direction-of-fit59 with the world; hence descriptions of the world
are still necessary for an explanation. But explanations go a step further in showing how
the subjective mind connects to the world. An explanation is thus an arrangement of
statements that evokes some scenario of possible experience identifiable to the reader that
accounts for both the factuality of what is the case (die Sachlage) and the possible effect
on a person’s psyche who is living this evoked scenario.
But why is human experience, and the effect of empirical phenomena on one’s
psyche, not just another fact of the world that can be described in the framework of
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Broch is responding to two works on the nature of science versus the humanities, one is Wilhelm
Dilthey’s Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften (1883); the other is Heinrich Rickert’s
Kulturwissenschaft und Naturwissenschaft (1899).
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‘Direction-of-fit,’ as a concept in the philosophy of mind, refers to the way in which a mental state
relates to the world.
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positivism? Broch’s answer to this is an appeal to Cartesian dualism; the extant,
objective person, i.e., the Sum, is definable descriptively, yet the essence of the reflective,
and transcendental person, i.e., the Cogito (or in Kantian language the ‘intelligible self’),
cannot be accounted for in any descriptive framework. This is because the Cogito lies
outside scope of any empirical verification with which a description of it might be formed.
But how can philosophy achieve the kind of rigor and rationality that Broch hopes
it can maintain, while also including the input of the subjective and perceptive mind that
supervenes over empirical facts. What Broch proposes instead of Wittgenstein’s and
Russell’s correspondence theory of truth and the picture theory of meaning is a coherence
theory of truth, accompanied by semantic holism.60
A correspondence theory of truth holds that statements (or beliefs) are made true
or false by some mind-independent thing (i.e., something in the world). Depending on
which correspondence theory one holds to, that thing can be a set of objects, a fact, a state
of affairs, or a sequence of members of a domain. Since there is a vast variety of
statements and kinds of things in the world, a correspondence theory can be fleshed out to
accommodate these varieties. What is important in a correspondence theory is what it is
that makes a statement true or false. A correspondence theory is not an explanation of
what is true, what it would take to prove that a statement is true, or the meaning of the
word ‘truth;’ any account of these things may come to bear on what it is that makes a
statement true, but these things alone are only corollaries of a correspondence theory.
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Some examples of Broch’s semantic holism are found in “Das Böse im Wertsystem der Kunst” (KW 9/2),
in which Broch explains that a line of poetry contains more semantic content than is explicitly expressed:
“Denn kraft der dichterischen Syntax steht diese Realitätsvokabel mit sämtlichen anderen der ganzen Welt
in Verbindung, es werden alle anderen mit dieser einen erahnt, und das Wertziel des Dichterischen, die
kosmische Unendlichkeit, erfüllt sich in der einzigen Realitätsvokabel eines lyrischen Gedichtes (KW 9/2
136)” [For by virtue of poetic syntax, this unit of reality connects with all others in the world, all the others
are intuitively felt in this one, and poetry’s ultimate value, cosmic limitlessness, is fulfilled in the single
reality-unit of a lyric poem] (G&Z 20).
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Wittgenstein’s correspondence theory from the Tractatus is stated in explicit terms: “A
picture agrees with reality or it fails to agree; it is correct or incorrect, true or false… The
argument or disagreement of its sense with reality constitutes its truth or falsity” (TLP
2.21-2.222).

The ‘sense’ of a sentence is the mental picture it evokes.

The correspondence theorist is (most often) an empiricist, of sorts, who believes
that the sense data of his experience, that is, the ‘given’ in immediate perception, is an
accurate (or mostly accurate) picture of the mind-independent world, the world that
science attempts to understand. Correspondence theorists do not deny the existence of
mind-dependent truths, such as, what one’s attitude towards a given thing is, they do
however assert that these mind-dependent truths can be viewed from a mind-independent
perspective, as in the case that I view Peter’s attitude as X. Peter’s attitude is
independent of my mind; hence I can formulate an objective statement about Peter’s
attitude. The correspondence theorist, or at least in the case of Bertrand Russell and the
empiricists of the Vienna Circle, believe that all things can be accounted for, after
analysis, in statements which purport to be objective. Hence the correspondence theorist
would reduce ‘Peter’s attitude’ to a configuration of neuronal energy impulses and
particles in his nervous system and brain.
A coherence theory of truth, by contrast, holds that if a statement (or belief) can
be made simultaneous to another statement without contradicting it, it is possibly true. If
statements are coherent with one another, the person believing in the statements can have
greater confidence that they are true; their coherency is an affirmation of some truthvalue, yet often of a lesser epistemic value than what the correspondence theorists believe
their statement to be worth.
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A statement is probably true if it coheres with a specified set of justified
statements, the probability increases as the number, or strength, of justified statements
with which the statement coheres, increases. For Broch this is essential in enabling an
ethical judgment to be falsifiable, since in a coherence theory a statement can acquire its
justification independent of empirical verification. In the case of an “autonome
Wertgebiet” [autonomous field of values], a statement, belief, or attitude is measured
against other statements, beliefs, or attitudes about things in that particular field (KW 9/2,
127). In regard, however, to statements for which our conscience demands evidence and
justification, that is, objective things, facts about the world, and scientific systems used to
describe them, the justification becomes circular if it does not appeal to something
outside the system, according to Broch. Broch suggests this outside confirmation comes
from an internal intuitive conscience, or a “Wahrheitsgefühl” [“feeling of truth”]. Hence
what makes Broch’s theory a coherence theory as opposed to a correspondence theory is
the transcendence he assigns to the person with the intuitive conscience (one can sense
the Kantian influence). The intuitive awareness (or common sense) of an individual,
according to Broch, provides the ultimate oversight to all statements, this is not to ensure
their truth-value, rather their coherence with the larger web of beliefs, or nexus of values,
held by the particular person (KW 9/2, 127-8).
The philosophical commitment that leads Broch to a coherence theory of truth is
his commitment to a Kantian form of transcendence. This is a position that Broch shares
with the Tractarian Wittgenstein. Russell, however, by reducing the mind to a product of
neuronal states, rejects the transcendental ego that Kant attempts to safeguard in the
Critique of Pure Reason (1782).
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The concept of supervenience (Broch does not use this term but implies it in his
discussions of set theory in “Die sogenannten philosophischen Grundfragen einer
empirischen Wissenschaft,” [KW 10/1]) is crucial to understanding Broch’s coherence
theory of truth because of Broch’s ambition of showing a unifying truth that has
supervenience over autonomous systems and “Wertgebiete” [fields of value].
Supervenience is a mathematical concept used by philosophers to describe the relation of
the functions of different levels within a hierarchy. How and when something supervenes
over another is a matter of dispute. For Broch, however, the concept applies to the
transcendental ego that is capable of forming emergent knowledge in light of particular
facts and social phenomena. Broch calls this knowledge of “Totalität,” which eludes the
grasp of positivism, yet is essential to a philosophical understanding, and, he argues, to
theism and ‘absolute’ ethical principles (i.e., those demanded by Kant’s categorical
imperative).
Broch explains, however, that a totality of coherent knowledge is elusive because
we do not always recognize our inner conflicts or contradictions in our values: “Wir
selbst, wir halten uns für normal, weil ungeachtet der Zerspaltung unsere Seele, alles in
uns nach logistischen Motiven abläuft” (KW 1, 420) [“We ourselves think that we are
normal, because in spite of the split in our souls, our inner machinery seems to run on
logical principles”] (TSW 375). Persons are able to kill in war, according to Broch, and
not be bothered by it afterwards because there is a “Zerspaltung, die in das
Einzelindividuum und in seine einheitliche Wirklichkeit selber hinablangt” (KW 1, 420)
[“split in the totality of life and experience […] a split that cuts right into the individual
himself and into his integral reality”] (TSW 375). An example of this is Broch’s
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character Hugenau from Die Schlafwandler (1932). Hugenau clearly perceives economic
value and the means to create it; hence he is economically logical, yet he fails to see any
‘absolute’ value regarding the inhumane consequences of his economical acumen.
Hugenau lacks a supervening perspective of the various intertwining systems in which he
finds himself. He is unable to see, or at least to care, that his actions are not
universalizable. He lacks knowledge of the normative rules to which, by virtue of his
membership in the human species, he is necessarily subject. Or in more Kantian terms,
he is oblivious of the moral law of his will.
V. Broch’s Kantian Ethics and Emotivism
Russell does not consider ethics genuine philosophy since all ethical arguments
contain at least one premise that is not a proposition but merely an expression of a desire.
Few philosophers however have engaged ethical problems with such vigor, both in
writing and in practice. Russell rejects the essential concept of Kant’s ethics: the
categorical imperative. What is “lacking in my ethical theory,” explains Russell, “is an
element of command, in fact the ‘categorical imperative’” (ROE 148). Russell is instead
a consequentialist and a relativist:
My view is this: the good life is one inspired by love and guided by knowledge.
When I speak of knowledge as an ingredient of the good life, I am not thinking of
ethical knowledge, but of scientific knowledge of particular facts. […] I do not
believe we can decide what sort of conduct is right or wrong except by reference
to its probable consequences. Given an end to be achieved, it is a question for
science to discover how to achieve it […] Outside human desires there is no moral
standard. (ROE 130)
Russell explains that ethical theory is superfluous. In the case that a child is ill,
love, according to Russell, is what makes you want to cure the child, and science tells
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you how this is done (129). There is no middle stage in which theory becomes necessary;
that is, there is no need to provide theoretical justification for your action.
Russell rejects Kantian ethics because it only tells us what is forbidden, not what
we ought to do (Carey and Ongley 117). He further objects that in the case we should
treat persons as ends and not merely as means—which is demanded by the categorical
imperative—we run into irreconcilable interests that force submission upon at least one
party (HWP 205). This, according to Russell, is often the case in politics. The practical
problem of honoring persons as ends becomes impossible in the case that interests collide,
since you must also treat yourself as an end whose will’s autonomy is to be respected,
and one person must in many cases be violated.
For Russell, the action that ought to be chosen is the one whose result yields the
greatest satisfaction of desires. But Russell’s example of the health of a sick child is
simplistic when seen in light of Broch’s ethical theory. It may be true that in the case of a
sick child we do not need ethical theory, this example however is not representative of
many other more troubling cases. We care for the sick child because we cannot bear to
think of not helping the child. But it is easy to imagine a case in which we are confronted
with an ethical dilemma about which we feel no emotion or desire whatsoever (say a
complicated bill to be passed by the senate), we are ambivalent towards the problem,
perhaps due to its complexity or its apparent distance from the things we do have feelings
or desires towards. It is in these instances, according to Broch, that ethical theory,
specifically Kantian, provides clarity.
What is fundamental to our current discussion of the connection between
rationality and desire is the rift between Russell’s and Wittgenstein’s view of practical
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reason on the one hand, and Broch’s on the other. Russell and Wittgenstein both see
practical reason as the role thought plays in determining how an act achieves its targeted
end, an end which, as we have seen, is the object of one’s desires or wishes. But practical
reason, in their view, does not tell us what ends our choices ought to aim at (our desire
alone does that). A strict division is made between rationality and volition, or in other
words, between the head and the heart. In Kantian ethics, the same distinction is made,
yet practical reason unifies volition and rationality in the moment of a choice. In SelfConstitution: Agency, Identity, and Integrity (2009), Christine Korsgaard argues in
defense of Kant’s notion of practical reason and the normativity that is entailed by it.61
She rejects the emotivist position because she believes that caring about or desiring
something comes with correlative commitments that extend beyond that thing, for
instance, (my example) caring about your child’s health commits you to caring about the
means to ensure her health, say, by having health insurance. Hence caring or desiring has
a logic; it means that you care about, or desire, things beyond the direct object of your
immediate desire, Koorsgaard explains.
Korsgaard’s position is similar to Broch’s. For Broch the web of correlative
commitments comprise a “Wertgebiet” [value system] which, though built upon the
volitions of an agent,62 is not reducible to them and is logical in the sense that the chain
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Korsgaard makes this more explicit in her essay “Morality and the Logic of Caring” (2006): “I follow
Kant in thinking that, at least in human beings, practical reason is the will, in the sense that the principles of
practical reason are constitutive of volition” (57).
62

The centrality of value in the formation of the system explains why Broch endorses Nietzsche’s
suggestion that the concept of value serve as the “methodologischen Kernpunkt der Philosophie (KW 9/2
121)” [methodological heart for philosophy] (G&Z 6).
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of cause and effect implicated by the system extends beyond the instance of postulating
value (“Wertsetzung”) upon any one particular thing or phenomenon.63
Kant defines a “postulate” as “a theoretical proposition […] attached inseparably
to an a priori unconditionally valid practical law” (CPR 5:122). The law that they ‘attach’
to is the moral law, that is, the categorical imperative. Hence postulating value towards
something, according to Broch, is a psychological and subjective phenomena which, to
be ethical, must be in accordance with, though not an application of, the categorical
imperative. Knowing what is valuable to us is thus achieved phenomenologically, and
through logical inference upon irrational, i.e., subjective, axioms (PSB 93).
Broch’s theoretical essay embedded in the novel Die Schlafwandler (1932)
explains the phenomenon in greater detail. Broch explains that the input of our irrational
minds accompanies, in a Kantian sense (“Kantisch gesprochen”),64 all categories of
thought:
und nicht nur das Wertsystem selber ist getragen vom spontanen Akt der
Wertsetzung, der ein irrationaler Akt ist, sondern auch das Weltgefühl, das hinter
jedem Wertsystem steht, ist sowohl in seinem Ursprung als in seinem Sein jeder
rationalen Evidenz entrückt. Und der gewaltige Apparat der erkenntnismäßigen
Plausibilisierung, welcher um die Sachverhalte herum errichtet ist, hat die gleiche
Funktion wie jener nicht minder gewaltige der ethischen Plausibilisierung, in
welchem sich die menschliche Handlung bewegt, Brücken des Vernünftigen, die
sich spannen und überspannen, sie dienen einzig dem Zweck, das irdische Dasein
aus seiner unentrinnbaren Irrationalität, aus seiner »Bösheit« zu höherem
»vernünftigem« Sinn und zu jenem eigentlich metaphysischen Wert zu führen, in
dessen deduktiver Struktur es dem Menschen ermöglicht wird, der Welt und den
Dingen und den eigenen Handlungen die gebührende Stelle anzuweisen, sich
selbst aber wiederzufinden, auf dass sein Blick unbeirrbar und unverloren bleibe.
(KW 1, 690)
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Willing an end, according to Kant, commits you to willing the means to achieve that end, which is the
hypothetical imperative.
64

The following lengthy quote is not peculiarly Kantian, though Broch makes the allusion, I assume, to
bring the reader’s attention to the transcendental ego implied in the text.
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Irrationality not only supports every value-system—for the spontaneous act of
positing a value, on which the value-system is based, is an irrational act—but it
informs the whole general feeling of every age, the feeling which assures the
prevalence of the value-system, and which both in its origin and in its nature is
insusceptible to rational evidence. And the powerful apparatus of cognitive
interpretation which is erected around all atomic facts to make their content
plausible has the same function as that other and not less powerful apparatus of
ethical interpretation which makes human conduct plausible; both of them consist
of bridges thrown out by reason, crossing and recrossing at different levels, for
the sole purpose of leading earthly existence out of its essential irrationality, out
of “evil,” by way of higher and “reasonable” meaning up to that ultimate
metaphysical value which by its deductive structure helps man to assign a fitting
relevance to his own actions, to all things and to the world, but at the same time
enable him to find himself again so that his vision ceases to be erratic and
transient.” (TSW 626)
Broch’s concept of a “Wertsystem” [“value-system”] consists of the organic, vague, and
often volatile inter-working between the agent (or plurality of agents), the ends willed,
and the various means to achieve those ends. The contrast Broch draws between
cognitive versus ethical interpretation, is significant in showing that ethical judgments
follow after our prior pursuit of an account of what is factual or explainable in empirical
terms. Our ethical interpretations, though distinct from our cognitive interpretation,
nevertheless follow from our cognitive interpretation.
To see more clearly the significance of ethical theory, particularly the categorical
imperative, some clarity must be brought to Broch’s notion of action and agency, and the
sources that inspired Broch on the subject, namely Aristotle, Plato, and Kant. Kant’s view
of action, according to Korsgaard, is roughly the same as Aristotle’s:
What corresponds in Aristotle’s theory to the description of action is what he
calls a logos – as I will render it, a principle. A good action is one that embodies
the orthos logos or right principle – it is done at the right time, in the right way, to
the right object, and with the right aim. (SCA 10)
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Aristotle’s logos entails the same features (plus others) as Kant’s view of action which is
described by a maxim in the form ‘do act x for the sake of y.’ The action includes both
the act and the aim together as one.
In Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten (1785), Kant gives specific examples
of actions in the ‘do act x for the sake of y’ form: “I will commit suicide in order to avoid
the personal troubles that I foresee ahead,” etc. (4:422). What counts as a maxim,
according to Korsgaard, is “the whole package” (11). Hence if I (the theoretical “I”)
were to commit suicide for some other reason—let’s say I had an alter ego with an
incontrollable impulse to detonate an atomic bomb killing millions and I decided to kill
myself to save the innocent people—the act of suicide would have different merit than if
I were merely trying to avoid a personal hardship. My act of suicide in the case that I
have wantonly violent impulses may in fact be commendable.65
Some have objected to Kant’s ethics as placing unreasonable demands upon one’s
constraints against their natural desires and impulses. A famous example of this comes in
the works of Friedrich Schiller in which he charges Kantian ethics of asceticism: “In the
moral philosophy of Kant the idea of duty is proposed with a harshness enough to ruffle
the Graces, and one which could easily tempt a feeble mind to seek for moral perfection
in the somber paths of an ascetic and monastic life” (Schiller 150). This objection against
Kant is in response to the Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten (1785) in which Kant
explains that natural inclinations are merely “sources of needs” and that “it must instead
be the universal wish of every rational being to be altogether free from them” (4:428).
However, Kant revokes this claim in his more mature philosophy in Die Religion
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I’m not making this argument though. The point is that the merit of the same act may be different if its
aim varies from one circumstance to the next.
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innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft (1793): inclinations “are good, that is, not a
matter of reproach, and it is not only futile to want to extirpate them but to do so would
also be harmful and blameworthy” (6:58). Broch’s moral philosophy is consistent with
the mature Kant in that it is self-affirming.
In respect to Kant’s form of action, and Aristotle’s notion of logos, Broch is in
agreement. From this it follows that Broch also agrees with Wittgenstein and Russell in
that normativity springs from the will, but unlike Wittgenstein and Russell, Broch’s
normativity is not contingent solely upon one’s desires. This is because there are two
types of reasons supplied by our faculty of practical reason, one is for the act and the
second is for the ‘act-for-the-sake-of-end’ complex, which must be capable of being
willed categorically. Emotivism obscures ethics, according to Broch, because it fails to
account for the nature in which an ethical judgment can be deemed true by virtue of the
coherence between the action and the logos according to which it is performed.
Emotivism instead reduces ‘good’ merely to the attitude towards an end (i.e., the aim);
separate from the other features surrounding the end such as time, place, manner, act and
end, which together, according to Aristotle’s logos, make the action right.
Normativity, for Broch, thus entails more than it does for Wittgenstein or Russell
since it derives from the universalizability of a desire for a particular action considered in
respect to the logos with which the action is in accordance. If I can will to do act X in
circumstance Y, then in order to meet normative constraints, it must be able to be willed
by everyone else put in the same circumstance. Thus I could justify lying to the Gestapo
(to use a familiar example) if I were housing Jews because I can also will that everyone
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else would lie to the Gestapo if they were housing Jews.66 I could not, however, justify
lying—assuming we accept Kant’s (and Broch’s) conception of normativity—in the case
of volitions that cannot be willed universally. Say, for instance, I am a florist and lie to
my patrons about when my roses were picked. I could sell more roses by exaggerating
their freshness, claiming that I picked them only a few hours ago when I really picked
them a week ago. But in this case I, the florist, cannot will that everyone else who is a
florist would lie about the freshness of their roses; for what if my mother (or I) were to
purchase week-old flowers only to have them wither the next day. In this case I would be
justifiably perturbed at the dishonesty of the florist.
So far we’ve seen roughly how Broch’s conception of normativity works, but
there is an important objection by the emotivist regarding the nature of moral judgment
that threatens the cogency of Broch’s ethics, and which potentially leads to a collapse
into a kind of full-fledged relativism similar to that endorsed by Russell. The emotivist
might say that even if we accept the ‘act-for-the-sake-of-an-end’ view of action, it is still
merely a second-order desire for the complex that gives assent in the event that the
second-order desire67 is efficacious in moving us to a choice. Hence—the objection
could go—there may very well be a logical form to the complex, yet this does not mean
that my volition for the complex is rooted in my rationality or inferred from a prior axiom,
I, after all, am merely wishing for the fulfillment of the complex. In order to escape this

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

66

Kant’s views on lying are sometimes a subject of dispute among Kant scholars because Kant appears to
be inconsistent or not entirely clear about the matter. He addresses the topic in the Grundlegung but is not
thorough.
67

A second-order desire is the desire to sustain or forgo a particular desire. In the case that this sentence is
true: ‘I want to smoke a cigarette, but I wish that I did not want to smoke a cigarette.’ The latter expresses
a second-order desire.
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circularity, which may have the power to render Kantian ethical theory untenable, Broch
turns to Kant’s philosophical anthropology.
The grounds for Broch’s rebuttal to the emotivist objection lie in his conception
of the person. In Kantian ethics, normativity is derived from our autonomy— “we give
laws to ourselves” (SCA 13). Broch interprets this as following: “kenne ich das Gesetz
meines Denkens, so kenne ich das Gesetz meines Ichs, Freiheit und Gebundenheit meines
Handelns. Wer das Gesetz seines Denkens—nur dieses und kein anderes—verletzt, ist
unmoralisch…(KW 10/1, 248)” [if I know the law of my thinking, I then know the law of
my [intelligible] self, and the freedom and constraints of my action. Whoever violates
the law of his thinking—only this and nothing else—is immoral]. The law of my willing
(i.e., the categorical imperative) is binding because if I am to exercise my autonomy, it is
necessary that my autonomy is not infringed upon by another agent. Willing in
accordance with the demands of universalizability is the way to ensure individual
autonomy among a plurality of people is maintained.
What resolves volitional discord, and establishes a hierarchy through which
ethical value becomes apparent, according to Broch, is a Platonic idea that supervenes
over all other systems:
Erst wenn ein übergeordnetes Wertsystem den Kampf der autonom gewordenen
Einzelwertgebiete wieder in sich aufnehmen und befrieden wird, erst wenn die
Einzelsysteme wieder zu dienenden Gliedern der übergeordneten platonischen
Idee geworden sein werden, eingefügt in die Ordnung ihrer Hierarchie, dann erst
wird auch wieder die Spannung und der krampfhafte Streit des Artverschiedenen
aus der Welt, aber auch von der Menschenseele weichen […]. (KW 9/2, 156)
Not until a higher value-system has absorbed and conciliated the warring of
autonomous individual value-systems, not until these individual systems have
again become subservient to an overriding Platonic Idea, have been fitted into its
hierarchy, only then will the tension and convulsive struggles between different
groups disappear, not just from the world, but from the soul of man. (G&Z 39)

!

,-

For Plato, the form of thing is perfection, from which alone it is possible for the
thing to be what it is. So knowledge of the Platonic idea of our mind or soul is necessary
if we are to achieve psychic unity.68

VI. Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations, ‘Post-Analytic’ Philosophy, and
Broch’s Turn to Literature
After teaching elementary school in rural Austria, Wittgenstein returned to
Cambridge in 1929 and devoted himself again to philosophy. His so-called transitional
years, from 1929-1932, were stimulated by conversations he had with a Marxist
economist Piero Sraffa, whom Wittgenstein credited for leading him to more homocentric philosophical considerations, according to Glock (Glock 21). Wittgenstein still
had a Tractarian view of the world, as shown by his “Lecture on Ethics” (1930), but soon
his philosophy was to undergo significant changes from the logical atomism endorsed by
the Tractatus. Instead of thinking of language as a function of an abstract system of
representation, he begins to see it as a social function. In the preface to the Philosophical
Investigations, Wittgenstein writes, “I have been forced to recognize grave mistakes in
what I wrote in my first book.” According to the Tractarian view, language is a kind of
calculus whose rules adhere to a precise and definite order that lies behind the otherwise
imprecise appearance of language. Wittgenstein began to question the Tractarian
account of language as he considered the difficulties that it would have accounting for
colors, specifically, the propositions ‘X is red’ and ‘X is green.’ These two statements
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Koorsgaard refers to this as self-constitution: “Normative standards are the principles by which we
achieve the psychic unity that makes agency possible. The work of achieving psychic unity … is what I am
going to call self-constitution” (7).
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are logically incompatible and must be analyzed into two separate propositions. But
Wittgenstein decided that this cannot be done because it is not possible to assign a
determinate property to a thing that has a range, or in the case of color, different shades
without a clear boundary between properties (red versus maroon, for example).
Wittgenstein ultimately came to the conclusion that “comprehending a proposition means
comprehending a language” (PI 73). Wittgenstein began to question this calculus model
beginning in 1932, according to Glock, first by viewing language interchangeably with a
kind of calculus and a kind of game (Glock 193). But he eventually replaced the calculus
model instead with a game analogy in which language functions according to rules
established arbitrarily in social practice: “I shall also call the whole, consisting of
language and the actions into which it is woven, the ‘language-game’” (PI 197). Both the
calculus model and the game model have their starting point in rules, but in the case of
games the rules determine what makes sense in language, that is, what is intelligible to
someone with whom one is speaking, not, as with the calculus model, what will bring
success as a result of properly applying a formal inference rule.
From this viewpoint, language is freed, at least in many cases, from the predicate
logic into which the early-stage analytic philosophers (Frege, Russell, and the early
Wittgenstein) were attempting to formalize sentences. We learn the meaning of a word,
in Wittgenstein’s game model, not (always) by associating the word with an object, but
by learning how the word can be used in context; “for a large class of cases—though not
for all—in which we employ the word ‘meaning’ it can be defined thus: the meaning of a
word is its use in the language” (PI 20). Hence it may still be the case that some words
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derive their meaning by “pointing to [their] bearer” (PI 21), that is, the object which the
word denotes, but this is only one of many different ways words are used:
But how many kinds of sentence are there? Say assertion, question, and
command? --There are countless kinds: countless different kinds of use of what
we call ‘symbols’, ‘words’, ‘sentences’. And this multiplicity is not something
fixed, given once and for all; but new types of language, new language-games, as
we may say, come into existence, and others become obsolete and get forgotten.
(we can get a rough picture of this from the changes in mathematics.) Here the
term ‘language-game’ is meant to bring into prominence the fact that the speaking
of language is part of an activity, or of a form of life. (PI 11)
By suggesting that language is a part of a form of life (Lebensform), Wittgenstein
turns our attention toward the contingent use of language. The meaning of a single word
may have shades, not necessarily in one instance of its usage, since a discrete definition
may be assigned ad hoc to a word, giving it a precise meaning. But this definition can be
revised as soon as the word is used differently from one language-game to the next.
Wittgenstein makes explicit his criticism of linguistic formalism of the logicians
Frege’s, Russell’s, and his own, project of creating an ideal language: “It is interesting to
compare the multiplicity of the tools in language and of the ways they are used, the
multiplicity of kinds of word and sentence, with what logicians have said about the
structure of language. (Including the author of the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus)” (PI
12). Frege suggests that a concept must be “unambiguously determinate” and have
“sharp boundaries” in order to have meaning (Posthumous 155). Frege’s rationale for
this is the principle of bivalence, that is, that every sentence must either be true or false.
Wittgenstein agrees with Frege on this principle in the Tractatus: “A proposition must
restrict reality to two alternatives: yes or no” (TLP 4.023). Wittgenstein is committed to
this position since it is implied by the picture theory of language; either a proposition
represents a state of affairs, or it fails in doing so. But Wittgenstein’s later rejection of
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the picture theory frees him from his commitment to the principle of bivalence.
Inexactness and indeterminacy become, for Wittgenstein, an intrinsic property of some
experiences and linguistic accounts of these experiences (Glock 99). This might seem
obvious when thinking of color words or concepts such as ‘big’ or ‘small,’ but according
to Wittgenstein, words that we otherwise might believe to have single definitions such as,
‘knowledge,’ ‘chair,’ and ‘game’ (examples Wittgenstein gives) are words that elude a
single, precise definition.
Even though these words can be used in different ways and with different
meanings, we are still able to know the meanings of these words, according to
Wittgenstein, by seeing the “family resemblances” of the particular instances which these
words intend to describe: “When philosophers use a word –knowledge, being, object, I,
proposition, name, etc. and try to grasp the essence of the thing, one must always ask
oneself: is the word ever actually used in this way in the language-game which is its
original home?” (PI 116). Finding the ‘essence’ of a concept means finding a general
definition that meets the necessary and sufficient conditions for its application. Yet this
is sometimes impossible considering the “complicated network of similarities,
overlapping and criss-crossing” (PI 66) in which a single concept may be employed.
Wittgenstein’s concept of ‘family resemblances’ emphasizes the vagueness of
language and many concepts, yet despite the vagueness of many concepts, they can still
usefully be employed in language because these concepts still have boundaries, albeit
vague ones, which give the concepts their sense. Determining a concept’s sense thus
consists in seeing the ways in which it is used; Wittgenstein compares a word to a chess
piece which is capable of doing certain things but not others, as delineated by the agreed
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upon rules of chess: “The question ‘what is a word really?’ is analogous to ‘What is a
piece in chess?’” (PI 108). Hence by pointing to examples in which the word is used in
the context of any particular language-game, the meaning of the concept becomes clear to
a degree.
What is especially interesting for our current study is Wittgenstein’s thought on
the use of fictional or hypothetical uses of language-games. In an attempt to clarify a
particular linguistic phenomenon and the accompanying psychological phenomena,
Wittgenstein makes use of ad hoc language-games as “objects of comparison” (Glock
194). These fictional language-games serve as thought experiments which can be
juxtaposed against other language-games, let’s say the language-game of everyday social
interaction, which can serve to clarify the juxtaposed language-game in either one of two
ways. First, in the case that a simple language-game may bring into clearer view some
aspects of our more complicated language-games; Wittgenstein does this in the Brown
Book to illustrate our uses of notions such as ‘truth.’
A second way in which Wittgenstein uses language-games experimentally is in
the form of reductio ad absurdum arguments. In doing so, Wittgenstein constructs a
language-game that in some way reflects the way in which certain concepts are used in a
particular philosophical theory that he is attempting to undermine. The most obvious
example of this is Wittgenstein’s bricklayers in the opening pages of the Philosophical
Investigations (PI 2), which he employs to show the error in the Tractarian view of
language. According to the Augustinian view of primitive language (which Wittgenstein
is appealing to), all words refer to objects. When the first builder asks his assistant to
bring a block, pillar, slab, or beam, he simply says ‘block,’ etc. Wittgenstein expands
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upon this conception of primitive language to show that even with a simple language like
the builders, the language user is participating in a form of life, which means that the
language is imbibed with non-literal and non-referential meanings.
The point of this kind of thought experimentation is to appeal to the intuition of
the reader by showing what it would be like if a set of circumstances were the case.
Readers must in this instance use their imagination to empathize with the form of life
evoked in the thought experiment. In doing so, the reader is supposed to realize the
absurdity that would ensue if the circumstance were actually the case. Hence
Wittgenstein makes powerful appeals to the reader’s intuition, rather than using rigorous
argumentation by means of logical inference.
It should further be noted that language-games are autonomous from one another
in the sense that a particular word may only derive its meaning from within the context of
a single language-game. Philosophical errors often occur, according to Wittgenstein,
when language-games cross each other and mistakenly carry the same meaning of a word
over into the other language-game (RFM 117-18). Only from within a “stream of life”
does a word get its meaning, and there are many streams (LWP §913).
The main concept which Wittgensteins’s notion of ‘language-games’ is intended
to debunk is the Tractarian argument for a general form of proposition. But propositions
increasingly become liberated from the need for justification in Wittgenstein’s later
thinking. This is perhaps most pronounced in “On Certainty” (1953), in which
Wittgenstein shows that in order to perform many of the activities of ordinary life, an
agent must be able to act upon beliefs that do not lend themselves to justifications, at
least not justification in terms of a logical inference. What happens when reasoning or
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philosophizing is conducted in a formalized manner, abstracted away from ordinary
language, is that much of the content that ordinary language possesses is lost: “We have
got on to slippery ice where there is no friction and so in a certain sense the conditions
are ideal, but also, just because of that, we are unable to walk. We want to walk: so we
need friction. Back to the rough ground!” (PI 107). In “On Certainty,” Wittgenstein
rejects skepticism in favor of pragmatism, showing that in order to act and function as a
human being we must suspend our skepticism or doubt about the certainty of knowledge
yet accept as true much of what cannot be proven true.
The ethical implications of Wittgenstein’s later thinking are different than those
expressed in the Tractarian view. In 1937, Wittgenstein wrote “The way to solve the
problem you see in life is to live in a way that will make what is problematic disappear.
The fact that life is problematic shows that the shape of your life does not fit into life’s
mold. So you must change the way you live and, once your life does fit into the mold,
what is problematic will disappear” (C&V 27). Wittgenstein’s concept of ‘mold’ is
analogous to Broch’s application of Platonic idea to the sphere of social phenomena. The
ethical implication is that there is a form, or forms, to which a good life must adhere if it
is to be a good life. Not a rigidly determinate mold, but one with fuzzy edges.
Wittgenstein’s later writing is sometimes referred to as ‘post-analytic’ philosophy.
The first traditionally recognized post-analytic philosophy published is sometimes
considered to be that of the American philosopher Willard van Orman Quine. Upon
finishing his dissertation at Harvard in 1932, Quine was appointed Harvard Junior Fellow,
which excused him from teaching for four years. He was invited by members of the
Vienna Circle to attend their meetings and discuss his work in formal logic and analytic
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philosophy for a year in 1932-33. Among those with whom Quine had discussions was
Rudolf Carnap, from whom Broch had taken philosophy courses only a few years prior.
Like many analytic philosophers, Quine had very little interest in the history of
philosophy, instead finding knowledge of mathematics and physics to be of greater
philosophical value than of the intellectual canon. Quine’s early works were primarily in
formal logic and set theory, but in the 1940s his interests extended into traditional
philosophical questions.
During the 1930s and 1940s logical positivism was the dominant school of
philosophy in English speaking universities. Two assumptions were made by the logical
positivists that were thought to be safe and were seen as essential to their philosophical
studies. The positivists believed that real knowledge must ultimately have a strict
relationship with empirical experience and that linguistic expressions were only
meaningful if they were reducible to vocabulary that captured this experience. In 1951,
Quine published the article “Two Dogmas of Empiricism” in The Philosophical Review,
which attacked both of the essential assumptions of logical positivism. Quine’s
arguments are not for the lay reader, and an advanced knowledge of logic and analytic
philosophy is required to follow them. The opening paragraph of the article, however,
serves as an effective abstract:
Modern empiricism has been conditioned in large part by two dogmas. One is a
belief in some fundamental cleavage between truths which are analytic, or
grounded in meanings independently of matters of fact and truths which are
synthetic, or grounded in fact. The other dogma is reductionism: the belief that
each meaningful statement is equivalent to some logical construct upon terms
which refer to immediate experience. Both dogmas, I shall argue, are ill founded.
One effect of abandoning them is, as we shall see, a blurring of the supposed
boundary between speculative metaphysics and natural science. Another effect is
a shift toward pragmatism. (Quine 20)
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The logical atomism advocated by Russell and the early Wittgenstein assumed
both of these dogmas that Quine attempts to refute. Russell believed that some logical
truths could be known independently of experience, that is, known analytically; Russell
also held that from sense data atomic propositions could be formed from which all other
propositions could ultimately be inferred. By refuting analyticity and reductionism, if in
fact he was successful,69 Quine showed that the ambition of logical atomism and logical
positivism were doomed, or at least insufficient.
Quine instead endorsed semantic holism in which the meaning of a sentence (and
hence the knowledge to be acquired from it) is confirmed by the whole field of
experience, not just particular sense data.70 Or in other words, “the unit of measure of
empirical meaning is all of science in its globality” (“TDE” 40), not a particular word or
proposition. Quine’s theory of truth is hence a coherence theory as opposed to the
correspondence theory of many positivists.
Quine’s paper received immediate attention by academic philosophers and had
profound influence in leading to the demise of logical positivism in the 1950s. Quine’s
colleague at Harvard, the professor of philosophy Peter Godfrey-Smith, writes in Theory
and Reality (2003) that Quine’s article is sometimes thought of as “the most important
[article] in all of twentieth-century philosophy” (Godfrey-Smith 33). Quine’s attack led
for a way around the scientism of the logical positivist philosophy of his day, not merely
by suggesting that it was unfruitful, but by showing that it was fundamentally flawed.
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

69

Some philosophers defend analyticity against Quine’s criticism. See Scott Soames, Philosophical
Analysis in the Twentieth Century, Volume 1: The Dawn of Analysis (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
2005) 360.
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Quine articulates his semantic holism already in “Two Dogmas of Empiricism,” though he revisits the
topic more extensively elsewhere, such as in “From a logical Point of View” (1953).
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Two years after Quine’s article appeared, Wittgenstein’s posthumous writings
were published under the title Philosophical Investigations (1953). Although his work is
very different from Quine’s in its aims, methods, and topics that it addresses,
Wittgenstein rejects, like Quine, the reductionism of logical positivism and denies that
the language of science is fundamentally different from that used in social practice.
In more recent decades Richard Rorty has perhaps been the most noteworthy
philosopher to carry the ‘post-analytic’ title. In Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature
(1979), Rorty builds on Wittgenstein, Quine, and Wilfred Sellars, arguing that much of
analytic philosophy in his day is concerned with pseudo-problems that are only sustained
if one plays the same language-games. Rorty, however, does not condemn the methods
of analytic philosophy; insisting that it is a “good style” of writing philosophy (Mendieta
23).
Rorty proposes that the philosopher need not identify himself as the “guardian of
rationality” but take up the task of “edification” in order to find “new, better, more
interesting, more fruitful ways of thinking” (Mendieta 23). The pragmatism behind
Rorty’s philosophy resembles that of Broch and the later Wittgenstein. Rorty suggests
that three primary beliefs characterize the pragmatist: first, “there is no wholesale,
epistemological way to direct, or criticize, or underwrite, the course of inquiry,” second,
that facts and values have “no epistemological difference,” and third, that there “are no
constraints on inquiry save conversational ones” (Mendieta 100). Broch’s attitude toward
philosophy is most similar to that of Rorty’s.
Broch’s philosophy does not easily fit into the criteria of any single particular
school of philosophy. Erich Kahler suggests Broch’s philosophy is inspired by
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pragmatism with value maintaining its central role (Kahler 1). But Broch draws from
phenomenological ideas of Husserl, ethical thought from neo-Kantians, and the formal
logic from the analytic tradition, not to mention Nietzsche’s, Weber’s, and Freud’s
influence. But to the extent that Broch’s philosophy does deserve a label, ‘post-analytic’
is the most fitting, not merely because of close engagement with, and rejection of, earlystage analytic philosophy, but because his aims and approaches are most in accord with
the pragmatist attitude of post-analytic philosophers mentioned above.71 Broch’s
semantic holism extends meaning far beyond determinate propositions seen by logical
positivists as the hallmark of their style.
For Broch, the novel functions in the same role as Wittgenstein’s thought
experiments in the Philosophical Investigations. If humans are to have an intimate
understanding of themselves, Broch explains, philosophy is in need of literature:
Hierzu bedarf es einer Verbreiterung des Exemplifizierungsraumes, und die wird
erzielt, wenn sich die Sozialtotalität in der Totalität eines in ihr ablaufenden
Menschenlebens spiegelt, genau so wie umgekehrt dieses nur dann zur Gänze
erfasst werden kann, wenn die ihm zugehörige Sozialitotalität gezeigt wird.
Gerade das wird vom Roman und der Hauptsache wohl nur vom Roman geleistet.
(KW 9/1, 114)
To do the latter requires a broadening of the scope of exemplification, and this is
achieved when the social totality is mirrored in the totality of a human life
elapsing within it; just as, conversely, a life can only be grasped in its entirety
when the corresponding social totality is depicted. This is precisely what is
accomplished by the novel and, in the main, only by the novel. (HHT 36)
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Broch endorses the attempt to mathematisize philosophy: “Was die neue Philosophie will, ihre Erhebung
zur reinen Wissenschaft, ihre Abkehr vom Dahin-Reden über die Dinge, dr ngt letzten Endes zu ihrer
Mathematisierung. Das ist erfreulich. Und der Ansatz ist bereits vorhanden, n mlich in der Logistik und
ihrer Zeichensprache” (KW 1, 730). See also, Markus Pissarek, “Atomisierung der einstigen Ganzeit”-Das
literarische Frühwerk Hermann Brochs (München: Martin Meidenbauer, 2009) 28-9.
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Broch’s recognition of the limits of logic and scientific language turns him away from the
Vienna Circle’s scientific philosophy, not because he believes it to be fundamentally
flawed, rather he finds it too narrow, lacking a sufficient methodological range to account
for ethical and metaphysical judgments. Broch’s turn to literature is in recognition of the
importance of what is left out of philosophical discussions when the stringent standards
of the Vienna Circle’s verification principle is imposed upon discourse. In this sense,
Broch has a view similar to Wittgenstein’s as we find out in a letter Wittgenstein wrote to
the editor of the Tractatus around the same time Broch was studying philosophy in
Vienna:
The book’s [Tractatus’s] point is an ethical one. I once meant to include in the
preface a sentence which is not in fact there now but which I will write out for
you here, because it will perhaps be a key to the work for you. What I meant to
write, then was this: My work consists of two parts: the one presented here plus
all that I have not written. And it is precisely this second part that is the important
one. My book draws limits to the sphere of the ethical from the inside as it were,
and I am convinced that this is the ONLY rigorous way of drawing these limits.
In short, I believe that where many others today are just babbling, I have managed
in my book to put everything firmly in place by being silent about it. And for that
reason, unless I am very much mistaken, the book will say a great deal that you
yourself want to say. Only perhaps you won’t see that it is said in the book.
(Stern 42)
Wittgenstein’s point is that the ‘ethical’ is not to be found anywhere in positivistic
philosophy, yet this only becomes apparent with a rigorous investigation into logic and
language. Where then is the ethical to be found? For Broch and Wittgenstein, the ethical
shows itself in the cause and effect of social intercourse; this means that philosophy is in
need of different methods of inquiry than logical analysis alone. Broch turns his focus to
literature in hopes of finding fertile grounds for ethical inquiry.
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Chapter 3
Broch’s Die Unbekannte Größe and
Wittgenstein’s Über Gewissheit

“It seems to me his philosophy is most true when it’s latent in the story.” -Wittgenstein
referring to Toltoy’s Resurrection, in Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Memior
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Introduction
This chapter is concerned with two related problems that plague some, perhaps
most, members of our species. The first is the role of one’s personal desires in
deliberation preceding ethical judgments; namely, to what extent and in what way do
personal desires inform, or ought to inform, our judgments of what choices to make
regarding our behavior. The second is concerned with the difficulty of achieving clarity
about the nature and shape of those desires, particularly in respect to the often debilitating
ambivalence that accompanies them. The inquiry that follows will be largely derivative
of Broch’s novel Die Unbekannte Größe and Wittgenstein’s Über Gewissheit. The
chapter is intended to lead to a deeper understanding of Broch’s novel, and of the
philosophical problems that its characters face.
I will approach Broch’s novel with less concern for the epistemological problems
it illuminates and that Broch suggests are important; only insofar as these problems are
relevant to ethics do they interest me. Thus my view of the problems in the novel are
presented slightly differently than Broch’s rendering of them. Broch wrote Die
Unbekannte Größe in 1933, not long after finishing his studies at the University of
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Vienna under the tutelage of the science-oriented philosophers of the Vienna Circle.
Broch considered the novel an insignificant work and the lack of attention it has drawn
from secondary scholarship suggests that this opinion is held by others as well.72
Commenting on his own novel, Broch brings attention to the two problems that he
considers most significant in the story. The first is concerned with the antecedent
conditions from which a person begins to view his life from an exclusively intellectual
and rational perspective:
Das erste Problem, das sich daher dieser Roman zu stellen hatte, war also die
Frage nach den Vorbedingungen, unter welchen ein […] Mensch zur
Einschlagung eines rein intellektuellen erkenntnism ßigen Lebens gebracht wird.
(KW 2, 243)
The first problem presented in the novel is the question regarding the preconditions in which […] a person is brought to approach life from a purely
intellectual and knowledge-based perspective. (my translation)
Broch explains that this problem deals with the most simple of human desires relating to
such basic things as “Geburt und Tod, […] Liebe und Natur und sozialer Verbundenheit”
(KW 2, 244) [birth and death, […] love and nature and social attachment (my
translation)]. The pre-condition that causes hypertrophic rationality is an over-estimation
of the authority science and rationality have in answering our existential questions. This
leads one to neglect affective, intuitive, and evaluative modes of thinking, which do not
rely exclusively upon material evidence, inductive probabilities, or deductive rules of
inference.
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Paul Michael Lützeler suggests Broch considered the novel a ‘Nebenarbeit’ [side project] but that the
novel is important in showing Broch’s engagement with science and logic, particularly foundational
problems in physics and mathematics in the late 1920s. See Paul Michael Lützeler, Die Entropie des
Menschen: Studien zum Werk Hermann Brochs (Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2000) 16.
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The second problem Broch highlights is the need for providing some structure in
which a person’s basic thoughts and feelings are given significance, despite a person’s
continued devotion to a narrowly defined area of rationality or science. In addition to the
“pure” knowledge of mathematics, according to Broch, there is an “Erkenntnis des
Gefühls” (KW 2, 247) [knowledge of the emotions (my translation)]; when one possesses
both, they have attained a “Gesamterkenntnis” (KW 2, 245) [holistic knowledge (my
translation)]. The pre-conditions of attaining “Gesamterkenntnis” lie in the mysterious
depths of both our psychology and formal logic.
The apparatus of mathematics, and the acquisition of knowledge through
mathematics, serves in the novel as an exemplar for analogous inner workings within our
soul/mind regarding the acquisition of non-mathematical, even non-rational, knowledge.
The story consists of a young physics doctoral candidate (and then post-doc), Richard
Hieck, at a university (probably in Vienna) in the 1920s. Richard is plagued by the
memories of his deceased father, whose mark is still felt on Richard’s family. Richard’s
father is described as an aloof, friendless, mysterious man who prefers the night. His
profession was unknown to his family; he came and went quietly from the house arriving
home very late only to sit in the dark and watch Richard and his siblings sleep. Richard’s
father refused to go on walks in the daylight with his children the way other fathers did.
Instead on one occassion, upon the insistence of mother, he took Richard on a walk at
night. Richard remembers the moonlight walk with his father as uncanny. His father led
him to a foggy meadow to pick flowers. After picking them, his father carried them
carefully back towards the town as if they were meant as a gift for mother. He then
stopped on a bridge and threw the flowers into a dark river below without any
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explanation saying “Sterne im Wasser” (KW 2, 16) [“Stars in the water” (11)]. His
father’s death seven years earlier was seemingly insignificant and his funeral was
attended by very few. There were no portraits of his father and the memory of him was
vague, indefinite, and shrouded in darkness, just as his life had been.
The Hieck household was still greatly affected by an “Atmosph re unfaßbarer
Unsicherheit” (KW 2, 15) [“atmosphere of incomprehensible uncertainty” (Muir trans.
9)] that distorted, in various ways, the lives of the five Hieck children who are now young
adults. Richard’s mother has gradually begun to find a more authentic version of herself
through contemplation in the years since the passing of her husband. Richard’s sister,
Susanne, has turned to religious devotion and is preparing to enter a convent. Richard’s
younger brother Otto, the least affected by the memories of their father, is a passionate
teenager following his interests in art, soccer, and girls. Richard’s other two siblings
have left their hometown.
Richard meanwhile has reacted against what the narrator calls the ‘vagueness’ of
his father by seeking “Eindeutigkeit” (KW 2, 18) [“definite certainty” (Muir trans. 12)] in
the rigor and discipline of mathematics, which he hopes to impart to his own students in
the future. This endeavor has determined the path of his life, and has become a safeguard
from everything that is uncertain.
The first form of uncertainty Richard encounters as an adult is in his relation to
women; for him this is an area of confusion and bewilderment. The narrator of the story
describes women as “Nachtmenschen” (KW 2, 20) [“creatures of the night” (Muir trans.
15)], in contrast to the “rein und klar und licht gleich der mathematisch durchleuchteten
Welt” (KW 2, 20) [“pure and clear and light like the shining world of mathematics” (Muir
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trans. 16)]. Darkness and night thus represent not so much evil, but vagueness and the
indefiniteness of thoughts based not on empirical facts or mathematical theorems, but on
intuitions and emotions. Thus the concept of evil may also be included among these
thoughts in darkness, but so too are notions of the good, love, etc., though Richard only
discovers this late in the novel.
Richard’s troubled psyche is in part, according to Broch, because of the decline of
a medieval theological world-view, which had provided a hierarchical system in which to
organize disparate domains of thought. The loss of this hierarchical and ordering system
caused an ever-increasing specialization of intellectual endeavors with little or no
connection to a more encompassing and holistic framework in which a particular thought
or piece of knowledge is shown to fit. It became dependent on a person’s interpretive
skill to bring coherence to one’s web of beliefs.
What makes these two problems more difficult is determining their relevance to
ethics. Broch’s novel has a Kantian leitmotif; Kant is alluded to in a couple of contexts,
one coming at the end of the novel with his famous line “der gestirnte Himmel über mir
und das moralische Gesetz in mir” (KW 2, 140) [“The starry heavens above me and the
moral law within me” (Muir trans. 176)].73 In the Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten
(1785), Immanuel Kant explains that the moral worth of an action is dependent not only
on the action itself, but also the motivation behind the action. Only if an action is willed
out of duty in accordance with the universal law of morality – the categorical imperative
– does the action have moral merit, Kant believes. There are occasions in which it may
seem to us as if our choices are the result of moral considerations, yet Kant believes that
we cannot be sure: “[it is] absolutely impossible by experience to discern with complete
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certainty a single case […] we cannot by any means conclude with certainty that a secret
impulse of self-love, falsely appearing as the idea of duty, was not actually the true
determining cause of the will” (GMS 67). The suspicion Kant levies against the
encroachment of “the dear self” in our moral deliberations is quite at odds with the
sentiment of other ethical systems, such as that of Spinoza. According to Spinoza, the
highest good for which we may hope is “self-esteem,” that is, “a joy born of the fact that
a man considers himself and his own power of acting” (Ethics 52). It is not at all clear
what Spinoza means by this, but it presents a very different notion of self-love from
Kant’s.74
While a Kantian, Broch adopts an affirming notion of self-love similar to Spinoza.
By ‘self-love’ I do not mean a self-interested narcissism, rather the affirmation of one’s
will as constitutive of who one really is, and an acknowledgement of this will as an
inviolable end which has inherent value in itself. Kant believed the will’s autonomy
depends upon the authority of the imperatives necessitated by reason, but for Broch, the
will’s autonomy depends also on the authority of the imperatives necessitated by love.
This implies that by loving an object or person, you take an interest in that object’s wellbeing; this is a self-less love. Yet by affirming your will’s selfless-love for your beloved,
you show simultaneously a love for the substance of your will, which is constitutive of
your authentic ‘self’; thus, self-love is essential for a good life, according to Spinoza.
Broch attempts to show his moral philosophy through the medium of a novel
because works of art, especially novels, are able, according to Broch, to appeal to our
practical rationality and our intuitive feelings from a more synoptic viewpoint than
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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For more on this, see Harry Frankfurt, “The Dear Self,” Philosophers’ Imprint, volume 1, No. 0, (Jan.
2001).
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philosophical arguments alone. Broch does not leave philosophy aside but incorporates it
into the narrative: Broch uses Kant’s line, “[d]er gestirnte Himmel über mir und das
moralische Gesetz in mir” (KW 2, 140) to unmask a multitude of philosophical
complexities that plague the main character of the story, Richard Hieck.
Richard seeks the epistemological certainty of mathematics in his studies of
astronomy and physics, yet when turning his examination inward to the subjective
content of his motivations, and towards his own personal moral law, he is confused by
the fragmented and opaque structure of his own will. He is unable to attain any degree of
certainty regarding what it is that he values. He fears that he is vacuous like his father.
Towards the end of the novel, his introspection becomes complicated by love and
tragedy; only through these is he able to see more clearly the substance of his own will.
Throughout the novel, Richard suffers from confusion due to his inability to
distinguish between epistemological certainty on the one hand, and subjective certainty
on the other. Wittgenstein’s Über Gewissheit elucidates this distinction, and can help
clarify the volitional paralysis that follows from subjective uncertainty, which prevents us
from having the kind of esteem for the substance of our will, i.e., our ‘self,’ which is an
essential ingredient of the good life.
I.

Kantian Ethics and Broch’s novel
Kant’s moral philosophy has been accused of being stark and demanding the kind

of rigid austerity exhibited by Kant himself. Its conception of duty, opponents argue,
forces its adherents to make the most solemn calculations regarding the universalizability
of their actions. While Kantians may act upon their desires, it is not ethically meritorious
to do so. Further, just because an action satisfies all the demands of the categorical
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imperative, it still does not guarantee that it is of any moral worth. Only an action that is
willed out of duty and in accordance with the categorical imperative is ethical. Kant’s
point is that a person cannot be considered virtuous merely by following his natural
inclinations, however benevolent those inclinations may be. It is only the person who
does what is right for the sake of doing what is right, the argument goes, that is virtuous.
But deciphering the motivation behind an action of another, or for oneself, is virtually
impossible, Kant argues. The contents of one’s will are often transient and opaque; and
humans are prone to rather grandiose feats of self-deception, particularly in regard to
their own moral character.
Broch does not challenge Kant’s conception of the moral law, nor does he dismiss
its relevance to ascertaining the moral merit of a choice. Further, Broch does seem to be
content accepting that adherence to moral duty is a necessary component of an ethic that
prescribes norms. Where Broch departs from Kant is in Kant’s suspicion of personal
desire, and the sternness with which a Kantian must hold his own hopes and fears in
check during moral deliberation.
For Broch, ethical judgments acquire a quasi-aesthetic status in which the good of
an action is perceived much in the same way as beauty is in a work of art. In the same
way that an artist’s painting is capable of evoking the most profound and subtle of human
emotions and inspiration, so too is a life well-lived. Perceiving the good in a life welllived is a phenomenological enterprise, that is to say, a mental undertaking in which a
person’s critical intellect is directed upon the sense data (i.e., phenomena) of his
conscious experience. Yet this aspect of Broch’s philosophy does not commit him to any
school of thought in the phenomenological tradition. Broch’s ethical theory has both
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phenomenological and Kantian elements. In the same way that a thing may be both
feline and mammalian, so too can a thinker maintain phenomenological and Kantian
components in his theory.
Before I address Broch’s novel in greater detail, I should clarify a few relevant
components of Broch’s philosophy. In “Zur Erkenntnis dieser Zeit: Paradigmatische
Skizzen zur Geschichtstheorie” (1919) [“On the Knowledge of this Age: Paradigmatic
Sketches of a Theory of History” (my translation)], Broch draws a distinction between
what he calls “Wirklichkeit” [reality] and “Leben” [life] (KW 10/2, 11). Reality, for
Broch, consists of the underlying causal laws that govern the events of time and space;
life is the experience of those events. If Jill (my example) has one pail of water and Jack
fetches her one more, she now has two. The law of addition underlies the experienced
event of her accumulating two pails of water; thus in this case, as in most others, reality
and life are intertwined. Reality is more fundamental because of its permanency and the
causal power that it has over life.
Broch explains that causal laws underlie our postulation of value upon things. We
value X for reason Y; our action, or choice, resulting from our postulation of value is
necessarily guided, except in the case of absent-minded convulsions, by the consideration
of whether the valued aim is taken into account. That is to say, we value an end, and thus
the means we take to achieve that end has a logic that is determined by whether our
action satisfies the demands of the aim.75 That is the ‘reality’ of ethical reasoning, but in
‘life’ only the “Erlebnisinhalt” [contents of experience] are tangibly present (KW 10/2,
25). Reconciling the a priori with the a posteriori, was a concern of Kant’s, Broch
explains, and is the most significant Kantian element in Broch’s philosophy. Broch cites
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Kant’s Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten in an attempt to show Kant’s approach to
resolving this supposed cleft:
und hier steht auch die ethische Tat Kants, nichts anderes wollend, als diesen Riß
zu schliessen – seine Forderung nach dem ‘guten Willen’, der das ‘Werk um des
Werkes und nur um des Werkes Willen’ schafft, […] m. a. W. handle, daß du das
Resultat deines Handelns, deine Wirklichkeit begreifest; was immer du schaffest,
schaffe es bewußt und der Definition deines Wertzieles gem ß, denn erst in der
Reinheit seiner Definition ist die Reinheit des Werkes, das um seiner selbst willen
geschaffen wird, begründet und gegeben. Die Totalit t solchen reinen Schaffens
aber ist die reine und objektive Wertwirklichkeit des erlebenden Menschen. (KW
10/2, 25)
and here stands also the ethical deed of Kant, wanting nothing else than to close
this gap—his requirement for the ‘good will’ that wills an action only for the sake
of the action, […] in other words, that acts in such a way that the result of its
action grasps its reality; whatever you do, do it consciously in accordance with the
definition of the valued aim, which is only grounded and given in the purity of its
definition, the purity of the action that is willed for its own sake. The totality of
such pure activity is the pure and objective value-reality of the experiencing
person. (my translation)
The onus of responsibility persons have for the ‘reality’ of their will, that is to say, the
vast web of correlative implications that follow from willing one particular object, is the
reason why, for Broch, a phenomenological approach to ethics is, by itself, insufficient.
Correlative implications are only made clear when logical connections are made between
the direct object of one’s will, and possible, or actual, states of affairs. Revealing logical
connections is an analytical task, not a phenomenological one; and is never wholly
resolvable through any method, at least not to the degree of certainty that Richard hopes
for.
Regarding Certainty
Two central philosophical issues raised by Richard’s pursuit of certainty are
directly pertinent to, and can be given a more subtle illumination by, Wittgenstein’s Über
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Gewissheit. Both of them stem from the same problem that our species faces in its
inability to attain indubitable certainty regarding a great number of beliefs. The first
consists of the difficulties we face in reconciling the different knowledge we acquire as a
result of our *ordinary* experience of life as opposed to the knowledge our species can
only attain with the aid of tools (including conceptual tools such as logic, mathematics,
scientific methods, or technological tools) that have been developed for the sake of
extending our knowledge beyond what we are capable of achieving otherwise. The
second philosophical problem, and the one that has even greater ethical implications,
results from the potential impairment that uncertainty–and its virulent offspring,
ambivalence and doubt—can cause to our agency, vitality, and aesthetic and emotional
depth.
After Richard has viewed non-empirical knowledge with pejorative cynicism, his
attitude begins to undergo a subtle change that will ultimately result in him finding a kind
of knowledge unattainable when limiting one’s inquiry to the methods and convictions of
the logical positivists of the Vienna Circle.76 This shift in attitude comes during a rather
sentimental and contemplative episode one night in the Hieck house. Richard is quietly
working on a calculation in the dimness of night when Otto says that Richard has it easy
being able to work at night instead of during the daylight hours. The narrator explains
that Otto—an aspiring artist—cannot suitably express what it is he was hoping to say.
The narrator goes on to characterize Otto’s thought as this:
das Unsichtbare in der Welt manifestiert sich in der Nacht, in der Nacht ergreift
das Denken Besitz von der Welt, doch wer die Welt mit den Augen bew ltigen
will, der ist auf die Sonne angewiesen. Und weil er es nicht ausdrücken konnte,
sondern lediglich spürte, daß es mit dem Malen zusammenhing, sagte er
schließlich nur: »Ich lerne jetzt Kupferstechen«. (KW 2, 21)
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The unseen forces in the world manifested themselves in the night, it was in the
night-time that thought embraced the whole world, but if a man wanted to
conquer the world by what he saw through his eyes, he had to depend on the sun.
And because he could not express this, because he only felt vaguely that it had
something to do with his vision as an artist, he said nothing after all but ‘I’m
learning copper-engraving now.’ (Muir trans. 17)
The things seen in daylight are empirical; the sentences that describe them are
propositions. But in the dark, one becomes more attuned to his attitude towards these
propositions; one’s perspective is thus generated and enhanced. This is the result of
seeing the intangible relations between a myriad of propositions; a vantage point afforded
not through sense data perception of the present, but through the apperception of one’s
memory.
Otto’s unarticulated thought soon leads to his comment about how funny their
family is with Susanne preparing for a convent and Richard devoted to mathematics.
Richard is moved with warmth for his brother and is brought to a reflective state of mind
that views the family synoptically; that is, from the perspective of an outsider who can
see the whole family and the various relations and components within it. This way of
seeing his family released something in Richard and he “gab sich dem Gefühle hin” (KW
2, 22) [“surrendered to the emotion” (Muir trans.18)]. The narrator does not describe this
emotion, or the thoughts that accompany it, but its effect on Richard is profound and
immediate.
Richard’s focus gradually returned to the calculation he had been working on
when Otto made the comment, but now a new “sternenhafte Landschaft” (KW 2, 22)
[“crystalline landscape” (Muir trans. 18)] opened up to Richard that could not be
described. He could sense in the distance a solution to the group-theory problem “in der
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die Zahlengruppen zwar nicht als solche zu sehen, wohl aber so leicht einzuordnen waren,
daß man die den Zahlen geöffnete, mit Zahlen sich erfüllende Landschaft in eine
beglückend logische und gleichzeitig ein wenig karussellhafte Bewegung versetzen
konnte” (KW 2, 22) [“in which the number groups, although not yet actually
distinguishable, could be so easily arranged that, when the whole landscape was filled
with their flocking constellations, one could set them all spinning like a merry-go-round
and yet in gloriously logical fashion” (Muir trans. 18)]. The solution to the problem was
still unclear, but the narrator explains Richard nonetheless felt as if he had advanced into
a new area of mathematics and discovered an insight into the infinitely complex structure
of mathematics that was constructed out of nothing other than the relations of objects to
one another. This new knowledge is incomplete, and Richard has yet to articulate it in a
theorem. Feeling its inchoate presence inspires Richard to pursue it, “er war von diesem
Ignorabismus zu immer neuen Vorstößen angestachelt” (KW 2, 49) [“driven on by that
same ignorabimus to break new ground” (Muir trans. 55)].
In “The Theme of Salvation in the Novels of Hermann Broch” (1970), James
Hardin observes that in several places in Broch’s oeuvre characters experience a
phenomenon Hardin calls “mystical salvation” (Hardin 221). By that he means an
experience through which a person gains perspective on an occurrence, often social in
nature, through which the person’s affections are moved resulting in a ‘salvation’ of sorts
from empirical habits of thinking. Unfortunately, such experiences are ephemeral and
persons often return to their prior way of thinking: “a sense of mystical salvation
overcomes many of Broch’s figures in the love experience, [but] its feeling is transient
and seems to have little impact on their lives,” explains Hardin (Hardin 221).
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Shortly after his warm emotional experience affected by the humorous view of his
loved ones, Richard gets back to work in search of a solution to a mathematical problem
sketched to him by his professor, Weitprecht. Richard’s view of the interpersonal
relations of his family is compared analogously to the problem in group-theory, on which
Richard is working tirelessly without making a breakthrough. Yet he is inspired,
nonetheless, by a vision of what it might look like: number groups spinning in perfectly
logical fashion “karussellhafte Bewegung” [“like a merry-go-round”], waiting to be
discovered in a “zart vernebelter Ferne” (KW 2, 22) [“hazy far-off horizon” (Muir trans.
18)]. And so Richard’s ambition remains undeterred by the elusiveness of his theorem
and all he can hope for is to discover another portion of the “komplizierten unendlichen
und niemals ausschreitbaren Gleichgewichtskonstruktion bloßgelegt, die an sich aus
leeren Beziehungen besteht” (KW 2, 22-23) [“complicated, infinite, boundless structure
of balanced forces which is built up out of nothing other but the relations of things to
each other” (Muir trans. 19)]. Richard’s moment of mystical salvation is due to his new
way of seeing the relations of things.
In Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein makes a categorical distinction
between seeing an object, versus seeing an object as something (193). He gives various
examples of this; the most well-known is the duck-rabbit. The drawing of the duckrabbit can be seen as either a duck or a rabbit depending on how one sees it. It is not as if
an optical illusion is occurring, rather the visual object lends itself to interpretation. What
is important in this distinction is the ability of our minds to notice aspects that may give
rise to conceptual clarity or, on the other hand, create ambiguity. The “dawning of an
aspect” (194) occurs through both visual experience and conceptual thought working in
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tandem, just as in the case that I meet an old friend and do not recognize him immediately,
it may then dawn on me that the face I am seeing is that of my old friend. Wittgenstein
explains, “what I perceive in the dawning of an aspect is not a property of an object, but
an internal relation between it and other objects” (212). Richard’s visual and social
experience of his family relations conjures in his mind a vision of an aspect that is
affective in nature, that is to say, a way of seeing his family transposed into an emotive
mental state. Yet this first dawning of an aspect engenders a correlative second aspect
that has direct implications on Richard’s mathematical problem, which the narrator
compares to a merry-go-round.
His application of this newly seen aspect to the sphere of mathematics ultimately
leads to a mathematical discovery for which Richard is critically acclaimed by his peers.
The narrator describes this as “ein Stück schöpferischer Aufhellung” (KW 2, 22) [“an act
of creative interpretation” (Muir trans. 19)]. But how, Wittgenstein asks,
is it possible to see an object according to an interpretation? The question
represents it as a queer fact; as if something were being forced into a form it did
not really fit. But no squeezing, no forcing took place here. When it looks as if
there were no room for such a form between other ones you have to look for it in
another dimension. If there is no room here, there is room in another dimension.
(200)
Richard does not consciously look for the mathematical aspect in the relations of his
family members to one another, it happened by chance. But this familial dimension
provided Richard’s mind with the picture most analogous to that of the solution to the
group theory problem he has been working on.
This episode gives us insight into a feature of Broch’s philosophy of mind—
which helps explain his aversion to the logical positivism of the Vienna Circle—namely,
what I will call Broch’s view of, for lack of better words, the inscrutability of
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intentionality.77 To illustrate this concept, let us take as our object of thought
Wittgenstein’s duck-rabbit:

Assume you have an aversion towards drawings of ducks, but you like drawings of
rabbits. If you see the duck-rabbit as a duck you will despise it, but if you see the duckrabbit as a rabbit you will like it. Now assume that you see the duck-rabbit at moment 1
as a duck, and you begin to reason about some implication that can be drawn from your
sense-data perception. You perceive the duck-rabbit drawing as distasteful, and decide
that you should not adorn your wall with distasteful drawings, from these premises it
follows logically that you should not adorn the wall of your house with the drawing. But
if, upon your conclusion, you re-examine the duck-rabbit, at moment 2, and you perceive
it as a rabbit, your line of reasoning that supported your conclusion at moment 1 is now
invalid because one of its premises is false. The inference rule of modus ponens (that if
A implies B, and A is true, then B is true) is broken due to the dual-aspect of the duckrabbit, hence the resulting contradiction and the logical fallacy. Conversationally the
valid argument looks like this: (i.) If I like a drawing, then it can adorn my wall; (ii.) I
like the duck-rabbit drawing. Therefore, (iii.) the duck-rabbit drawing can adorn my wall.
The problem with the argument is the equivocal second premise; I only like the duckrabbit drawing when I perceive it as a rabbit.
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I couldn’t think of another way to describe the concept I have in mind here without using philosophical
jargon. The concept is simpler than my verbiage would make it seem. It only amounts to the fact that, at
times, our intentionality towards an object shifts or is multi-dimensional leaving us with difficulty when we
attempt to discern the logical implications that follow from an argument in which one of its premises relies
on a definitive proposition to articulate something inherently transient or ambiguous.
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Broch’s view of the inscrutability of intentionality points out the dependency of
deductive logical rules such as modus ponens upon necessary and sufficient conditions.
The fact that I view the duck-rabbit drawing as a rabbit, and thus like it, is not a sufficient
condition to ensure that another aspect of the duck-rabbit will not cause me to dislike it.
The intentionality of my mind towards the duck-rabbit is vague and contingent. So when
my argument relies upon an intentional mental state that plays the role of a negation of a
thing X, the validity of my argument becomes susceptible to whim and caprice. These
facts do not present a formal problem to logicians, but they do present problems to
persons engaged in thought about the contents and dispositions of one’s own mind, and
the manner in which those contents and dispositions relate to the mind-independent world.
The point of all this is to show that necessary and sufficient conditions are not easily
ascribable to our attitudes towards the things in our consciousness. Thus the power of
deductive logic is tempered whenever we are trying to apply deductive rules of logic to
our experience in life; however, though its power is tempered, it is not abolished.
To help in such matters, the field of modal logic was developed in the twentieth
century to enable more nuanced applications of logic. While contemporary modal logic
was not initiated until C.I. Lewis and C.H Langford published their work Symbolic Logic
in 1932, Broch anticipates the need of more work in modal logic. Broch alludes to “die
Modalit t des Schlusses” (KW 10/2, 18) [modality of the conclusion (my trans.)], and
further to the troublesome roles of “Nötigung” (KW 10/2, 20) [necessity] and
“Möglichkeit” (KW 10/2, 21) [possibility] in logic. Broch is primarily concerned with
the difficulties posed to philosophers as they work through problems relating to
empiricism and idealism, and Kant’s synthetic/analytic distinction.
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Wittgenstein addresses the same problem as Broch in Über Gewissheit.
Wittgenstein makes a Kantian observation, namely, that we do not have direct access to
things-in-themselves but must rely on the representation given to us by our faculties of
perception. He explains it this way:
‘I know’ has a primitive meaning similar to and related to ‘I see’ … ‘I know’ is
supposed to express a relation … between me and a fact. So that the fact is taken
into my consciousness. (Here is why one wants to say that nothing that goes on in
the outer world is really known, but only what goes on in the realm of sense-data.)
This would give us a picture of knowing as the perception of an outer event
through visual rays which project it as it is into the eye and the consciousness.
Only then the question at once arises whether one can be certain of this projection.
And this picture does indeed show how our imagination presents knowledge, but
not what lies at the bottom of this presentation. (93)
From this it does not follow that the things-in-themselves are substantially different from
our representation of them, but it does force us to admit that our representations are
dubitable to a degree.
Wittgenstein’s point here can be applied to Richard’s seeing the aspect in which
the relations of his autonomous family members function in unison, like autonomous
figures on the same merry-go-round. This perception is accompanied by an affective
aspect, that is, a way of seeing the family affectively, though the narrator does not
articulate the nature of Richard’s affection. Broch explains in his commentary on the
film “Das Unbekannte X,” which was inspired by Die Unbekannte Größe, that the novel
demonstrates two types of knowledge, one that is “rein[en] Erkenntnis” (KW 2, 247)
[pure knowledge] and another that is “Erkenntnis des Gefühls” [knowledge of the
emotions] (KW 2, 247). Richard intentionally pursues pure knowledge through his work
in mathematics and physics, but through the hardships and realities of his experiences
finds himself seeking knowledge of the emotions in equal zeal. Knowledge of the
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emotions is not fully comprehensible for human understanding, the novel implies, yet
knowing one’s emotional state towards a particular thing is justifiable through
introspection. This is what Wittgenstein means when he says that there is something true
about solipsism (Tractatus 5.62).
Only when this introspective knowledge is united with pure knowledge is,
according to Broch, true knowledge of human life attainable: “Der Roman zeigt, daß es
neben dieser auch eine “Erkenntnis des Gefühls” gibt, unerfaßbar für den Verstand,
dennoch gleichberechtigt, und daß erst in der Verbindung beider das wahre Wissen um
das Leben erreicht wird” (KW 2, 247) [The novel shows that in addition to this {scientific
knowledge} there is also a ‘knowledge of the emotions,’ incomprehensible to the
understanding, nevertheless just as justifiable, and that only in the connection of both can
true knowledge of life be achieved (my translation)]. In his pursuit of mathematical
knowledge, Richard toils through the writings of his professor hoping to discover a
breakthrough like that of Leibniz’s or Cantor’s. But the larger vision of what he is
seeking fails him. Wittgenstein suggests that a person may be able to see a particular
thing, while maintaining an “aspect-blindness” towards seeing the thing for what it is, or
may be (PI 213). Similarly, Richard feels as if he is looking at the problem from the right
angle, only the larger solution has yet to present itself. Richard possesses knowledge, but
somehow it seems to him incomplete or insufficient for understanding what lies just
beyond his grasp.
Just as Hardin’s claim that mystical salvation is often transient, Richard soon
becomes oblivious to the functional aspect he had once seen in his family. Richard is to
waver in and out of aspect-blindness toward his family. He is at times unable to see in
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them the aspect that previously engendered his affection towards them. This ultimately
contributes to his brother’s feeling of abandonment and lack of brotherly devotion from
Richard preceding the climax of the story.
II.

Wittgenstein compared to Richard Hieck’s character
Though questions concerning knowledge, certainty, the categorical imperative,

etc., are best pursued with straightforward philosophical explication, the manner in which
these issues affect our individual personalities, or manifest themselves in our experience,
are best shown in the context of a person’s life. If we compare Richard Hieck with the
accounts of Wittgenstein’s personality as recorded by biographers, we see deep personal
turmoil that makes these otherwise abstract and impersonal areas in philosophy directly
relevant to the quality and depth of experience of these two personalities. Besides the
obvious facts of living in roughly the same time and place, Richard shows remarkable
similarities to Wittgenstein.
(a) Intellectual similarities
Richard’s intellectual curiosity was first stimulated by the supposed possibility of
reducing all of mathematics to logic—a project pioneered by Gottlob Frege referred to as
logicism. So too was Wittgenstein’s first interest in philosophical matters stimulated by
the foundational problems of mathematics. As a young student at the Technische
Hochschule in Berlin Charlottenburg, Wittgenstein studied mathematics as it applies to
engineering but after receiving his certificate and continuing his studies at the College of
Technology in Manchester, he became more interested in pure mathematics and its
foundations. A professor at Manchester suggested that Wittgenstein read Gottlob Frege’s
Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik: eine logisch-mathematische Untersuchung über den
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Begriff der Zahl (1884). Apparently that was enough to persuade Wittgenstein to meet
with Frege in Jena, who then redirected Wittgenstein to Bertrand Russell. At
approximately the same time, Wittgenstein lamented the fact that he could not study
physics with Ludwig Boltzmann in Vienna. Boltzmann was one of the foremost
proponents of the atomic theory in physics, but had taken a keen interest in the
philosophical implications of the theory.
Wittgenstein’s interest in atomic theory and its relations to philosophy inspired his
Tractatus, which features an acute focus on the minutia of meaning, particularly the
relation of ‘atomic’ sense data to a word, its position in a sentence representing a fact,
and the mathematical/logical relation of facts to one another. According to Russell’s
first-hand account, Wittgenstein had a profound ability to analyze the grounds that lie
behind our claims to knowledge. It is not until the 1930s that Wittgenstein begins to
acquire a more synoptic viewpoint. His later work, particularly his concepts of forms of
life, language games, his revised view of logic, and his use of thought experimentation,
suggest a more holistic attitude on the part of Wittgenstein. In Wittgenstein on Mind and
Language, David Stern explains that Wittgenstein does not abandon the belief that
language is rule-governed, but that “rule-governed behavior depends on practical context”
(120). In other words, Stern explains, “his conception of language becomes increasingly
broad, until it includes the whole range of human activity” (120). Though his philosophy
acquires a more anthropocentric focus, Wittgenstein never abandons his concern for the
logical rules implicit in language.
In Die Unbekannte Größe, Richard is trained in mathematics and physics. Upon
finishing his dissertation and publishing an article on group theory, he is offered a
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position at the university’s observatory. Like the early Wittgenstein, Richard’s
estimation of the significance of logic is supreme; “Alles, was geschieht, vollziet sich
nach logisch gebauten Gesetzen […] wenn wir die Logistik erst richtig ausgebaut haben
werden, dann haben wir die Wirklichkeit in der Hand” (KW 2, 40) [“everything that
happens follows logical laws […] If we had the science of logic properly worked out,
we’d have reality in the hollow of our hands” (Muir trans. 43)]. Richard endorses
Frege’s and Russell’s belief in logicism; as Richard explains it, the belief that “Logik und
Mathematik aber sind identisch” (KW 2, 40) [“logic and mathematics are identical” (Muir
trans. 43)]. He sees no limitation to the application of logic, and anything that would
appear to transcend logical laws he calls mysterious and dark.
Yet this lack of complete understanding is what inspires Richard to pursue science.
His intellectual passion dominates his life and extends into every aspect of his life
including his personal relations. He expresses relief any time he returns to his academic
work after a diversion. In one instance, after spending time with his sister discussing her
mystical religious beliefs, Richard is excited to return to the world of science and
expresses enthusiasm “wieder einmal mit großer Leidenschaft von
erkenntnistheoretischen und logischen Grundlagen jeglicher Forschung zu sprechen”
(KW 2, 121) [“to dilate on the epistemological and logical groundwork underlying every
king of research…” (Muir trans. 149)]. This passage is significant in Richard’s
development as a thinker, not merely as a mathematician or physicist, but as one in
search of knowledge that brings synoptic coherence to disparate and seemingly
unconnected strands of facts and concepts. Richard shares Wittgenstein’s sentiment from
Wittgentstein’s journal entry before World War I: “Don't get involved in partial problems,
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but always take flight to where there is a free view over the whole single great problem,
even if this view is still not a clear one” (NTB 23e). Richard likewise refuses, according
to the narrator, to consider “eine Aufgabe anders als im Zusammenhang des
Gesamtsystems zu sehen und von diesem aus zu begreifen (KW 2, 80)” [“any task except
in relation to a systematic whole and understand it from that point” (Muir trans. 96).]
This explains Richard’s approach to understanding the research of his professor and
advisor Weitprecht; Weitprecht’s magnum opus provides the holistic framework from
which all of his various articles acquire their significance. Richard must apply his
“Organisations- und Einfühlungsgeschick” (KW 2, 80) [“organizing and intuitive powers”
(Muir trans. 96)] in order to construct a systematic understanding of particular aspects of
Weitprecht’s theory. A particular word or concept derives its meaning only in the proper
context of the language game of Weitprecht’s scientific inquiry.78
Richard only gradually begins to realize the diverse functions of thought after
having a narrowly scientific bias towards the value of thought throughout the bulk of the
novel. Richard becomes aware of the narrowness of his focus, and the erroneous picture
of the world that can be generated as a result. One instant of this occurs as he is riding on
the train discussing Einstein’s theories in physics with Ilse, a fellow physics student. The
two of them are seated across from a man reading a newspaper. The narrator describes
the two of them looking at the cover of the newspaper and comparing “die
Allgemeinverst ndlichkeit der Zeitung mit der Isolierung ihrer eigenen
Verstandesgemeinschaft […]” (KW 2, 89) [“the universal comprehensibility of the
newspaper with the isolation of their own specialized understanding” (Muir trans. 108).]
But in spite of this admitted narrowness of their research, Richard is not overtly cynical
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about its value; he instead pulls out a piece of paper and jots down some formulae. While
Richard’s thought assumes an increasingly synoptic viewpoint, attention to acute detail is
never abandoned.
One way in which the urge to acquire a synoptic, or holistic, viewpoint manifests
itself in Wittgenstein and, even more so, Richard is through an interest in astronomy.
Norman Malcolm explains that he and his wife met Wittgenstein for a walk one evening
and Wittgenstein insisted that the three of them should represent the rotation of the solar
system. Malcolm’s wife was the sun, Malcolm was the earth, rotating around his wife as
she walked steadily through the lawn; Wittgenstein represented the moon as he ran very
quickly around Malcolm. Malcolm explains that Wittgenstein “entered into this game
with great enthusiasm and seriousness, shouting instructions at us as he ran. He became
quite breathless and dizzy with exhaustion” (Malcolm 52). At roughly the same time,
Wittgenstein was working on a conception of infinity; perhaps his interest in the topic
was stimulated by a wonder at the expanse of the universe.
Above all, the similarity Richard and Wittgenstein share is a deep (perhaps neurotic)
concern for the pursuit of understanding. Richard devotes himself to the study of science
and mathematics with, according to Broch, a monkish asceticism; Broch suggests this in
his commentary:
Der Roman Die Unbekannte Größe hat einen jungen Mathematiker zum Helden, der
in seiner Wissenschaft eine Art modernes Mönchsideal sieht und von dem Vorsatz
erfüllt ist, sein Leben aussschließlich der “reinen Erkenntnis” zu weihen. (KW 2, 247)
The novel The Unknown Quantity has as its hero a young mathematician who sees his
devotion to science as a kind of monastic ideal; he’s filled with a sense of resolution
to consecrate his life exclusively to the pursuit of ‘pure knowledge.’ (my translation)
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Richard views his pursuit of knowledge as a self-sacrificial devotion to the love of truth.
Surrendering his personal, non-academic interests is the price he is willing to pay. The
narrator describes this as a kind of surrendering; Richard’s surrendering is analogous to
his sister’s religious surrendering, and to that of Christ’s submission to Roman authorities
before his crucifixion: in all three cases the subjects choose to subject themselves to
complete personal loss out of devotion for some greater ideal. Though the ideals are
different for each, the inner act of unreserved acquiescence is the same.
Wittgenstein not only demonstrates a similar devotion through his actions, but goes
further by articulating such surrendering into a moral maxim. According to Norman
Malcolm, Wittgenstein was deeply angered that the wife of the philosopher G.E. Moore
would limit the amount of time he could devote to philosophical discussions after he
suffered a stroke. Wittgenstein believed that Moore should have been free to discuss
philosophy as long as he wanted. If he were to die from a stroke due to the stress of a
philosophical discussion, then so be it, that “would be a decent way to die: with his boots
on,” according to Wittgenstein (Malcolm 67). This reveals much about Wittgenstein’s
own sense of purpose for his life.
One is reminded here of the young Wittgenstein who, in spite of the danger of war,
focused on the problems of logic as he huddled in the dugout of a trench in World War I.
According to Bertrand Russell, Wittgenstein “was the kind of man who would never have
noticed such small matters as bursting shells when he was thinking about logic” (330).
The severity with which Wittgenstein drove himself in pursuit of philosophical
understanding is shown further by his preference for austere working conditions.
Wittgenstein searches for solitude in rural Norway, Ireland, and Austria where he can
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escape the pomp of academia and work without distractions. Further, Wittgenstein’s
willingness to give away his inherited fortune, only to live in very modest unadorned
quarters, sleeping on a cot rather than the comfort of a bed, suggests an attitude of selfsacrifice of material and social well-being for the pursuit of the life of the mind.
(b.) Moral outlook
Richard and Wittgenstein have a strikingly similar moral outlook. Russell
describes Wittgenstein as feeling that he was “a miserable creature, full of sin” (Monk
64). Wittgenstein deeply resented vanity, whether his own or that of the intellectuals in
Cambridge. As an adolescent, Wittgenstein reflected in his diary (Denkbewegungen 183)
that he was overly concerned with pleasing others. This pressure was no doubt
exacerbated by his being in the prominent Wittgenstein family, and a son to the
demanding Karl Wittgenstein. The Wittgensteins regularly hosted prominent musicians
and politicians at their house. The pressure to uphold a proper image contributed to his
vanity. As he matured and gained greater self-awareness, he lamented that this impulse
was still with him. This was a source of extreme inner turmoil for Wittgenstein, and
provided the impetus for his austere and simple lifestyle, as if it were only by directly
fighting against the temptation to construct a false image of himself that he could bear
himself. Intellectual transparency and verbal directness were the best antidotes to the
vain and pretentious claptrap he believed most philosophers to be guilty of. Wittgenstein
was influenced by Otto Weininger’s essay on Henrik Iben’s play Peer Gynt. Weininger
explains that the protagonist of the story tries to purge from his mind the vain impulses
that drive him to enhance his reputation in the eyes of his peers. For Weininger, this
leads to a neglect of one’s authentic self in exchange for living according to a
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“Lebenslüge,” that is to say, the constructed expectations or norms that others may
impose on you, rather than living according to what you find valuable in life.79
Wittgenstein’s character, according to G. H. von Wright, was one of extreme
seriousness in two regards. The first is “fixed in ‘strong principles’; the other springs
from a passionate heart […]. Wittgenstein was acutely and even painfully sensitive to
considerations of duty, but the earnestness and severity of his personality were more of
the second kind” (Malcom 19). Wittgenstein’s character manifested itself in his lectures.
One of Wittgenstein’s students and closest friends, Norman Malcom, explains the terror
of attending Wittgenstein’s lectures:
Wittgenstein was a frightening person at these classes. He was very impatient and
easily angered. If someone felt an objection to what he was saying he was
fiercely insistent that the objection should be stated. Once when Yorick Smythies,
an old friend of Wittgenstein’s, was unable to put his objection into words,
Wittgenstein said to him very harshly, ‘I might as well talk to this stove!’ Fear of
Wittgenstein helped to keep our attention at a high pitch […]. Wittgenstein’s
severity was connected, I think, with his passionate love of truth. He was
constantly fighting with the deepest philosophical problems. The solution of one
problem led to another problem. Wittgenstein was uncompromising; he had to
have complete understanding. He drove himself fiercely. His whole being was
under a tension. No one at the lectures could fail to perceive that he strained his
will, as well as his intellect, to the utmost. This was one aspect of his absolute,
relentless honesty. Primarily what made him an awesome and even terrible
person, both as a teacher and in personal relationships, was his ruthless integrity,
which did not spare himself or anyone else. (Malcolm 27)
For Wittgenstein, philosophy is like working on oneself, which he compares to the work
of an architect, the task is to change how one sees things (C&V 24). Yet Wittgenstein’s
standard for craftsmanship was perfection and, according to Malcolm, Wittgenstein had a
“genuinely moral disapproval of the flimsy or the slip-shod” (86). Thus any display of
flimsy or slip-shod philosophy by one of his students, or by himself, led to deep contempt.
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Another student of Wittgenstein’s, W. A. Hijab, said Wittgenstein “was like an atomic
bomb, a tornado — people don't appreciate that” (Fitzgerald 93). Hijab’s comments
depict both the volatility and destructive force of Wittgenstein’s teaching temperament.
Richard’s lecturing style was likewise abrasive, and his moral outlook encroached
into his lectures. Richard is portrayed as having a teaching style much like
Wittgenstein’s. According to the narrator, Richard’s “Vortr ge hatten auch hier
denselben Fehler wie im Seminar: aggressiv und autorit r, er duldete weder
Zwischenfragen noch Einw nde” (KW 2, 81) [“lectures had the same fault as his classes:
aggressive and authoritarian, he would suffer neither interruption nor objection” (Muir
trans. 98)]; and further, he was, in “seiner Unduldsamkeit kein guter Lehrer (KW 2, 18)
[“his impatience made him a bad teacher” (Muir trans. 12)]. Richard’s moral indignation
is enflamed in several ways. One way is very similar to Wittgenstein’s; namely, by the
careless and haphazard use of language when pursuing understanding. In a discussion
with the lab assistant Dr. Kapperbrunn, Richard becomes infuriated by Kapperbrunn’s
comments regarding Richard’s interest in astronomy. Richard laments the human race
for its propensity to ‘bullshit.’80 The narrator explains that Richard has
die haßerfüllte Verwunderung über die Ausdrucksf higkeit des Menschen, über
seine ruchlose F higkeit, Worte zu halbwegs geordneter Sprache zu verbinden
ohne Ahnung von dem Wesentlichen, auf das allein es ankommt und das allein
ausdruckswürdig ist. Die Sünde des Nichtwissens! die Verstocktheit des Nichtwissen-Wollens! (KW 2, 39)
an amazement, tempered with hatred, at the volubility of the human race, the
infamous readiness with which people strung words together into half-articulate
speech without having the slightest inkling of the essential meaning of things,
which alone was of any consequence and alone made speech justifiable. The sin
of not-knowing, the stupidity of not-wanting-to-know! (Muir trans. 43)
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See Harry Frankfurt, On Bullshit (Princeton: Princeton University Press), 2005.
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Richard’s indignation is not just towards the disinterest of many people in the pursuit of
knowledge, but also of our species’ ineptitude in acquiring it. Richard first associates all
that is unclear or indefinite as sinful or bad, since it cannot be given intellectual assent
from a strict and disciplined mind that demands verification as a criterion for truth. In
this sense, his attitude is much like that of the Tractarian Wittgenstein and the Vienna
Circle whose manifesto adopted, pejoratively, the Tractarian view that anything not
reducible to empirical experience was nonsensical and merely mysticism. But for
Richard, the pursuit of knowledge meant shining light into darkness, so to speak, that is
to say, identifying the sources of knowledge that generate our hitherto un-verifiable areas
of belief (such as ethics or mysticism), or to penetrate into undiscovered areas of
knowledge about our universe.
The narrator explains that Richard’s academic arguments were often with himself,
since the science of logic, Richard believed, was able to describe all causality,
understanding logic was the key to understanding the workings of his own soul, and also
his place in the universe:
[…] jedes Klarmachen der wissenschaftlichen Situation war ihm immer auch eine
Erhellung der eigenen Ziele, und dass er solche Erhellung gewinnen und ussern
konnte, das war wie eine Befreiung von dem, was hinter ihm lag, es war wie ein
beginnendes Aufatmen und wie die Verheißung eines Lichtes […]. (KW 2, 81)
[…] every clarification of a scientific situation was also to him an illumination of
his own aims, and the fact that he could achieve and utter such an illumination
was like a deliverance from all that lay behind him, like the beginning of a freer
atmosphere and the promise of a light […]. (Muir trans. 98)
This passage reveals how personal science and understanding are for Richard. While the
scientific method is characterized by cool and dispassionate discourse, underlying this
pursuit, for Richard, is an unyielding interest in his own self. He is described as being
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self-absorbed; “Er war viel zu sehr eingesponnen in sich selbst, um einen andern zur
Kenntnis zu nehmen, um mit ihm Mitleid zu haben” (KW 2, 56) [“Richard was too
wrapped up in himself to pay much attention to another, to feel any sympathy for another”
(Muir trans. 63)]. This self-absorption was caused in part by the complexity of the
contents of his mind, namely, the problems in physics and mathematics with which he
was working. This complexity was exacerbated by Richard’s belief that the same
problems had direct relevance to all conceivable problems including those of Richard’s
own feelings. To make matters even worse for Richard was the apparent discrepancy in
his ability, on the one hand, to resolve mathematical paradoxes, and his emotional
ineptitude on the other. The narrator of the novel explains that in “menschlichen Dingen
begriff Richard langsam” (KW 2, 56) [“Richard was slow of comprehension where
human feelings were concerned” (Muir trans. 62)]. Richard’s social intelligence is
inhibited by his chronic ambivalence towards others, likely a result of his intellectual
habit of suspending judgment, which in some social and aesthetic situations prevents
depth or perspective.
(c).

Cynicism Towards Academia

Cynicism towards academia, or at least towards hyper-intellectualism, is a
leitmotif that runs through Broch’s novel. Richard admires his dissertation advisor,
Professor Weitprecht, for his brilliance in science, but begins to resent him for his antisocial behavior. When Richard visits Weitprecht at his private residence, Mrs.
Weitprecht greets Richard. She does not wait long before she discourages Richard from
pursuing a career as a professor like her husband: “Ich warne alle jungen Leute vor der
akademischen Laufbahn” (KW 2, 54) [“I always warn young people against an academic
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career” (Muir trans. 61)]. Weitprecht is portrayed in this scene as lonesome, unsociable,
and absentminded. When he sees Richard he looks at him with a look of
incomprehension and quickly greets him only to be distracted by the papers he’s
shuffling on his desk. Instead of engaging Richard in friendly conversation, Weitprecht
calls for his wife to see if she can find something for him. Weitprecht is searching for
two pages of notes relating to his academic work. Finally his wife points to them lying
on his desk and Weitprecht is relieved, but still distracted. It is only when she urges
Weitprecht to greet Richard that he engages Richard in conversation. But Richard
suspects that Weitprecht does not even recognize him. The conversation immediately
turns to Weitprecht’s research. The narrator explains that Richard begins to despise
Weitprecht; Richard realizes how “verpfuscht” (KW 2, 56) [“deformed” (Muir trans. 63)]
this man’s life is. Richard perceives Weitprecht’s narrowness and lack of social
understanding and suspects there may be some connection to his inordinate amount of
devotion to the pursuit of knowledge of the minutia of physics, while neglecting
knowledge of human life.
In another scene, Richard comments that science is a “dürres Geflecht, an dem
eine Schar von Blinden in unsinniger Weise besch ftigt war” (KW 2, 42) [“irrelevant
tangle at which blind men pick insanely” (Muir trans. 46)]. In “Brochs Drehbuch Das
Unbekannte X: Eine filmhistorische Verortung” (2009), Claudia Liebrand suggests that
the first section of the film Das Unbekannte X, based on Broch’s novel, can be read as an
“Universit tssatire” (Liebrand 98) [“university satire” (my translation)] depicting the
“Eitelkeiten und Beschr nktheiten des deutsch-österreichischen Universit tssystems”
(Liebrand 98) [“vanity and narrowness of the German-Austrian University system” (my
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translation)]. While Richard’s disdain of academia stems from the narrowness forced by
the specialization of academic research and the negligence that ensues towards the pursuit
of a holistic worldview, Wittgenstein’s disdain of academia is caused largely by the
pretension of the academic climate (for which he blames himself for contributing).
Wittgenstein, according to Malcolm, was “revolted” by his academic lectures, he
“felt disgusted with what he had said and with himself” (27): his disgust was attributable
to the vanity and incompleteness of the thoughts expressed in them. Wittgenstein warned
Malcom against the trappings of academia, observing that a “normal human being could
not be a university teacher and also an honest and serious person” (30). Wittgenstein
“attempt [ed] to persuade me,” according to Malcom, “to give up philosophy as a
profession. He commonly did this with other students of his” (30). Malcolm goes on to
explain that Wittgenstein believed professors’ professional vanity and ambitious trifling
impair their ability to do honest research. In a letter to Malcolm, Wittgenstein
congratulates Malcolm for receiving his PhD: “And now: may you make good use of it!
By that I mean: may you not cheat either yourself or your students. Because, unless I’m
very much mistaken, that’s what will be expected from you. And it will be very difficult
not to do it, & perhaps impossible; & in this case: may you have the strength to quit” (36).
Wittgenstein eventually takes his own advice and resigns his professorship at Cambridge,
in part so that he can devote himself to his philosophical work.
In one respect, Richard and Wittgenstein do share a common reason to despise
academia; namely, the vexing turmoil caused by pursuing seemingly un-resolvable
problems. The narrator explains that Richard “sch mte sich seines Vortrags […] es war
die Scham der Unzul nglichkeit, die ihn befallen hatte” (KW 2, 98) [“felt ashamed of his
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lecture […] it was the shame of insufficiency that seized him” (Muir trans. 118)].
Similarly, according to Malcolm, Wittgenstein was “constantly depressed, I think, by the
impossibility of arriving at understanding in philosophy” (32). Part of the cause of
Wittgenstein’s revulsion over his lectures was the incompleteness of the thoughts
expressed in them. Rudolf Carnap describes the grief involved in Wittgenstein’s pursuit
of understanding: “When he started to formulate his view on some specific problem, we
often felt the internal struggle that occurred in him at that very moment, a struggle by
which he tried to penetrate from darkness to light under an intense and painful strain,
which was even visible on his most expressive face” (Monk 244). One source of relief
Wittgenstein had from the rigors of philosophy was film; after lecturing he would often
watch an American film (apparently he despised British movies). Another source of
relief were detective stories, the resolution offered by detective stories brought
satisfaction to his seemingly insatiable desire to get to the bottom of problems.81
Richard, on the other hand, finds little relief from the un-resolvable (at least to
him) problems of mathematics; they plague him continuously. A temporary release from
this burden comes only toward the end of the novel, the narrator explains that Richard is
doing research at the university when a “Strom unbekannten Lebens drang von irgendwo
herein. Strom einer noch unbekannten Evidenz, die irgendwo floß, einer Evidenz, die
allen eigentlichen Sinn, sogar den der Mathematik tragen mochte. Denn das Ziel der
Erkenntnis liegt außerhalb der Erkenntnis” (KW 2, 106-07) [“current of unknown life
came surging in from somewhere, a current from some as of yet unknown source of
evidence which might hold the real meaning of everything even of mathematics. For the
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purpose of knowledge lies outside knowledge” (Muir trans. 130)]. Shortly after this
experience, Richard and his new love, Ilse, kiss in a moment of passionate embrace. This
display of love takes Richard to a blissful state: “Es war das Herausgehobensein aus dem
Meere […] das Grauen der Freiheit, das Phantom des Mittags” (KW 2, 108) [“It was an
uplifting out of the sea […] the shudder of freedom, the spectre of noon” (Muir trans.
132)]. What had seemed important to Richard, namely, the pursuit of intellectual
understanding, at once became trivial and unimportant. Richard is released into a new
way of seeing the world, and a new state of being. Though this “mystical salvation”
(221), as Hardin calls it, is temporary, the new way of seeing the world makes it possible
for Richard to affirm the subjective contents of his will. It becomes clearer to him what
he wills; he has acquired a degree of subjective certainty.
III.

Subjective Certainty and its Relation to Human Flourishing
In Über Gewissheit, Wittgenstein makes a case against epistemological

skepticism. For the sake of our interest in Broch’s Die Unbekannte Größe, I will pick
and choose some relevant aspects of Wittgenstein’s conception of certainty, and apply
them in a way that Wittgenstein may not have intended, but that still yield some
interesting points. Wittgenstein’s Über Gewissheit is a collection of notes, written in the
last two years of Wittgenstein’s life and not intended for publication. Wittgenstein’s
thoughts are in response to G. E. Moore’s “Proof of an External World” (1939) and
“Defense of Common Sense” (1925).
One of the aspects of certainty that Wittgenstein broaches is the question of
whether, or in what cases, a notion of certainty is merely a psychological phenomenon, or
in other words, a degree of conviction regarding a particular truth (e.g., that ‘here is a
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hand’, etc.). If you are walking through a forest, explains Wittgenstein, and stumble
upon a house, you might say, “There’s a house.” In this case you have a high degree of
certainty because there is no evidence against your proposition. It is possible that the
house is in fact not really a house, perhaps it was just an illusion. But you may increase
the degree of certainty you have in believing it is a house by walking up closer to it, or
walking around it. The highest degree of certainty is achieved by anticipating and
eliminating reasons for doubt. In this case you have achieved not merely a psychological
certainty, (i.e., a very strong conviction about the truth of the sentence), but also an
epistemic certainty (or as much of it as is possible).
Epistemic certainty is achieved when there is no good reason to doubt x.
Wittgenstein explains, “there is a tone of doubt, and a tone of conviction, but no tone of
knowledge” (Malcolm 92). What he is doing here is drawing a distinction between
psychological and epistemic certainty. The skeptic says that we don’t know something if
it is possible to conceive of a reason to doubt it, for instance, that something we discover
in the future might make it untrue. But for Wittgenstein this kind of skepticism is out of
focus and masks the way we ascertain certainty. For Wittgenstein, certainty is evinced by
our practical considerations. If one were to entertain a speculative doubt about whether
or not one’s eyes or lungs exist, this doubt would be alleviated in that very moment in
which the doubter breaths or sees. Such practical considerations make speculative doubt
an absurdity for Wittgenstein: “Suppose a person of normal behavior assured us that he
only believed … he had hands and feet when he didn’t actually see them, and so on. Can
we show him that it is not so from the things he does (and says)?” (OC 428).
Wittgenstein’s pragmatist argument defeats the skeptic’s objection by showing its
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incoherence against the backdrop of the skeptic’s actions. Certainty of many beliefs is
presupposed and also justified by our engagement in, and discourse about, the world.82
While Wittgenstein’s concern is with our certainty in the existence of the external
world, I would like to redirect this concern to our certainty regarding our attitudes and
appraisal of value regarding things. I may ask myself, as Wittgenstein does, ‘am I certain
that the house exists’, but I may also ask myself a question such as ‘am I certain that I
want to continue living in this house and not some other.’ In the latter case, the question
of certainty is not answered definitively by empirical evidence, it is admittedly of the
psychological kind. However, using Wittgenstein’s pragmatist grounds for knowledge,
the belief that ‘I am certain I want to live in this house’ may be justifiable not merely by
inner conviction, but also in examining reasons to the contrary. If there exists no reason
(and no inner voice) against your continued desire to live in the house, then the belief
may acquire an epistemic status. The fact that you continue to choose to live in the house
(assuming you have the option of leaving) is enough evidence for you to assume that you
are certain you want to live there. The example I just provided is perhaps trivial, but
there are many questions regarding the appraisal of value which have far-reaching
consequences, and present troubling challenges to the conscientious thinker.
Wittgenstein’s Über Gewissheit has had an enduring influence on contemporary
philosophy of action and a brief excursion will help us see how subjective certainty has
important ethical implications. In “The Importance of What We Care About” (1988),
Frankfurt explains that philosophers have committed a tremendous amount of effort to
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finding answers to two broad questions; those with a concern for “deciding what to
believe…” and those for deciding “how to behave” (80). But, according to Frankfurt,
there is another branch of inquiry whose questions are directly pertinent to our ability to
understand ourselves and to flourish; namely, “what to care about” (80). The question is
fundamental because its answers provide us with, according to Frankfurt, a structured set
of ends that we can pursue wholeheartedly, which Frankfurt considers essential to, but
does not guarantee, a life well-lived. For Frankfurt, doubt, or ambivalence, towards what
we value forges an inner division that cripples us, diminishing our vitality.
For Frankfurt, what prevents us from becoming alienated from our authentic
selves is identifying what he calls “volitional necessities.” That is to say, things about
which we cannot help but care. These could be almost anything from an invigorating
hobby, to a loved one, to an ideal, etc. While some ends may be more rewarding than
others to care about, this is not Frankfurt’s point. He is not so much concerned with the
specificity of the ends being pursued, rather the role they play in restoring an inner
harmony to the agent. By definition, a volitional necessity is the result of an appraisal of
value of a thing, which it is literally unthinkable to question. An example might be that
of the love of a parent for a child. It is unthinkable for a parent (at least for most parents)
to view their child with apathy. Parents are most often incapable of impartiality towards
the well-being of their child. Thus they care to act in such a way that preserves that
child’s well-being without any thought to the contrary.
Frankfurt believes that many are plagued by a restlessly critical mind that
scrutinizes the value they may project upon an object. By identifying a set of valuable
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ends, and giving assent to its privileged place in one’s conduct, an agent’s critical
intellect is quieted and his humanity is restored from the paralysis caused by ambivalence.
Frankfurt seems to be arguing in a Wittgensteinian vein. According to
Wittgenstein, “some propositions are exempt from doubt, are as it were like hinges on
which those turn” (OC 342). The hinge propositions that Wittgenstein evokes fit
irrevocably in a system of a language game. He explains further:
It is quite sure that motor cars don’t grow out of the earth. We feel that if
someone could believe the contrary he could believe everything that we say is
untrue, and could question everything that we hold to be sure. But how does this
one belief hang together with all the rest? We would like to say that someone
who could believe that does not accept our whole system of verification. The
system is something that a human being acquires by means of observation and
instruction. I intentionally do not say ‘learns.’ (OC 279)
Wittgenstein’s concern in this passage is specifically with empirical facts regarding
which persons may obtain verification from a source external to their minds, through
observation and instruction. But the kind of verification that is important to Die
Unbekannte Größe is the kind Richard seeks regarding his feelings and intuitions. While
a material observation may stimulate an internal affect in the observer, the verification of
the feeling is not the external object of observation, but internal psychic material in one’s
mind.
How then does one acquire this kind of subjective certainty that is not verified by
motor cars, trees, a hand, or a house (all examples used by Wittgenstein)? In Die
Unbekannte Größe, Richard mistakenly believes that all knowledge is empirical and
rational. The dark and mysterious realm of one’s psyche, Richard believes, operates
according to logical rules; though the science of logic lags behind and is too incomplete
to grasp how the psyche works, according to Richard. But Richard is confused about this,
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and his confusion is resolved through his love affair with Ilse. Richard discovers the
boundary of logic as he steps across it.
As it turns out, love is not the result of reasoning; it is not a conclusion supported
by premises.83 It does not, in most cases, depend upon reasons. And it is not up to the
logician to conduct a deductive analysis of love’s properties. In other words, love does
not have a logic.84 Love, according to Frankfurt, creates reasons (TOS 25). That is to say,
the concern that a lover has towards his beloved compels him to consider what action
would honor that love. Love thus imposes some constraints upon the lover’s will insofar
as the lover has compelling reasons to do some things and not others. But in the life of
Richard’s character, love plays a more fundamental role in his agency than providing
practical constraints on his behavior.
Richard’s hypertrophic rationality has prevented him from loving with the kind of
depth more common to our species; not from loving mathematical and scientific truths,
which Richard shows profound devotion, but humans, including himself. Richard begins
to identify in himself a desire for greater social depth; this desire becomes apparent to the
reader as Richard feels revulsion towards Weitprecht for his un-social behavior. The
narrator of the novel directs the reader’s attention to the intellectual alienation felt by
Richard in contrast to his brother Otto’s vitality. Richard embraces his stoicism early in
the novel and sees it as a virtue for the pursuit of intellectual understanding. But his
stoicism is eventually broken down by his love for Ilse and the death of Otto. These two
events play decisive roles in Richard’s discovery of what it is he cares deeply about. The
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My view of the concept of love has been influenced by Harry Frankfurt, Necessity, Volition, and Love.
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) 1999.
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What I mean is that love for an object is not generated through logical reasoning. In one sense, love does
have a logic. If you love X, and Y has some effect upon X, your attitude towards Y may be affected.

!

$'+

objects of Richard’s love, Ilse and Otto, function as ‘volitional necessities’ which not
only give him reasons for acting, but engender inside him a subjective certainty, that is to
say, a strength of conviction verified not through observation or instruction, but through
self-reflexive introspection upon the contents of his own psyche and through his actions
that follow from his emotion.
It is through experience that Richard acquires subjective certainty. The
achievement of certainty occurs, broadly speaking, in two regards. The first is through an
expanse of time in which his relations to Ilse and Otto acquire meaning for him. Through
the collection of memories of these two individuals, Richard is able to muster a feeling
for them via apperception. They are not mere strangers to Richard, but instead each
plays a unique role in Richard’s psychic biography. Quite beyond his conscious
awareness, Richard has come to love Ilse and Otto. The second way through which
Richard acquires subjective certainty is in the specific moment in which his subconscious
feelings are brought into his conscious mental perception. In respect to his love for Ilse,
Richard becomes aware of his love for her as she kisses him and utters the words ‘I love
you.’ The feelings existed prior to this experience, though Richard had yet to embrace
them. The same can be said regarding Otto’s death. Upon hearing the gruesome news,
Richard’s brotherly love for Otto is expressed through profound mourning. Both of these
moments of love carry a personal significance for Richard that makes his previous
concerns for discovering mathematical and scientific truths seem trivial. The subjective
importance of his objects of love trumps any objective importance that his academic
work might entail.
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Richard’s thoughts regarding love become clear to him in a scene in his devout
sister Susanne’s room. On the wall are the words “Du bist der Herr, ich bin Dein Knecht”
(KW 2, 119) [“Thou art my master, I am thy servant” (Muir trans. 147)]. Richard sees
these words and thinks to himself, “die Welt brennt in uns, nicht außer uns” (KW 2, 120)
[“the world burns inside us, not outside us” (Muir trans. 147)]. These words ignite a
mystical impulse in Richard. He looks at Ilse and has a “unheimlich” (KW 2, 120)
[“uncanny” (my trans.)] feeling: “es war die Blindheit, unheimlich und vorstellbar, und
eine wehe und blinde Z rtlichkeit war es, die ihn überkam; die Liebe als unendliche
Aufgabe, ja, und als Knecht ihr zu dienen, wie man der Erkenntnis zu dienen hat!” (KW
2, 120) [“It was like blindness, uncanny and unimaginable, and it was a pitiful and blind
tenderness that overcame him; Love as an unending task, yes, and to serve Love as a
servant, as one had to serve Knowledge” (Muir trans. 147)]. This passage does not
suggest Richard has lost any fervor for his pursuit of knowledge, but that he has
identified love as an equally compelling end. But it is not love in general that is
compelling to Richard; his love has a particular direct object: Ilse. Richard has acquired
a high degree of subjective certainty regarding the importance of his beloved Ilse. The
conviction of the importance of her well-being gives Richard a final end that can be
willed without instrumental considerations. The narrator expresses Richard’s mystical
creed: “das göttliche Ziel des Seins liegt ausserhalb des Seins, das letzte Ziel der Liebe
liegt ausserhalb der Liebe und ist doch die Liebe” (KW 2, 120) [the divine end of Being
lies beyond Being, the final end of love lies beyond love and yet is love (my trans.)].85 I
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think this statement is confusing, but it contains something essential to the novel. I will
try to unpack it here through some rudimentary conceptual analysis.86
An ‘end’ is a point at which we may direct our perceptions, attitudes, or actions.
An end’s status as an end suggests it is important to us in itself; but it may still be
possible that the end serves as means to yet another end.87 A ‘divine end’ is metaphysical,
not contained in the objects of the world. Our ‘Being’ is the self-reflexive consciousness
of the phenomena of our minds; in other words, it is the state of mind that prevails when
one directs one’s attention to capture phenomenal experience and simultaneously its
subjective meaning. To say that ‘the divine end of Being lies beyond Being’ suggests
that our self-reflexive consciousness must have some direct object which itself is not
reducible to mental origins; thus Broch is denying solipsism.
The second half of the creed is more challenging to understand. A ‘final end’ is
one that has no further conceivable utility. Unlike a mere end, the value of a final end is
wholly terminal; it can command authority come what may. A lover may love a final end,
but love itself does not present itself to our consciousness directly; rather our
consciousness is directed toward the beloved object. One may define a concept of love,
and esteem such a concept, but such esteem is derived in recognition of the role love
plays in our psyche, not from the concept itself. In other words, when we love something
we adopt an attitude towards it. The attitude is not an object, rather it is about an object.
There may be properties that the object possesses (red, charm, etc.) that have a causal
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Though analysis will not do the mystical creed justice, or serve as a cheap substitute for the experience
that underlies it, it may provide an avenue for attaining a conceptual understanding of the variables
contained in it.
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Imagine that I go to college to get a degree. I take courses as a means to achieve that end. But after
college, the degree might serve as a means to another end, say, getting employed.
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force in generating love, but not a property called love. The attitude towards the object
comes with correlative considerations that may then serve as sources for other loves.88
Finally, Richard’s mystical creed contains an obvious paradox, how can something lie
beyond love and yet be love?
If we adopt a Wittgensteinian conception of certainty to this paradox we may
surmise that what the narrator expresses is that love is not reducible to an attitudinal
disposition or affection, but a particular configuration of the will, that is to say, love is a
matter of volition. According to Wittgenstein’s pragmatist conception of certainty, the
fact that we act in such a way (except in cases of involuntary convulsion, etc.) is evidence
that we have a degree of certainty about something. The pragmatist argument made by
Wittgenstein is that our action entails a suspension of doubt regarding the importance of
the end we are pursuing or the means employed to achieve that end. Hence with this in
mind the paradox can be viewed in the following way; love is affective in so far as it
determines what end we deem inherently valuable, yet love is also volitional insofar as it
determines the course of our conduct towards our beloved final end.
This conception of love defeats the skeptic’s arguments against our ability to be
certain about our love. The skeptic wants to claim that our certainty regarding what we
love is merely a matter of conviction, but Wittgenstein argues that it is something logical
as well, since love provides the reasons to justify our volitional action, and verbal
utterances, towards the object loved. What is needed, according to Wittgenstein, to
defeat the skeptic’s arguments doubting our ability to ascertain certainty regarding
experiential statements is to show “that the highest degree of certainty is nothing
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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For instance, imagine I love it when a specific sports team wins. If a player on that team plays an
important role in that team’s victory, he may engender my affection.
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psychological but something logical: that there is a point at which there is neither any
‘making more certain’ nor any ‘turning out to be false.’ Some experiential statements
have this property” (Malcolm 91). Wittgenstein goes on to explain that in teaching a
language to a child, one does not say “‘I believe that that is red’ or ‘I know that that is
red,’ but simply ‘that is red’” (92). The statement is learned without a reservation
because such statements are required for learning the language. A judgment may turn out
to be false, but those are exceptional cases, explains Wittgenstein. His point is that some
propositions are essential to a “frame of reference”; without them it is impossible to make
judgments about anything at all. Yet we do, and must, make judgments in order to act
and choose; hence we demonstrate a degree of certainty of our belief about what we
value or will by infering to choose in one way and not in another.
Ilse and Richard soon experience this discrepancy between choice and thought.
Ilse is spending time with Richard discussing mathematics and the cosmos when the
narrator explains that with
jedem Atemzug den unlöslichen Zusammenhang zwischen Gedachtem und
Erlebtem, zwischen Denkbarem und Erlebbarem als ein neues und großes
Aufklingen ihres ganzen Wesens empfand, denn das Erkennen, in dem dies
geschah, schwebte einem vielfachen Echo gleich im Gewölbe des Seins […]. (KW
2, 96-97)
every breath she drew [she] felt the indissoluble relation between what was
thought and experienced, what could be thought and experienced, as a new and
wonderful harmony of her whole being; for the knowledge by means of which
this happened floated like a manifold echo in the vault of Being […]. (Muir trans.
116)
As Richard and Ilse kiss, the narrator explains that they are “losgelöst von ihrem
Willen, losgelöst von ihrem Sein, getragen von der Woge der Dunkelheit, die über ihnen
zusammenschlug” (KW 2, 108) [“released from all willing, released from Being, upborne
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by the wave of darkness that washed over them” (Muir trans. 132)]. But Richard and Ilse
are not alone in discovering the importance of one’s subjective objects of devotion and
care; Weitprecht experiences something similar.
Weitprecht takes a vacation–which is very out-of-character for him—and returns
with a different perspective on the significance of his academic work. The narrator does
not divulge the full details of this vacation, or the causes of Weitprecht’s new perspective,
but what is clear is that Weitprecht used to be ‘drawn irresistibly’ to the university but
now feels disenchanted with academic work. Richard insists to Weitprecht that his
theories are important “au&er jedem Zweifel” (KW 2, 123) [“beyond all doubt” (Muir
trans. 152)], but Weitprecht replies:
Die objektive wohl, mein lieber Doktor Hieck, so will ich’s wenigstens hoffen,
aber die subjektive Wichtigkeit hat nachgelassen . . . ja, ja.. sehen Sie, wenn man
mich nicht nach Nauheim geschickt h tte … dann w re ich heute
wahrscheinlich noch der Alte. (KW 2, 123)
The objective importance certainly, my dear Doctor Hieck, at least I hope so; but
their subjective importance isn’t what it was. . . Well, well… you see, if they
hadn’t sent me to Nauheim…. Then I should probably be the same man today.
(Muir trans. 152)
Weitprecht’s wife insisted that he take a leave to become cleansed by the hot springs at
Bad Nauheim, which are believed to cure neuroses, among other ailments. Weitprecht
goes on to explain:
wer an der wissenschaftlichen Erkenntnis arbeitet, arbeitet mit siebzig genau so,
wie er mit dreißig gearbeitet hat . . . und schließlich wird er gef llt, mittendrin
gef llt, aber an keinem Ende, weil er seines eigenen Todes vergessen hat . . . ein
böser Mensch mit einem bösen Herzen . . . ja, ja, lieber Freund, mit einem bösen
Herzen, das im Namen der Erkenntnis viel Unrecht geübt hat. (KW 2, 125)
Anyone who labors at scientific knowledge does his work at seventy just as he did
when he was thirty ... and finally he is struck down, struck down in the middle of
it, but without reaching an end … an evil man with an evil heart ... Yes, yes, my
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dear friend, with an evil heart, which has committed much wrong in the name of
knowledge. (Muir trans. 155)
The wrong that Weitprecht has committed in the name of knowledge is the same wrong
that Richard has committed; namely, in seeking a purely formal knowledge which is void
of content pertinent to one’s existential life. The ‘evil’ in such an omission is in failing to
identify particular direct objects of one’s love, or will. The result is a loveless,
volitionally vacuous, hypertrophically rational person whose humanity is lethargic and
inert.
IV.

Conclusion: Answering the question ‘how should I live?’
Wittgenstein asks “what is the use of studying philosophy if all that it does for

you is to enable you to talk with some plausibility about some abstruse questions of logic,
etc. and if it does not improve your thinking about the important questions of everyday
life?” (Kenny 10). For Richard, questions about life, and how to live, are more difficult
than those of mathematics or science because of the inchoate nature of the concepts
centrally implicated in the answers. Answering the question ‘how should I live?’ is
challenging in primarily two respects. The first is in delineating what action is morally
permissible, or required by the demands of ethical normativity, and the second, even
more challenging task is determining for yourself what ends are worthy of your concern.
Complicating the second task is the correlative question that accompanies it; namely,
what would my life consist of in pursuit of a specific end. An agent may deem an end
valuable, but recognize that a life lived in pursuit of that end might be vapid. In such
case the agent may feel compelled to pursue ends that are of lesser inherent value, but
whose means of pursuit are more invigorating and likely to provide sustained satisfaction
and meaning in life. At the beginning of this chapter I mentioned that Broch is
!
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influenced significantly by Kant and Spinoza in his attempt to answer these questions, I
will return now to these important philosophers.
In Treatise on the Improvement of the Understanding (1662), Spinoza expresses
despair at the temporality of his surroundings and resolves to find something that will
enable him “to enjoy continuous, supreme and unending happiness” (3). Spinoza
suggests that this entails improving one’s rational understanding of the world, which is
commensurate more or less with a person’s enjoyment of it. Broch says something
remarkably similar in his philosophical writings: “Rationalismus geht oftmals mit
Lebensgenuß Hand in Hand” (KW 9/1, 111) [“Rationalism often goes hand in hand with
an enjoyment of life” (HHT 33)].89 According to Spinoza, finding joy in the attainment
of wealth, sensual pleasure, or fame, is problematic because it arouses tumultuous states
of mind such as competitiveness, envy, fear of loss, etc. Instead Spinoza believes that
only through the infinite and eternal can one find enduring happiness. What he means by
this is that if something is infinite, there is no competition with others for possession of it
since there is not a limited supply. Further, if it is eternal, one has no fear of losing it; it’s
always going to be there. The fact that something is infinite and eternal is not a sufficient
condition to guarantee that it will ensure enduring happiness, according to Spinoza, but it
is a necessary condition. What Spinoza’s ethical outlook seeks to generate is a personal
character in which the laws governing nature—those of physics, biology, and
mathematics, etc.—are in accord with those guiding one’s choices; or in his words “the
knowledge of the union existing between the mind and the whole of nature” (6). This
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Broch’s conception of rationalism entails some sort of instrumentalism, which in the context of art can
lead to adornment concealing something ugly; in this context rationalism has some negative connotations.
Regardless of whether it has potential to lead to an aesthetic false consciousness and kitsch, in its better
applications Broch views rationality favorably, it is not incorrigibly at odds with aesthetics.
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cohesiveness produces a stability of mind that enables our various competing and
conflicting inner impulses to coalesce in harmony to the forces of nature that are at work
both in us and in the world. From this vantage point we can reassess the value we ascribe
to various ends, and the means through which ends are pursued.
Not surprisingly, Spinoza’s ethical outlook was popular with the Vienna Circle,
and other scientists and mathematicians such as Wittgenstein, Russell, and Einstein. The
moment in which one becomes most perceptive of the infinite and eternal, is, according
to Broch, when one encounters death:
Und weil die Ewigkeit des Todes die Pforte ist, die einzige Pforte, durch die das
Absolute in seiner ganzen magischen Bedeutsamkeit ins reale Leben einzieht, in
seiner Gefolgschaft die magischen Worte von der Unendlichkeit und von der
Ewigkeit und vom All nach sich ziehend, Worte, die als solche einer logischen
Zergliederung sonst kaum standhalten würden, und weil der Tod in seiner
unvorstellbaren Lebensferne dennoch von so n chster Lebensn he ist, daß er die
Seele des Menschen unabl ssig mit seinem physischen Sein und metaphysischen
Dasein erfüllt, deshalb muss seiner Absolutheit, die die einzige Absolutheit der
Realit t und der Natur ist, eine Absolutheit entgegengeworfen werden, die, vom
Willen des Menschen getragen, die Absolutheit der Seele, die Absolutheit der
Kultur zu schaffen bef higt ist; und diese sehr merkwürdige Bef higung der
Seele, vielleicht die merkwürdigste Erscheinung der menschlichen Existenz,
findet ihre Ausdrucksform in jenem stets sich erneuernden Akt, der der Akt der
Humanit t schlechthin zu nennen ist, und eben in dieser Humanit t zum Akt der
Wertsetzung und Wertbildung sich erhoben hat. (KW 9/2 125)
And because the eternity of death is the gateway, the only gateway through which
the absolute enters into real life in all its magical meaningfulness, bringing in its
train the magic words “infinity, “eternity,” and “universe,” words that otherwise
could not withstand logical analysis, […] because of death, the only absolute of
reality and of nature, another absolute must be thrown up against it by the human
will, which can create the absolute of the soul and the absolute of civilization; and
this remarkable ability of the soul, perhaps the most amazing phenomenon of
human existence, finds its form of expression in that ever-renewing act, which
could simply be called the “act of being human,” and in this humanity, human
existence is elevated to the act of value setting and value creating. (G&Z 9)
This passage suggests not only a limitation to the application of logical analysis, but also
the necessity of existential awareness, and volitional malleability, if persons are to

!

$(*

ascertain what it is that is meaningful to them and achieve the fruition of their full
humanity.
In Die Unbekannte Größe, the concept of infinity is introduced through Richard’s
investigations of group theory. The concept of eternity, on the other hand, is introduced
through the death of Richard’s brother Otto. As Richard mourns the suicidal drowning of
his brother, he gains perspective on the transience of human life. It is through this
heightened awareness that it becomes clearer to Richard what he cares most deeply
about: in this case the life of his brother. This experience spawns value in the sense that
Richard’s endless striving for certainty is put to rest and the inner division created by his
chronic ambivalence towards all things is resolved, albeit temporarily. Richard can
wholeheartedly indentify with his love for his brother, and faces no uncertainty as to
whether his brother’s death merits his mourning; it would be unthinkable for him to
remain passively unmoved by the event. He is driven by an ‘inner necessity’ to mourn.
The experience transforms Richard’s outlook on the world. He arrives at the mortuary to
see Otto’s corpse; the narrator explains that “angesichts dieses Todes begann etwas in
Richard zu leben” (KW 2, 134) [“in the face of this death something began to live in
Richard” (Muir trans. 167)]. Richard was able to hear a ‘living voice in his heart’; as he
held Otto’s hand, Richard began to cry out unashamedly.
The narrator explains that Richard’s deep mourning and new perspective on
mortality liberates him from a burden, though Richard does not know what the nature of
that burden is:
denn in dem Animalischen, das da aufgeschrien hatte, und in der Furcht, deren
Schrei alles Animalische durchzittert, war ein Wissen durchgebrochen, vom
Animalischen getragen und doch die Furcht überdeckend, ein sonderbares und
einmaliges Wissen, das in keinerlei System stand und daher auch nicht beweisbar
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war, vollkommen isoliert, trotzdem Leben, trotzdem Erkenntnis, und in gleicher
Weise vom Animalischen wie vom Erkennen gespeist. […] ein Wissen, das, über
Otto und über Ottos Tod weit hinausreichend, die Ganzheit der Welt umfaßte und
bei aller Unbeweisbarket, bei aller Isoliertheit eindeutig, hell und bestimmt war,
befreit von aller Mehrsinnigkeit, befreit vom Flackern der brennenden Dunkelheit.
(KW 2, 135)
For in the animal instinct that cried out in him, and in the fear whose cry vibrates
through all that is animal, an awareness had broken through, borne on his animal
nature and yet transcending fear, a strange and unique awareness that could be
found in no system and so was not demonstrable, complete in its isolation, but life
nevertheless, knowledge nevertheless, and nurtured in like manner from his
animal nature and his mind. […] an intuition and recognition […] far
transcending Otto and Otto’s death, embraced the totality of the world, and
despite its undemonstrability and its isolation remained simple, clear, and definite,
freed from all doubleness of meaning, freed from the flickering uncertainty of the
burning darkness. (Muir trans. 168-69)
Richard does not suppress his animal instincts, or passively submit to them; rather he
identifies with them by adopting them as authentically his and allowing them to resonate
through his mental state. Thus, the causal forces of nature’s laws—in this case, the laws
of kin selection which have designed his psychology to mourn the death of a loved one—
determine his state of mind. Although Richard is subject to causal forces determined
beyond his own willing, by identifying a caused mental state (that of deep sadness) as
authentically his, he is the rational agent behind his mourning. At last, he is able to feel
the harmony between his mind and affections, his love for his brother is unadulterated,
and he is no longer in “Schrecken über seine eigene Unklarheit” (KW 2, 35) [horror at his
own un-clarity (my translation)] and “Gleichgültigkeit” (KW 2, 35) [“indifference” (Muir
trans. 35)] which had previously prevented him from caring deeply about the well-being
of others.
The new perspective Richard has is sub specie aeternitatis, i.e., a view of the
world from eternity, one that is “unabh ngig von der Zeit, unabh ngig von der Dauer,
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sie war unauslöschlich vorhanden […] unverlierbares Wissen um den unr umlichen
Weltraum einer jeden Seele” (KW 2, 135-36) [independent of time, independent of
duration, indelibly there […] an awareness that could never be lost of the non-spatial
space of every soul (my translation)].90 Like Spinoza, Wittgenstein sees such a view as
necessary for perceiving the good life: “the good life is the world seen sub specie
aeternitatis” (NTB 83e).91 A view of the world sub specie aeternitatis is also the
necessary pre-condition for perceiving the categorical imperative of one’s rational agency.
This is because in order to see the law prescribed by the categorical imperative, one must
have a view of the relation between the ends willed, the means to the end, and the
motivation that underlies the will. Such a view is not afforded with a view of the world
exclusively from temporality; one must possess supervening reflective abilities that
transcend one’s subjectivity. Only hypothetical imperatives are derived exclusively from
the viewpoint of subjectivity, since it is the subject who posits hypothetical ends. But the
ends that are to be willed universally, thus demanded by the categorical imperative, are
only to be seen from a perspective of universality, which is not the one we have in our
temporal cognition of our immediate phenomena.
In “Hermann Broch’s Die Unbekannte Größe: the Central Symbol of ‘Sterne im
Wasser’” (1974), Watt explains that in his “symbol of ‘Sterne im Wasser’ Broch
deliberately expands the significance of Kant’s words beyond the Categorical Imperative
to include the phenomena of love and death as reflections in human experience of a
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One might object here that the experience of the death of a loved one would be dependent on time or
duration; this much is true. However, a generous reading of Broch would suggest that death makes one
more aware of the continuation of time beyond our own passing; hence a sense of the endless expanse of
duration.
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See chapter 4 for a more extensive engagement with the notion of seeing the world sub specie
aeternitatis.
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transcendental reality” (Watt 848). This reality is grasped by Richard when he faces
death vicariously through his brother because, as Carsten Könneker explains,
Im Angesichts des Todes verliert der Mensch seine Bindung an jedes
Wertsystem—unabh ngig davon, wie eng diese zuvor gewesen sein mag; als
Sterbender ist der Mensch nur noch Mensch und nicht mehr Repr sentant
irgendeines Partialwertbereichs. Folglich ist seine Erkenntnis dann auch keine
partielle mehr, sondern Erkenntnis schlechthin. (Könneker 449)
In the face of death a person loses his connection to every value system –
independently of how strong the connection might have been; when dying, a
person is just a person and no longer a representative of a particular partial valuearea. Thus his knowledge is no longer partial, but knowledge per se. (my
translation)
The face of death releases our concern for the contingent needs that dominate the living
person, such as, comfort, health, money, etc. This liberation enables us to see more
clearly the things that are more indelibly important to us. Richard explains that in life we
are plagued by the ‘uncertainty of Being,’ an irresolvable perplexity in the system of our
values that we never, apart from the moment of death, view with clarity. Though
Richard’s mourning is caused by forces beyond his voluntary control—namely, his
brother’s death and Richard’s love for his brother—his will is autonomous in so far as,
the narrator explains, Richard is able to ascent knowingly to the control of the grief inside
him. He is able to legislate to his will the law that loves his brother as an end, and could
at the same time be willed by anyone in his circumstances. Thus the conditions of the
categorical imperative are met by his mourning. Both the ‘starry heavens’ and the ‘moral
law’ are accessible to human consciousness, the former from the sense data of one’s
observation, the latter from the perspective of self-reflexivity, which is, according to Kant,
“discernable only to the understanding,” and which enables a person to become cognizant
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that he is not “in a merely contingent connection, but also in a universal and necessary”
connection to the world of sense data (CPR 203).
One may be tempted to object to Kant’s unrestrained praise of human
understanding; after all, as Ziolkowski points out, Richard’s “elaborate systems turn out
to be no defense against the power of emotion” (366). But asking the question ‘what is
the limitation of logic?’ has an unnecessarily cynical tone to it. A better question is ‘what
does logic accomplish in our practical lives?’ To answer this question one must look into
the language games that we use in our practical lives and discern what logical rules are
operative in them. When this question is pursued in tandem with the question ‘what does
loving, or willing, do for us in our practical lives?’ the discrepancy in the answers to both
questions reveals the limitations of logic and rationality.
Broch believed that the novel helps one to see both how logic operates in social
discourse, and its limitations:
die kognitive Aufgabe des Dichterischen in ihrer allgemeinen […] Bedeutung ist
Fortsetzung der rationalien Erkenntnis über die rationale Grenze hinaus, ist
Hinabsteigen ins Irrationale […] und eben diese Totalit! t des Erkennens und
Erlebens […] gibt ihm jene Richtung, die zwar auf das Ziel aller Wissenschaft,
n mlich die Erkenntnis an sich hinweist […]. (KW 9/2, 46)
the cognitive task of poetry in its general meaning is the extension of rational
knowledge beyond the border of rationality, it is the descent into the irrational
[…] and it is just this totality of knowledge and experience […] that gives
direction to all of science; which is knowledge for its own sake […]. (my
translation)
This passage strikes me as exceedingly ambitious. One might object to Broch by
charging that to acquire a totality of knowledge and experience one must be omniscient
and omnipresent, which no one is; thus the task of poetry is doomed. But in a more
generous reading of the passage, one may soften the claim by replacing ‘totality of
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knowledge and experience’ with ‘a synoptic viewpoint of knowledge and experience.’ I
think this expresses in less grandiose terms what Broch is after.
The texts examined in this chapter present a compelling case that love and logic
are both necessary in guiding us to attain the kind of life that is the best our species can
hope for. The skeptic may have grounds to doubt the certainty of our sense data
perceptions; Wittgenstein is willing to admit this: “concepts of knowledge and certainty
have no application to one’s own sensations” (Malcolm 33). Our species is chronically
prone to error concerning the acquisition of belief, and in discerning the justification of
beliefs. But in the experience of life, choice regarding our actions and use of words
evinces certainty in the success of these choices in leading us to a coherent way of living.
What has to be overcome, according to Wittgenstein, is not a “difficulty of the intellect
but of the will” (BTS 161). This is to say that it is not intellectual rationality that is
always to fault when our lives are not as we would like to make it, but volitional
rationality.92 Wittgenstein explains that the “most important and effective change” (C&V
53) that a person can bring about is a change in his own attitude, but such a change is
very difficult and often overlooked.
In conclusion, Kant believed that except when we act according to the moral law,
we act according to self-interest. Only when we act according to the moral law, suggests
Kant, can we achieve autonomy from the same contingencies that Spinoza reluctantly
admits have deleterious effects on our wills, such as, the love of comfort, fame, wealth,
etc. Broch’s novel suggests, however, that the renunciation of our interests for the sake
of the demands of the categorical imperative is not always necessary. Insofar as a
person’s will is comprised of the things about which he most genuinely cares, and a
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person’s self is essentially comprised of his will, then a person can achieve autonomy in
the moments in which he affirms the inner necessity of love; Richard is unable to
disregard the commands that his love for Ilse and Otto impose on his will. What is
essential is that the interests are selfless in the sense that caring deeply about x, y, and z,
means that I have a sustained interest in the well-being of x, y, and z, independently of
their instrumental value. Richard’s love for Ilse and Otto is selfless because he holds
them as final ends. According to Kant, rational commands of the moral law are
categorical, but according to Frankfurt, the commands of “selfless love are also
categorical” (“ANL” 136). Richard’s love for Otto and Ilse resonates through his being,
only by affirming it unconditionally is he able to achieve a kind of “self-esteem,” or an
affirmation of his own will, that Spinoza believes is necessary for a good life.
The novel ends with a discussion between Richard and Kapperbrunn.
Kapperbrunn skeptically asks Richard,
Wie heisst es doch bei Ihrem alten Kant: der gestirnte Himmel über mir und das
moralische Gesetz in mir? […] das stimmt gar nicht […] denn wie windig es mit
den kosmischen Gesetzen aussieht, das erleben wir gerade jetzt, und von den
moralischen wollen wir lieber ganz schweigen. (KW 2, 140-41)
What is it your old friend Kant says again? The starry heavens above me and the
moral law within me […] that isn’t right at all [. . .] for we’re finding out now
how many holes can be picked in the cosmic laws, and we’d better leave the
moral laws out of it. (Muir trans. 176)
But for Richard, the moral law has more enduring cohesion than Kapperbrunn’s cosmic
laws: the “Erkenntnis der Liebe [ist] […] gültig ohne Beweis […] in der Einsamkeit des
Herzens ist alles absolut, hier gibt es keinen statistischen Ann herungswert, hier gilt das
Gesetz schlechthin” (KW 2, 141) [“knowledge of love [is] valid without proof […] in the
loneliness of the heart everything is absolute, in the heart there are no statistically
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approximate values, there the law is valid” (Muir trans. 176)]. Richard has found that his
love for Otto—made clearer in Otto’s death—and for Ilse, provide him with compelling
final ends that alleviate his chronic ambivalence and uncertainty, restoring his vitality and
full humanity to him. The commands of love are absolute, for Richard, because it is
unthinkable for him to violate them, and because they provide the insoluble justification
for his action.
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Chapter 4
The World viewed ‘Sub Specie
Aeternitatis’: Wittgenstein and Broch’s
Der Tod des Vergil

“The work of art is the object seen sub specie aeternitatis; and the good life is the world
seen sub specie aeternitatis. This is the connection between art and ethics” (NTB 83e). –
Wittgenstein

[What one]“finds beautiful in a work of art is the result of these subjective, affective
pleasures, of a very personal liberation from fear, uniting him [...] in a literal unio
mystica” (G&Z, 18). –Broch
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Before Broch wrote Der Tod des Vergil [The Death of Virgil], he wrote a shorter
piece, Die Heimkehr des Vergil [The Homecoming of Virgil], which he read on Austrian
radio in 1937. The morning after the Nazi annexation of Austria, in March 1938, four
Nazis arrested Broch on the suspicion that he was a communist sympathizer.93 While in
captivity Broch began to expand the shorter work into the full-length Der Tod des Vergil.
He was released after a few weeks, but the experience brought perspective. He explains
in a letter ten years after the event:
Das Buch ist nicht als Buch, sondern als eine Art privates Tagebuch geschrieben
worden, d.h. es wurde als Buch begonnen, wurde als Tagebuch fortgesetzt und
wurde dann schließlich wieder zu einem Buch umgestaltet. Während der
Tagebuchzeit glaubte ich, daß ich niemals mehr etwas veröffentlichen und im
Konzentrationslager enden würde; es war also private Auseinandersetzung mit
dem Todeserlebnis und der Todesrealität. (Lützeler 220)
The book was written not as a book, but as a kind of private diary, that is, it began
as a book, was continued as a diary and then the final part was written as a book
again. While I was writing it as a diary I believed I would never publish anything
again and that I would end my days in a concentration camp; it was therefore a
personal confrontation with the experience and reality of death. (Lützeler 157)
The novel is very difficult to understand, and Broch seems to lament that he would write
such a work. Hannah Arendt called Broch a “Dichter wider Willen” [poet against his
will] (HAHB 186). What she meant was that Broch was a poet even though he saw
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literary language, like Nietzsche, as potentially deceitful and vain.94 As a former student
of mathematics and philosophy, Broch saw the more pristine language of symbolic logic,
mathematics, and the hard sciences as ‘honest’ and epistemologically superior to that of
poetic language. However, he believed straightforward discursive language was
incapable of yielding full insight into ethical problems.
Broch, like many other canonical German literary figures, including Brecht and
Schiller to name only a few, does not identify with the Bohemian creed l’art pour l’art.95
The Bohemian96 would argue that adopting utilitarian ends for the production of art
results in art that is not created out of artistic inspiration, but is mere mimicry and
kitsch.97 Broch is sympathetic to the Bohemian, but does not draw the same conclusion
that art and ethics should remain discrete. Broch is also critical of kitsch, and the attempt
to use art for the promulgation of moral dogmas (secular or religious). Instead, Broch
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Broch alludes to Nietzsche in the context of language, ethics, and positivism, though it’s not entirely
clear what aspect of Nietzsche’s philosophy is most directly pertinent: “so soll die Sprache selber dieses
mystische Wertszentrum werden. Es ist nicht die Mystik, welche der logische Positivismus meint […] Der
philosophische Sprachmystizismus ist etwas anderes, er steht an der Grenze der Dichtung—wie das
Beispiel Nietzsches zeigt—, […] er hofft, daß die dischterische Erkenntnis die Aufgabe der
philosophischen Erkenntnis übernehmen und daß ihre ‘gemäßigte’ Mystik die Tragik der ethischen
Stummheit aufheben werde” (KW 9/2, 193-94) [“language itself must become the mystic value center. This
is not the mysticism meant by logical positivism […] The philosophical mysticism of language is
something else, it stands at the edge of poetry—as the example of Nietzsche shows—, […] in the hope that
poetic insight will take over the task of philosophic insight, and that its ‘moderated’ mysticism will finally
cancel out the tragedy of ethical silence” (G&Z 57)].
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Broch praises the “Russian novel” for breaking “through the boundaries of l’art pour l’art,” which made
possible “the ethical work of art” (HHT 51). One should remember here the profound influence Russian
novels had on the young Wittgenstein during WWI.
Further, the slogan l’art pour l’art had not been coined during Schiller’s day, but his substantial engagement
with ethics in his works, and his essay On the Aesthetic Education of Man, suggest he sees art as a primer
for ethical discussion.
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The term ‘Bohemian’ as I am using it here, refers to persons devoted to the creation and appreciation of
beauty, with a tendency to neglect or ignore their material prosperity and conventional social norms.
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This is a simplification of a somewhat arcane subject of aesthetic psychology. Broch’s opinions on the
matter are expressed in “Das Böse im Wertsystem der Kunst” (KW 9/2, 119-156). Virgil also defends the
autonomy of art (KW 4, 313).
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believes in the autonomy of art, while also believing that aesthetic inspiration yields art
that is often ethically revelatory. Authentic representational art, for Broch, contains
insights about the deepest values of our species, and in the case of the novel, can show
the ways in which persons relate to the things they value. Thus good art is not generated
didactically; coincidentally, however, it contains some didactic value to its perceiver.
Broch’s respect for the straightforward, precise language of science did not
prevent him from using lyrical language; nor did it prevent him from knowingly uttering
‘nonsense,’ in the Wittgensteinian conception of the word. On the contrary, Broch
blamed positivism and Wittgenstein’s famous dictum (calling for silence in matters that
cannot be reduced to representational propositions) for inciting unfair cynicism towards
language, leading to a “Stummheit” [muteness] (KW 9/2, 178) that contributed to what he
considered an ethical retardation of central Europe in the early twentieth century. The
most conspicuous evidence of this ethical decline, for Broch, was the widespread
popularity of fascist thought and the social Darwinism of the Nazis. The suspicion and
sacrilege to which language became subjected, extended to the human “Geist” [spirit]
itself, since language is the ether in which the spirit lives and functions (KW 9/2, 17880).98 Broch’s defiance of the final line of the Tractatus, however, belies the depth to
which the thoughts conveyed in the Tractatus inspire Der Tod des Vergil. In his essay
“James Joyce und die Gegenwart (1936),” Broch reveals the relation of his thought to the
Tractatus:
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Broch explains further: “denn da er am Wort zweifelt, verzweifelt er auch am Geiste, am Geiste seiner
eigenen Menschlichkeit, am Geist, der durch die Sprache wirkt […]” (KW 9/2, 177) [“for having lost faith
in words, [mankind] despairs of the spirit, too, the spirit of its own humanity, that spirit which works
through language” (G&Z, 42)].
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Die Philosophie hat ihrem Zeitalter der Universalität, dem Zeitalter der großen
Kompendien selbst ein Ende gesetzt, sie mußte ihre brennendsten Fragen aus
ihrem logischen Raum entfernen oder, wie Wittgenstein sagt, ins Mystische
verweisen. Und dies ist der Punkt, an dem die Mission des Dichterischen einsetzt,
Mission einer totalitätserfassenden Erkenntnis, die über jeder empirischen oder
sozialen Bedingtheit steht und für die es gleichgültig ist, ob der Mensch in einer
feudalen, in einer bürgerlichen oder in einer proletarischen Zeit lebt, Pflicht der
Dichtung zur Absolutheit der Erkenntnis schlechthin. […]. (KW 9/1, 85)99
The age of philosophical universality, which was also the age of the great
compendiums, was brought to an end by philosophy itself, which became obliged
to withdraw its most burning questions from the realm of logical discussion or
else, as Wittgenstein has put it, refer them back to the mystical. It is at this point
that the mission of literature begins; the mission of a cognition that remains above
all empirical or social modes of being and to which it is a matter of indifference
whether man lives in a feudal, bourgeois or proletarian age; literature’s obligation
to the absoluteness of cognition, in general. (G&Z, 88)
Unlike other examples of philosophical/literary amalgams, such as those attempted in
Schiller’s Gedankenlyrik, Nietzsche’s aphorisms, or Sartre’s existential novels, Broch’s
philosophical literature is unique. He explains that the cognition that remains above the
empirical and social is one achievable not through “lyrische Philosophie” (MHB 223),
which he says he avoids, but instead only in the simultaneous,100 stream-of-consciousness,
and ultimately phenomenological form of literary perception through which alone one is
able to glean from a text the ineffable substance of ethics: “nur hiedurch ist es ihm
möglich, das Unaussprechbare auszudrücken, n mlich in der Spannung zwischen den
Zeilen und Worten, zwischen den Farbflecken auf der Leinwand, zwischen den
musikalischen Tönen” (MHB 223) [only through this is it possible to express the
unspeakable; that is, in the suspense between the lines and words, between the spots of
paint on the canvas, between the musical notes (my translation)].
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Broch’s belief in the mission of literature is echoed in Der Tod des Vergil at KW 4, 313.
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Broch’s comments are consistent with Wittgenstein’s suggestion, in his “Lecture
on Ethics,” that the ‘absolutes’ of ethics are not expressible in propositional language.
Further, that the mental states through which the absolute is discerned are only generated
from a particular perspective, namely, “sub specie aeternitatis” (NTB 83e). Broch’s
novel attempts to achieve both of these difficult tasks; the result is an intellectually
strenuous novel to read, but one that, I believe, offers enough intellectual bounty to make
the read worthwhile. Apparently the Austrian P.E.N. Club had a similar opinion as they
nominated Broch for the Nobel Prize in Literature in 1950, the same year that Bertrand
Russell won it.101 Hannah Arendt also held Der Tod des Vergil in high regard, having the
novel in mind when she said that Broch “belongs in that tradition of great 20th Century
novelists who have transformed, almost beyond recognition, one of the classic art-forms
of the 19th Century” (“AHB” 476), and further she suggests, “The Death of Virgil, one of
the truly great works in German literature, is unique in its kind” (“AHB” 481).102
This chapter draws equally from Wittgenstein’s earlier and later philosophy. The
scholarship on Wittgenstein had been heavily weighted towards logical and
epistemological concerns until recent decades in which a torrent of works on
Wittgenstein’s ethics and aesthetics have flooded secondary literature. Some of these
works will help tease out the Wittgensteinian elements of Der Tod des Vergil. Though
Broch was directly acquainted only with Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, his Tod des Vergil
suggests some anticipation of Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations.
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Paul Michael Lützeler, Hermann Broch und die Moderne: Roman, Menschenrecht, Biografie (München:
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For more on Arendt’s views of Broch’s works, and the rather extensive letter exchanges between the
two of them, see Paul Michael Lützeler, ed., Hannah Arendt—Hermann Broch, Briefwechsel 1946-1951
(Frankfurt/M: Suhrkamp, 1996).
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Broch’s Der Tod des Vergil
The setting for Broch’s Der Tod des Vergil is ancient Rome in 19 BC, the year of
Virgil’s death and the completion of his Aeneid. The Roman Republic has collapsed, and
the Roman Empire is in its nascent stages.103 The era is meant to have important
commonalities with Europe in the early twentieth century, particularly the demise of the
Austro-Hungarian Empire and the cultural turmoil of the inter-war years in which a new
value-system and political structure have yet to become established. Virgil is summoned
to meet with Caesar Augustus regarding the Aeneid. In the first chapter, “Water—The
Arrival,” Virgil arrives by ship in Brundisium. He is carried in a sedan chair through the
slums of Brundisium and he is shocked by the animalistic conditions of the people living
there. Some in the crowd mock Virgil and yell out insults. The city is in an unusually
festive spirit in anticipation of the Caesar’s birthday and Virgil’s visit. In the bustle of
the crowd a young boy sees Virgil and reacts with fanfare. The boy, Lysanias, follows
Virgil throughout the story, and it is gradually revealed that Lysanias represents Virgil’s
boyhood self. A slave belonging to the Caesar also accompanies Virgil. The slave
represents another of Virgil’s alter egos. Virgil, meanwhile, is old, ill, and expecting his
impending death. His awareness of death puts him in a sentimental frame of mind in
which he reflects on his life, especially his parents, early childhood, and failed romances.
The narrator explains that Virgil was lured to Athens by the prospects of studying
in the same city that produced Plato and the hope that he could escape the aesthetic
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Broch suggests that it is important that there is a sense of “no longer” and “not yet” creating the feeling
of transition, death, and emergence. He suggests the same feeling of suspense exists in his own day in
respect to the collapse not only of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, but of Christendom as well. The feeling
of ‘not yet,’ is in anticipation of a yet to emerge secular democracy. See, KW 4, 253, among other places.
Or consult Patrick Eiden-Offe, Das Reich der Demokratie: Hermann Brochs ‘Der Tod des Vergil’ (Munich:
Wilhelm Fink, 2011).
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sophistry in which he felt trapped.104 Instead Virgil wants to live a life devoted to
“Philosophie” and “Wissenschaft” [science] (KW 4, 12).
The second chapter, “Fire—The Descent,” Virgil has arrived at the temple, and
prepares to sleep. He continues to reflect on his life as his heightened awareness of the
temporality of life leads him to savor the memories of his past. He admits that for his
entire life he has been conscious of a coming death and this awareness had always shaped
his perspective on life. The Aeneid, which has consumed him for many years, fails,
Virgil suggests, to express a ‘supernatural’ reality that he had hoped to find through
lyrical language. Virgil laments that he has failed as an artist, and that the Aeneid is a
product of his vanity and has no use to humanity. His conscience calls out to him to burn
the Aeneid.
In the third chapter, “Earth—The Expectation,” two old friends of Virgil come to
his side: Plotius and Lucius. They encourage Virgil to recover from his illness so that he
can finish the Aeneid. Lucius is a poet, like Virgil, and reasons with Virgil about the
value of Virgil’s work. Lucius is not persuaded by Virgil’s criticisms of his own work.
A request is sent out for a doctor, and Caesar Augustus, concerned for Rome’s greatest
poet, arrives to meet Virgil. Augustus tries to persuade Virgil that the Aeneid is a great
work, belongs to the people of Rome, and should not be burned. Augustus explains that
poetry is divine because it is unique in its ability to represent totality, and that art must
play a central role in the kind of society Augustus hopes to mold. Augustus is enchanted
by the Aeneid and sees the work as championing Roman virtues and legitimizing royal
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He has hope for a “kunstabgewandtes, dichtungsfreies Leben” (KW 4, 12) [a life free from art and
poetry].
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rule.105 Virgil, however, sees the Aeneid as sophistry, perversion, and deceit, and insists
that it be burned. Virgil does not get his way; Lucius refuses Virgil’s request to burn the
Aeneid. Virgil continues to resist Augustus until Virgil proposes that the slave that had
accompanied Virgil to the palace be set free in exchange for a completed manuscript.
Augustus agrees to Virgil’s request; too weak to continue working, Virgil insists that
Plotius and Lucius finish the Aeneid.
In the final chapter, “Ether—The Homecoming,” Lysanias points the way to a
distant shore as he escorts the dying Virgil. The expanse of water between the two
bodies of land represents the ‘ether’ through which the boat crosses from what can be
expressed in language, on one side, and what lies “jenseits der Sprache” [beyond
language], on the other. Analogously, words are the ‘ether’ through which the spirit
communicates. During the passage Virgil dies, passing to the realm of eternity. The
scene is foreshadowed near the beginning of the story when Lysanias says, “Dein Weg ist
Dichtung, dein Ziel ist jenseits der Dichtung” (KW 4, 59) [Your path is poetry, your aim
is beyond poetry].
The events of the story occur in a single day, and are frequently interrupted by
Virgil’s meditative ruminations. As Virgil is arriving aboard the ship, he realizes that his
own free will has been compromised by his blind willingness to glorify the Roman
Empire. He used his great talent as a poet to please the emperor and create a myth that
lauds the status quo of the Roman monarchy. By riding aboard the ship transporting
Caesar, Virgil has woven his “Schicksal” [fate] inextricably with that of Caesar’s, if only
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Lucius also suggests Virgil’s Aeneid is quintessentially Roman when he remarks that “die Größe Roms
und die Größe deiner Dichtung nicht mehr von einander zu trennen sind!” (KW 4, 225-26) [“the greatness
of Rome and the greatness of your poem can no longer be divorced from each other” (Untermeyer trans.,
240).
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temporarily. 106 The wind and water bringing the ship to port are following the eternal
causal laws of the cosmos. The theme of fate is an important one because it reveals how
a person is “eingebettet im Strom” [embedded in the stream] of life (KW 4, 44). In a
meditative state, Virgil declares that “das Schicksal der Äneis, sein eigenes Schicksal,
[ist] unvollendet!” (KW 4, 89) [the fate of the Aeneid, its own fate, [is] incomplete (my
translation)]. Its fate, like that of all things, is death and destruction. Against the causal
determinism of fate and the natural laws that underpin it, there exists only one reprieve,
according to Broch, namely, the inner law of one’s own soul. Here is Broch’s Kantian
belief that human reason endows a person with self-legislative power, an inner necessity
that determines the action of humankind. The key passage articulating the role of
necessity for Virgil comes as he makes one last effort to bring himself to the window of
his room to look through the darkness of night and breath in fresh air. He introspects into
“das Jetzt seiner Seele” (KW 4, 93) [“vital immediacy of his own soul” (Untermeyer
trans., 97)] and struggles to perceive its “innerste irdische Notwendigkeit” (author’s
italics, KW 4, 93) [“innermost NECESSITY” (translator’s capitalization, Untermeyer
trans., 97), or in other words, the soul’s volitional necessities, the things that inspire one
to action, that is, the ‘musts’ that shape our agency and direct our behavior. Virgil’s
meditation at the window looking out into night reveals to him the only thing stronger
than fate, and the volitional necessity which supplies the vérités fondamentales107 of all
ethical knowledge; namely, love. Love, for Broch, is volitional and as such originates in
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“Er hatte sich vom Schicksal treiben lassen, und das Schicksal trieb ihn dem Ende zu” (KW 4, 12) [“He
had allowed himself to be driven by fate and now fate drove on to the end” (Untermeyer trans. 12)].
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Broch explains in a letter to Aldous Huxley in 1945 that he is exploring the ways in which one loses and
regains “vérités fondamentales,” which apply to religion, but to ethics as well (MHB 226).
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our wills; this is reconciled with the action demanded by the Kantian imperative as
Virgil’s trance reveals to him that duty is “zur Tat aufrufend” […] “härtester Befehl”
[summoning to action […] the imperative command” (Untermeyer trans. 174)]. And
later, “es gibt nur ein Gesetz, das Gesetz des Herzens!” (KW 4, 232) [“there is only one
law, the law of the heart” (Untermeyer trans. 246-7). Since our minds formulate secondorder desires and volitions, we are not helplessly steered by the causal forces of nature, or
our own primary impulses.
Human action is juxtaposed to the physicality of the four elements in the four
chapter titles of Der Tod des Vergil —1. Water: The Arrival, 2. Fire: The Descent, 3.
Earth: The Expectation, 4. Ether: The Homecoming. We can decide to contribute to
these forces from the causality of our own agency. The novel thus contrasts the
deterministic view of fate with the ‘law of the heart,’ which steers the actions of men.
But Virgil does not realize the power of his own will until he awakens from the
dogmatic slumber in which his blind patriotism had led to his masterpiece: The Aeneid.
He regrets that he did not pursue truth through philosophy or science, resorting instead to
poetry,108 but his justification for using literary language is his belief that literature can
lead to a “neuer Einheitsvielfalt, zu neuer Vielfaltseinheit, zu neuer Schöpfung” (KW 4,
275) [“new and united diversity, […] a new and manifold unity, [a] new creation”
(Untermeyer trans. 293)].
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This point is made by Walter Baumann in “The Idea of Fate in Hermann Broch’s Tod des Vergil,”
Modern Language Quarterly June 1st (1968) 197.
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The stream of life is the first-person experience of time.109 But as Virgil begins
to realize on the boat journey, the form of life is not merely an abstraction but a
subjectively perceivable phenomenon. The narrator explains that as Virgil develops a
heightened second-order110 awareness of his body and life, he discovers the “Form seines
Lebens” (KW 4, 12) [form of his life (my translation)]. In one important respect, this
unites Der Tod des Vergil with Wittgenstein’s notion of ‘Lebensform’ in his
Philosophical Investigations. Vergil is able to see the form and structure in which his
own life is woven into the fabric of his society and the phenomena of his experience.
From the perspective in which one is able to perceive one’s own ‘Lebensform’
imbedded in the structure of the world, one is able to attain a synoptic viewpoint and
perceive “das All wie eine einzig zeitlose Erinnerung” (KW 4, 45) [the All as a single
timeless memory]. Virgil achieves this viewpoint but becomes ashamed by what he sees
of himself. This shame is enhanced as he is walking through the slums of Brundisium in
which he sees the masses of people acting as beasts.111 He is reminded of his own
animality and the inescapability of his own bodily existence.
Most of all the Aeneid engenders a feeling of shame in Virgil. He had believed
that he wrote it in all seriousness and honesty, but his recent epiphany has made it clear to
him that his vanity has led to his own self-delusion. His talent as a poet is unquestioned,
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In Zeit und Geschichte in Hermann Brochs Roman ‘Der Tod Des Vergil,’ Timm Collmann explains that
Broch is appealing to Kant’s distinction between the ‘abstract physical conception’ of time versus
‘experienced time’ (6).
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By ‘second-order’ awareness I mean the uniquely human ability that persons have to formulate thoughts
or perceptions about their own thoughts or perceptions. For instance, I might say to myself ‘isn’t it funny
that I’m afraid of spiders?’ In this case I have formulated an introspective thought directed at my own
mental phenomena.
111
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and his writing charmed not only the Caesar, but others as well. However, it becomes
clear to Virgil that this charm leads to nothing positive.
Much of the novel is similar to the historical account of Virgil’s death. What is
innovative on Broch’s part is both the “musical” form in which the novel is written, to
which I’ll return momentarily, and the content of Virgil’s meditations.112 Both of these
innovations account for the uniqueness of Broch’s work. Together they yield insights
that would not come to fruition in a bare-bones historical narrative of Virgil’s death.
Hence, an analysis of the novel cannot articulate the (putative) insights intended by Broch,
simply because the insights of the novel only result from language games of its kind.
Broch’s novel presents its own aesthetic theory in the claims of Catullus, one of
the poets whose writings inspired Virgil: “Echte Kunst durchbricht Grenzen, durchbricht
sie und betritt neue, bisher unbekannte Bereiche der Seele” (KW 4, 239) [“genuine art
bursts through boundaries, bursts through and treads new and hitherto unknown realms of
the soul” (Untermeyer trans. 255)]. But what “boundaries” are being broken by art? The
boundaries are those of language, specifically the representational language theorized in
the Tractatus. But how are such boundaries broken? Since the boundaries of Tractarian
language are the same as those imposed on empirical thought, it’s the boundary of
empirical thought that is being broken. In Broch’s theoretical writing, cognition is
thought of as an intellectual faculty, whereas the emotions are a different faculty, or
perhaps a distinctly unique type of cognition. Art thus has the ability to transverse the
boundary of all possible propositions, and into the inner sphere of mind’s intentionality
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Others have commented on how Broch’s novel has a musical structure to it. See, for example, Marianne
Charriere-Jacquin, “Zum Verhältnis Musik—Literatur im Tod des Vergil,” Hermann Broch—Das
dichterische Werk: Neue Interpretationen (Akten des Hermann-Broch-Symposions Rottenburg-Stuttgart
1986) eds. Michael Kessler and Paul Michael Lützeler (Tübingen: Stauffenburg, 1987) 7-18.
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and propositional attitudes. The parts of our minds in which attitudes are housed, so to
speak, are the “unknown” realms of the soul. They are unknown because the justification
of a propositional attitude is arbitrary, and wholly subjective. But this does not make
these justifications of equal value. There are right and wrong justifications supporting
propositional attitudes. For Virgil, it is the unique function of art that “bricht durch ins
Ursprüngliche, ins Unmittelbare, ins Wirkliche…” (KW 4, 239) [“burst[s] through into
the original, into the immediate, into the real” (Untermeyer trans. 255)] making clearer to
us the appropriate attitude and degree of fervor with which that attitude ought to guide
our behavior. The “real” in this context should be read as the reality of persons’
subjective relations to the things around them, reminiscent of Wittgenstein’s solipsistic
view of the will in the Tractatus.113
Considering this subjective reality can explain why Virgil says that he wrote the
Aeneid “zuerst für mich” (KW 4, 292) [“primarily for myself” (Untermeyer trans., 311)].
The knowledge to be acquired through it is largely subjective. He explains further,
“Ungeduldig war ich nach Erkenntnis … und darum wollte ich alles aufschreiben …
denn das ist Dichtung; ach, Ungeduld nach Erkenntnis ist sie, dies ist ihr Wunsch, und
darüber hinaus vermag sie nicht zu dringen …” (KW 4, 300) [“I was impatient for
knowledge […] and that is why I wanted to write down everything…for this, alas, is what
poetry is, the craving for truth; this is its desire and it is unable to penetrate beyond it”
(Untermeyer trans., 320)].114 It seems here that Virgil is contradicting his earlier
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statements; he says at KW 4, 239 that art bursts through boundaries, and at KW 4, 300
that poetry is unable to penetrate beyond truth. The resolution of this prima facie
paradox is revealing of Broch’s blending of philosophical traditions. It is common in the
phenomenological tradition to refer to one’s conscious experience as ‘reality’ and shun
attempts to articulate a concise theory of truth, as one might find in the tradition of
empiricism. For Broch, a sentence’s truth is affirmed by its coherence with the web of
beliefs in which it is embedded.115 Thus ‘reality’ and ‘truth’ are two distinct things in
Virgil’s terminology.
This point is important to keep in mind when considering the relation of Der Tod
des Vergil to the philosophical era in which Broch wrote it. In the first chapter of this
dissertation I presented the atomistic views of language held by Frege, Russell, and the
Tractarian Wittgenstein, and the closely related positivistic view of language held by
Broch’s professors in the Vienna Circle. The temptation that faced them was to believe
that the sense of language is determined wholly by the syntax and vocabulary of a
particular sentence, and its truth-value is the correspondence relation the sentence has to
the state of affairs that it represents. Considerations for the human activity in which a
sentence is used was not given due respect. In the Philosophical Investigations,
Wittgenstein suggests that although humans can use language in a Tractarian sense, that
is just one of many language games in which our species engages. The meaning of a
sentence is derived from the role the sentence plays in the form of life in which the
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sentence’s user is embedded: the logical rule governing the use of the sentence must also
accommodate the variations in which sentences present semantic content.
Thus the latter Wittgenstein’s notions of ‘form of life’ and ‘language games’
provide a more congenial theoretical approach to understanding the literary theory
embedded in Der Tod des Vergil. And one of the ensuing questions that follows from
such theoretical considerations, and which is most pertinent to the philosophically
interested reader of Broch’s novel, concerns the influence of literary art, specifically
novels, on our moral judgments. Its corollary addresses how a novel in general, and
Broch’s Der Tod des Vergil in particular, provides the reader with a viewpoint from
which the reader may gain greater insight into the ethical quandaries facing one’s own
life. The devil’s advocate might sympathize with Virgil by arguing that novels—and
lyrical language—merely delude readers yielding false consciousness116 through
pretentious language and impossible or hyperbolic scenarios.
In Wittgenstein, Ethics and Aesthetics: The View from Eternity (1991), B. R.
Tilghman credits the aestheticians of the first half of the twentieth century for asking the
right questions and seeing the importance of art in a person’s life, but is critical of their
“metaphysical obfuscations” and philosophies of perception that were entangled in their
answers (15). Tilghman likewise criticizes analytic philosophers for not taking the
philosophy of aesthetics seriously during the early and middle decades of the 20th century,
and for misidentifying the purpose of Wittgenstein’s philosophy by focusing on the
‘language of art’ instead of the role art plays in our lives; he cites Francis J. Coleman’s
article “A Critical Examination of Wittgenstein’s Aesthetics” (1986) and Richard
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Schusterman’s “Wittgenstein and Critical Reasoning” (1986) as examples. Tilghman
suggests that the most important task for the philosophy of art is in making clear “why
and how art is important to us and how it does and how it can enter into our lives; what,
for example, its connection is with our moral life” (16). Tilghman suggests that the
“most profitable way of doing this […] is by means of a deeper and far more careful
study of the work of Wittgenstein” (16). Broch would agree with Tilghman on both of
these points. Broch was equally critical of metaphysical obfuscation and trivial
moralizing. The challenge here is determining whether ethical problems can be brought
to resolution more effectively, or in a way that yields better results, if art, particularly the
novel, is in some way seen as complementary to rational discourse, and is uniquely
revelatory in a way that cannot be mimicked through any other means including logical
argumentation or ordinary life experiences.
For Wittgenstein, language is more revelatory; it does not merely communicate
the content of propositions. His distinction between what is said in a proposition versus
what is shown by the same proposition suggests that he too believes important insights
transcend the content of a proposition. He clearly states in the Tractatus that the logical
form of a proposition is shown, not said, and in his “Lecture on Ethics” he suggests that
language cannot communicate the absolutes of ethics, though such absolutes exist in
some mystical sense. For Broch, literary form has unique revelatory power for much the
same reason that Wittgenstein believes some things are only show-able in language: “Nur
die Gedichtform aber ist imstande, eine solche Einheit des Disparaten herzustellen und
plausibel zu machen, denn im Gedicht vollzieht sich die Aussage nicht im rationalen
Ausdruck, sondern in der irrationalen Spannung zwischen den Worten, zwischen den
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Zeilen, kurzum in der ‘Sinnarchitektur’” (KW 4, 494) [Only literary form is suitable to
present and make plausible the unity of disparate things; for in poetry a proposition is
completed not in rational expression, but in the irrational suspense between the words,
between the lines, that is, in the ‘sense architecture’ (my translation)]. Broch’s belief that
the form of language is integral in yielding its sense, echoes Wittgenstein’s interest in
articulating the form of a proposition in the Tractatus. But meaning conveyed in the
‘suspense between the words’ and ‘between the lines’ is more reminiscent of
Wittgenstein’s aphorism in Culture and Value: “Philosophie dürfte man eigentlich nur
dichten” (28) [“one should write philosophy only as one writes a poem”]. I suspect
Wittgenstein means that in writing philosophy, one is forced to condense into a limited
number of words meanings that extend beyond their single utterance in the philosophical
text; his Tractatus might appear to some as a condensed form of ideas that are much
bigger than they appear in their truncated Tractarian manifestation.
James Joyce’s Ulysses inspired Broch’s novel. Commenting on Joyce’s work,
Broch applies the standards of “sub speciae aeternitatis et sub speciae mortis” (KW 9/1,
66). Broch’s commentary on Ulysses isn’t directly relevant to this chapter, but the fact
that such concepts are at the forefront of Broch’s thoughts is important, particularly since
Broch alludes to Wittgenstein explicitly. Broch suggests that James Joyce’s Ulysses and
Finnegans Wake defy linguistic conventions and create a new “Weltsicht” [vision of the
world], and in its midst an original conception of the “Menschengestalt” (KW 9/1, 241)
[shape of mankind]. This ‘shape’ of man, which is represented in our consciousness, is
constructed through our perceptual faculties, rather than our empirical senses or rational
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apparatus. Hence, the challenge to the reader of a novel to perceive the ‘shape’ of man
ultimately entails problems of intentionality.
In the previous chapter I argued that Broch viewed intentionality as problematic;
specifically in its role in giving the mind the psychological raw material from which
reasoning gains traction, so to speak, with the world. This makes the task of assessing
the ethical worth of a novel equally problematic since intentionality is the means through
which our minds discern the phenomena of a novel. Broch believed that since a person’s
intentionality yields mental phenomena that are often inscrutable and inchoate, using
deductive logic to pursue conclusions drawn from said phenomena is not a foolproof
method. This caveat is necessary because the premise supplied to an argument by means
of one’s intentionality often lacks a stable epistemological footing. I used Wittgenstein’s
analogy of the duck-rabbit to illustrate the point. Wittgenstein shows that the duck-rabbit
drawing may be seen as a duck, rabbit, or duck-rabbit; it is dependent upon the viewer to
see the “aspect[s]” in the drawing giving it the character that one attributes to it. Herein
lies one of the problems of looking to an object of art as revelatory.
Drawing a conclusion about the duck-rabbit assumes that the viewer sees it in one
way and not the other, yet the same drawing is inherently indeterminate, or perhaps it is
better to say that its determinacy is inherently arbitrary since I may be resolute in my
perception of the drawing as rabbit and not a duck. The problem for Broch is that
deductive logic – while pristine and systematic in its formal state—acquires a level of
arbitrariness when used in the language games of ordinary experience. This is in part
because the soundness of an argument often depends upon a premise that is comprised
solely of an inscrutable mental phenomenon.

!

$+*

The question then arises whether anything might be done to make inscrutable
mental phenomena more unequivocal, and whether there is true insight to be gleaned
from such opaque and even ‘mystical’ mental phenomena. Broch believed the answer to
both of these questions is yes. To the first question–whether unequivocal conclusions can
be achieved—he believes it is the role primarily of empirical and rational faculties, while
the latter question—whether insight can be gleaned from inscrutable mental
phenomena—requires other equally diverse and subtle thinking strategies. For this latter
purpose, Broch conceived of an epistemological form for the novel, that is, a form that
gives one knowledge—with coherency as its justifying criterion—of one’s relation to the
world. The fruit of his ingenuity was Der Tod des Vergil.
The novel attempts to give the reader a view of the world sub specie aeternitatis,
that is, from the perspective of eternity; Broch does not coin this notion, but borrows it
from Spinoza.117 But what is that? And what epistemological status do beliefs have that
are born from this perspective? To understand this concept and to see how this works in
the case of Broch’s novel, we have our work cut out for us. Let’s begin with a
rudimentary historical sketch of what the notion of ‘seeing’ something sub specie
aeternitatis has meant.
Spinoza was the first to use the phrase sub specie aeternitatis.118 He admitted that
there are different ways of knowing something, and as a rationalist he sought to improve
the intellect’s ability to arrive at knowledge. Hence he was interested in understanding
how perspectives are generated, maintained, and justified. Spinoza believed that “method
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is nothing else than reflective knowledge (cognitio reflexiva)” (238). The method
through which perspectives are attained, for Spinoza, consists of forming an idea in one’s
mind that is directed towards experiential sense data. It is reflexive in the sense that the
idea itself, a mental entity, can be the object of thought, though the idea may very well
consist of content that is derived from a non-mental source. The idea is mental whereas
the substance119 about which the idea is directed is ontological, yet is a bearer of physical
properties that are discernable through sense perception. The reflexivity of knowledge,
for Spinoza, necessarily includes intentionality since the idea has an intentional direct
object. Spinoza calls the reflexive method of attaining knowledge sub specie, or ‘from
the perspective.’
Since sense datum alone does not reveal the causal nexus in which objects persist,
it is reason (not sense data) that induces an object’s situation in relation to all things.
Thus it is reason that allows us to gain perspective on an object by gaining a synoptic
viewpoint of its place in a larger whole. There are of course different angles that afford
different perspectives; what is relevant to Broch and Wittgenstein is the perspective one
gains from the viewpoint, according to Spinoza, of God.120 This is the viewpoint from
eternity, i.e., as God would view the world. This is done only when the necessity inherent
in nature, that is, nature’s causal nexus, is the context in which the origins of an object are
understood. Considering Spinoza’s pantheistic conception of God, a viewpoint from
God’s perspective is not one in absentia from physical laws, but in complete conformity
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and acquiescence to them.121 From this perspective, according to Spinoza, one has an
absolute perspective. Only from this perspective is knowledge of reality gleaned. In
Spinoza’s word, “the bases of reason are notions . . . [that] must be conceived without
any relation of time, but under a certain species of eternity” (72). Timelessness is
important to the concept because the causes of contingent phenomena are thought, by
Spinoza, to be consistent and permanent, even though their product is neither.
Spinoza’s notion of sub specie aeternitatis was revisited in the nineteenth century
by Hegel and by Hegel’s nemesis Schopenhauer. In “Not Only Sub Specie Aeternitatis,
but Equally Sub Specie Durationis: a Defense of Hegel’s Criticisms of Spinoza’s
Philosophy” (2009), Fritzman and Riley suggest that Hegel sees a view of the world sub
specie aeternitatis as incomplete. They explain instead that Hegel argues that a subject is
always involved in the act of perceiving.122 The subject’s perception is in a moment in
time, even if the perception is sub specie aeternitatis. Therefore they conclude that, at
least for Hegel, “to grasp and express the truth sub specie aeternitatis is to explicitly
recognize that truth is necessarily sub specie durationis” (93). Schopenhauer, though one
of Hegel’s fiercest critics, has a similar view, and develops the idea further in The World
as Will and Representation (1818), which was to become a major influence on
Wittgenstein before he wrote the Tractatus.123
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In “Schopenhauer and Spinoza” (1974), Brann suggests that both Schopenhauer
and Spinoza “consider overcoming emotions and passions the highest goal of cognitive
insight and practical wisdom” (193). For Schopenhauer, art can play a fundamental role
in achieving this due to the perspective art gives on the world, as he says, ‘sub specie
aeternitatis;’ art treats an object or a scenario in the world as, in his words, removed
“from the stream of the world’s course, and holds it isolated before it. This particular
thing, which in that stream was an infinitesimal part, becomes for art a representative of
the whole…” (WWR, §36). Wittgenstein gives us an example, as Tilghman points out, of
something similar to Schopenhauer. In his Notebooks 1914-16, Wittgenstein explains, “If
I have been contemplating the stove, and then am told: but now all you know is the stove,
my result does indeed seem trivial. For this represents the matter as if I had studied the
stove as one among the many things in the world. But if I was contemplating the stove it
was my world, and everything else colorless by contrast with it” (83). In Culture and
Value, Wittgenstein elaborates further, “only an artist can so represent an individual thing
as to make it appear to us like a work of art. […] A work of art forces us—as we might
say—to see it [that is the object] in the right perspective, but in the absence of art, the
object is just a fragment of nature like any other” (4). But what is the ‘right’
perspective? And how does this relate to ethics?
For Broch, the ‘right’ perspective, as it relates to ethics, is achieved when a
person gains both a new perspective on an object, that is, freed as much as possible from
prejudices or biases, conjoined with a perspective in which the object is seen as integral
to the person’s conscious existence. This idea, and the role of art in producing
perspective, is captured in Hofmannsthal und seine Zeit, in which Broch explains:
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In jedem Kunstwerk muß, bei allen konventionellen Konvenüs, die ganze Kunst
neu anheben, nicht nur, weil (im Gegensatz zum wissenschaftlichen Vorgang) der
künstlerische Akt, sonst wäre er keiner, stets auf neu das Sein in seiner Ganzheit
zu erfassen hat, sondern auch, weil es überhaupt keine verschiedenen Kunstwerke
gäbe, wenn nicht jedes in der Totalität, das es ist, ein Stück neuer Seinsrealität
aufdeckte. (KW 9/1, 257)
In every work of art, the whole of art, despite all traditional conventions, must
begin anew, not only because (in contrast to the scientific process), the artistic act,
for otherwise it would not be one, must always grasp being in its entirety as if it
had never been seen before, but also because there would be no diverse works of
art at all if not each one of them, in the totality which it is, uncovered part of a
new reality of being. (HHT 169)
Seeing the role that a particular thing plays in one’s consciousness has a generative effect
on a person’s moral character, that is to say, the attitude (and proclivities) the person
takes towards the objects and phenomena in the world, and how the person is likely to
respond to the demands of circumstances.
In “The Avant-Garde in Crisis: Hermann Broch’s Negative Aesthetics in Exile”
(1986), Lützeler explains that for Broch, the novel is to take up “tasks which
neopositivism [of the Vienna Circle] considers ‘unscientific,’ i.e., it takes care of an area
given up by philosophy” (16). Further, discovering new perceptions “provide[s] the
foundation for a new ethical theory” (17). The fact that Broch is reacting against the
logical positivism of the Vienna Circle is an important point. Broch’s philosophy
professor at the University of Vienna, Rudolf Carnap, wrote Pseudoproblems of
Philosophy, which appeared originally in 1928, the same time Broch was attending
Carnap’s lectures. Broch is sympathetic to Carnap’s assertion that metaphysical
nonsense is an obstacle to thought, but arrives at a different conclusion from Carnap’s;
Broch, in reference to Carnap, suggests “so hat sich die Philosophie vielfach auf das rein
Logische züruckgezogen, und wenn sie auch an ihrem prinzipiell philosophischen
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Standpunkt nach wie vor festhält, so hat sie sich eben doch bemüßigt gesehen, jene
Bereiche—vor allem die des Ethischen und Metaphysischen—aus ihrer Domäne
auszuschalten” (KW 9/1, 84-85) [“philosophy has frequently returned to pure logic, but
although it clings now as before to its basic philosophical standpoint, it has nevertheless
felt constrained to eliminate certain attributes particularly the ethical and the
metaphysical” (G&Z 88)]. Whereas Carnap wants to create a clear path that avoids
metaphysics, Broch is willing to take up the arduous challenge of metaphysical reflection,
quite distinct from the pristine language of Carnap’s creation; Wittgenstein would have
supported Broch’s effort.124 While Broch is more willing to broach metaphysical
questions than Carnap, Broch tries to avoid pursuing answers to the pseudo-problems that
Carnap ridicules. Broch makes clear his appreciation for the advancement of philosophy
by means of formal innovations in logic, and states that “die Entdeckung der
Sinnlosigkeit gewisser Fragestellungen, deren Legitimität früher außer jedem Zweifel
gestanden ist, zu den Großtaten der modernen Logik gehört” (KW 9/2, 189) [“one of the
great contributions of modern logic has been the discovery of the meaninglessness of
certain questions whose validity had previously been beyond question” (G&Z 53)].
Broch is willing to try to trod metaphysical ground to find the means through which
genuine problems can be resolved through the attainment of a specific state of mind, not
through belief in the correct set of propositions. However, like Carnap, Wittgenstein, and
other early-stage analytic philosophers, Broch emphasizes the significance of finding
endurable—rather than merely contingent—answers to ethical problems: the aim of the
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poet is to search for the “Ethische im Unabänderlichen” (KW 9/1, 134) [“ethical within
the unalterable” (HHT 51)].
The Tractarian conception of Sub Specie Aeternitatis
Wittgenstein once said “I am not a religious man but I cannot help seeing every
problem from a religious point of view” (Drury 79). Perhaps the view that he is referring
to is what in other places he refers to as the view sub specie aeternitatis, which he
believes is essential to both aesthetic and ethical perception. In the Tractatus,
Wittgenstein suggests that “[e]thics and aesthetics are one” (88). This bold claim defies
the various historical conceptions of both ethics and aesthetics. Historically, from figures
such as Aristotle, Baumgarten, Kant, Tolstoy, etc., art has been seen as serving ethical
purposes, seen as needing to have no purpose, or seen as completely disconnected from
human life altogether.125 While it is clear that Wittgenstein diverges from tradition, it is
not clear what he means when he says that ethics and aesthetics are one. Some light is
shed on the matter in his Notebooks 1914-16. There he says that the “work of art is the
object seen sub specie aeternitatis; and the good life is the world seen sub specie
aeternitatis. This is the connection between art and ethics” (83). But this still doesn’t
decide the matter for us. It does not suggest how the world, or an object, is seen sub
specie aeternitatis, or what this view consists of; nor does it suggest the probable result
that comes from such a view. Articulating answers to any of these concerns would
inevitably result in crossing the boundary of sensical language, which contradicts
Wittgenstein’s quietism. But if we look more closely at Wittgenstein’s conception of
transcendence, we may be able to achieve some clarity into what Wittgenstein means by
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the assertion that art and ethics are connected by the vantage point of the perceiver of an
object or the world.
Wittgenstein explains that the logical form of a sentence is shown, not described:
“There is indeed the inexpressible. This shows itself; it is the mystical” (Tractatus 90).
Since a meaningful sentence (according to the Tractatus) represents a picture of physical
space, seeing the world sub specie aeternitatis is to see physical phenomena together with
the logical space in which they are embedded. Further, Wittgenstein suggests, this entails
seeing the world as a limited whole: “The contemplation of the world sub specie
aeternitatis is its contemplation as a limited whole” (89). But Wittgenstein emphasizes
both an objective and subjective element to this way of perceiving. He makes a
distinction between “viewing the world as a limited whole” and “feeling the world as a
limited whole” (89). The transcendental view of the world as a totality of contingent
facts is an objective view that may be shared with the astronomer, physicist, etc., but the
feeling of the world as a limited whole is exclusively personal. It is the experience with
the mystical. It is only from this mental state that an absolute ethical judgment can be
made by the individual, though words do not have the expressive power to represent the
absolute directly. This relates to Wittgenstein’s comments in his “Lecture on Ethics,”
which is still very much in the Tractarian way of thinking about language; “if a man
could write a book on Ethics which really was a book on Ethics, this book would, with an
explosion, destroy all the other books in the world. Our words used as we use them in
science, are vessels capable only of containing and conveying meaning and sense, natural
meaning and sense. Ethics, if it is anything, is supernatural and our words will only
express facts; as a teacup will only hold a teacup full of water and if I were to pour out a
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gallon over it” (7).126 The imagery evoked by the teacup metaphor has an interesting
suggestion, namely, that there is more water than what can be contained in the teacup. In
other words, there is meaning that cannot be put into sentences. For Wittgenstein, the
propositional sentence expresses facts, but he does not limit expression to merely
propositional sentences; in Culture and Value, he suggests that art is also a “kind of
expression” (83). The suggestion here defies the Vienna Circle’s manifesto
Wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung. Der Wiener Kreis [The Scientific Conception of the
World. The Vienna Circle] whose belief it was that nothing is left to communicate
except—staying with Wittgenstein’s metaphor—that which can fit in the teacup, i.e.,
statements reducible to sense data experiences. The point that Wittgenstein makes is not
that nonsensical language is vacuous, but that it shows something that cannot be said in
representational language.
The famous ladder analogy at the end of the Tractatus, which Wittgenstein
borrows from Schopenhauer, elucidates this point. Schopenhauer suggests that
For the man who studies to gain insight, books and studies are merely rungs of the
ladder on which he climbs to the summit of knowledge. As soon as a rung has
raised him one step, he leaves it behind. On the other hand, the many who study
in order to fill their memories do not use the rungs of the ladder for climbing, but
take them off and load themselves with them to take away, rejoicing at the
increasing weight of the burden. They remain below forever, since they are
carrying what ought to have carried them. (WWR, vol. II, 72)
Schopenhauer implies that new knowledge propels one into a realm of higher
understanding, but that the various particulars of knowledge themselves are not of value,
indeed, are obstructive and cumbersome. Wittgenstein likewise sees the value in
obtaining the theoretical knowledge of philosophy, but not as a value in its own right, but
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instead to return to life with the perspective necessary to guide oneself in accordance with
wise norms, or to quiet the turmoil in one’s own mind. Wittgenstein’s rendition looks
like this:
My propositions serve as elucidations in the following way: anyone who
understands me eventually recognizes them as nonsensical, when he has used
them—as steps—to climb up beyond them. (He must, so to speak, throw away
the ladder after he has climbed up it.) He must transcend these propositions, and
then he will see the world aright. (Tractatus 90)
The arduously logical view of language and language’s representational power is
able to give the reader a view of the world sub specie aeternitatis only if one senses
intuitively the existence of the excess gallon of water—using Wittgenstein’s metaphor
again—that pours over the teacup. Through this realization the ethical purpose of the
Tractatus is achieved, even though it does not discuss ethics. It enables one to achieve a
viewpoint from which an ethical absolute may be felt. The members of the Vienna Circle
were drawn to Wittgenstein’s logical atomism, but missed the point that what was most
important, at least to Wittgenstein, is not communicated in the representational view of
language which the Tractatus appears to promote. Wittgenstein’s comments to the
publisher Ludwig von Ficker:
My work consists of two parts: the one presented here plus all that I have not
written. And it is precisely this second part that is the important one. My book
draws limits to the sphere of the ethical from the inside as it were, and I am
convinced that this is the ONLY rigorous way of drawing those limits. In short I
believe that where many others today are just gassing,127 I have managed in my
book to put everything firmly into place by being silent about it. (Stern 42)
Hence the Tractatus shows us the “right” (90) way to see the world by providing a
transcendental vantage point, not by articulating propositions of ethics. Such
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propositions do not exist, according to Wittgenstein: “it is impossible for there to be
propositions of ethics” (88). The transcendental point of view is better expressed,
according to Wittgenstein, in the statement “I wonder at the existence of the world” or
“how extraordinary that anything could exist” (“LE” 8). What is to be gleaned from
these expressions is that ethics, for Wittgenstein, does not consist merely in directives or
norms to govern our actions, but instead consists of the right attitude towards the world.
Thus an important distinction must be kept clear when considering Wittgenstein’s ethics.
On the one hand Wittgenstein makes moral imperatives and commands, particularly to
his students including Norman Malcom, but in addition to the “musts” that we might
appeal to in governing our actions, ethics consists of a sui generis perspective or attitude.
The attitude that results from perceiving the world from eternity consists in part of
relinquishing one’s ultimate control over the happenings of the world: permanent and
stable (or at least relatively so) laws govern the events of time quite independently of
human willing. Wittgenstein suggests, “The world is independent of my will” (87), and
further in his Notebooks 1914-16, “I can only make myself independent of the world –
and so in a certain sense master it—by renouncing any influence on happenings” (73e).
The Spinozan ethical imperative of achieving supervening independence over the objects
of one’s sense-data continuum is clear in these passages. Wittgenstein further elaborates
by suggesting that the happy man has no fear even in the face of death (NTB 74), is in
agreement with the world (75), and more harmonious than the unhappy man (78). The
good life, as Wittgenstein implies, consists invariably of both an inner harmony and a
harmony with the world; but Wittgenstein does not make it entirely clear how such
harmony alleviates fear of death, or whether it is such fearlessness that precedes, and has
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causal force upon, one’s harmony: “Death is not an event in life: we do not live to
experience death. If we take eternity to mean not infinite temporal duration but
timelessness, then eternal life belongs to those who live in the present. Our life has no
end in just the way in which our visual field has no limits” (TLP 88-89). While
Wittgenstein does not sustain philosophical inquiry into the implications surrounding
death and the change of mental state persons undergo as they become aware of their own
mortality, Broch engages the matter in greater detail.
Broch’s Notion of Sub Specie Aeternitatis
While Broch’s notion of sub specie aeternitatis contains the same elements as
Wittgenstein’s, including a perspective from a synoptic and relatively detached viewpoint,
it does not entail any element of self-renunciation, which some interpreters have read
Wittgenstein as entailing. While a perspective might be formed aloof from the objects
perceived, the compulsion to act upon a perspective must come from one’s will,
according to Broch. In the context of Joyce’s Ulysses (which Broch says inspired his Tod
des Vergil), Broch explains that the awareness of the temporality of the phenomena of
our experience evokes a view of the world sub specie mortis. For Broch, a perspective
sub specie mortis implicates an awareness of one’s death, and the temporal nature of
existence in general, which enables one to grasp the full circle of life, from birth to death.
A view of the world from eternity only becomes fully vivid when it includes a view of
one’s life under the aspect of one’s own death. We see or experience a particular event in
our day and know that it came and went, just like all of our experiences. This perspective,
according to Broch, causes, at least temporarily, a ‘fission of values’ because we tend to
view a specific phenomenon in isolation from others. The contrast, though not mutually
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exclusive, is to possess a view of multiple phenomena simultaneously. The character
Virgil attains both vantage points, and his quasi-hallucinogenic monologue is born of the
state of mind in which he finds himself, a state of mind synchronized to the events in its
perceptual field, and in full grasp of the causal nexus of discrete phenomena.
Music is the example Broch gives of a kind of simultaneity of discrete aural
perceptual phenomena; consider the simultaneity of various notes from the instruments of
a symphony, or the interplay of base and treble notes of a Bach organ piece. In “Letter to
the Editor: Hermann Broch” (1963), Steiner explains that Der Tod des Vergil is
constructed like a “quartet, and the language renders with uncanny precision alternances
of key, mood and cadence, such as are inherent in musical notation. The last
movement—Virgil’s entrance into death—carries speech to its last limit: silence. Like
Wittgenstein’s Tractatus […]” (265). The musical structure of the novel is not a mere
aesthetic embellishment; for Broch, musical cognition is the closest a person can come to
experiencing timelessness because multiple melodies and notes are able to occupy the
same moment. The composer Leonard Bernstein was so impressed by Der Tod des
Vergil that he contacted Broch to discuss the possibility of making it into a symphony;128
and later the novel was put to music by Jean Barraque.129 The simultaneity of multiple
sensations that inform perception (not just in music), such as, seeing, hearing, etc., have
the power to give the perceiving subject the feeling of an annulment of time so long as
the perceptions are united by an enduring thought held by the subject. Broch attempts to
achieve this in Der Tod des Vergil by means of parataxis, that is to say, by stringing
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See Jörn Peter Hiekel and Alice Sta"ková, “Der Tod des Vergil: Broch-Vertonungen des Komponisten
Jean Barraque,” Hermann Broch und die Künste, hg.v. Alice Sta"ková und Paul Michael Lützeler (Berlin:
Debruyter, 2009) 157-183.
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together fragmentary phrases each of which is intended to offer a different angle on the
same direct object of thought. In this respect, Broch’s novel does not accord with
Wittgenstein’s Tractarian definition of philosophy: “The object of philosophy is the
logical clarification of thoughts” (44). But it is more congenial to Wittgenstein’s later
endeavor of finding meaning by understanding the ‘family resemblances’ that give
conceptual boundaries to a particular thought.
Delineating the boundaries of a concept helps avert full-blown relativism in moral
semantics. In “Literature, Philosophy, Politics and the Challenge of Hermann Broch”
(1986), Dowden suggests that Broch viewed the effects of relativism as “corrosive” (3).
Dowden sees Broch as criticizing both literary naturalism and philosophical positivism
for contributing to relativism by limiting discourse to “social descriptions and
psychological facts” (4). This abnegates the efforts, in Dowden’s reading, of the “valueseeking soul” (4), which alone brings a supervening perspective that allows one to assign
the appropriate value where it belongs. Dowden alludes to the last section of Der Tod
des Vergil in which Broch “proposes that the lyrical in literature, like the ornamental in
architecture, simultaneously contains and expresses the irrepressible non-rational side of
the mind that the tradition of reason and science have sought to repress” (5). Repression
of the irrational side of the mind is helpful if the task is to conceive of the objective
relations between discrete phenomena, for Broch, but the contribution of the irrational, or
intuitive, side of the mind is essential in forming evaluative judgments, and is
inextricably connected to perceptions of sense data. The limitations on science and pure
reason, therefore, do not preclude their usefulness, or epistemological basis. Their
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limitations are in deciding for us the course of action suitable for our flourishing,
recognition of beauty, etc.
Broch attempts to achieve simultaneity in literary form through the formation of
single sentences that possess overlapping fragments. An example is the following
daunting sentence from Der Tod des Vergil:
Zeit strömte oben, Zeit strömte unten, die verborgene Zeit der Nacht,
wiedereingeströmt in seine Adern, wiedereingeströmt in die Bahnen der Gestirne,
raumlos Sekunde an Sekunde gefügt, die wiedergeschenkte, wiedererwachte Zeit,
überschicksalshaft, zufallsaufhebend, ablaufsentbunden das unabänderliche
Gesetz der Zeit, das ewigwährende Jetzt, in das er hinausghalten wurde: Gesetz
und Zeit, auseinander geboren, einander aufhebend und stets aufs neu sich
gebärend, einander spiegelnd und nur hiedurch erschaubar, Ketten der Bilder und
Gegenbilder die Zeit umschließend, das Urbild umschließend, keines von beiden
jemals zur Gänze erfassend und dennoch zeitloser und zeitloser werdend, bis im
letzten Echo ihres Zusammenklanges, bis in einem letzten Sinnbild sich das des
Todes mit dem alles Lebens vereinigt, die Bildwirklichkeit der Seele, ihre
Wohnstatt, ihr zeitloses Jetzt und daher das in ihr verwirklichte Gesetz, ihre
Notwendigkeit. (KW 4, 92)
Time flowed above, time flowed below, the hidden time of night flowing back
into his arteries, flowing back into the pathway of the stars, second bound
spacelessly to second, the re-given, re-awakened, time beyond the bonds of fate,
abolishing chance, the unalterable law of time absolved from lapsing, the
everlasting now into which he was being held: Law and time, born from each
other, annulling, yet always giving birth to each other anew, reflecting each other
and perceptible in this way alone, chain of images and counter-images, noosing
time, noosing the arch-image, neither wholly captured, yet for all that becoming
more and more timeless until, in their last echoing unison, in a final symbol, the
image of death unites with the image of life, portraying the reality of the soul, her
homestead, her timeless now, the law made manifest in her, and hence her
necessity. (Untermeyer trans., 97)
Another way in which Broch suggests simultaneity can be achieved in literary form is
through the use of archetypical figures or behavioral patterns. The archetypes of the wise
old man or the rogue are universally recognizable in various cultures and epochs. Such
universality evokes a view of the world, according to Broch, sub specie aeternitatis, and
lends to art’s significance: “alles künstlerische Schaffen […] eigentlich nur sub specie
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aeternitatis erfolgen kann, wenn es nicht an seiner eigenen Sinnlosigkeit verzweifeln und
ersticken will […] (KW 9/2, 196) [“art can only work from the vantage point of eternity,
if it is not to despair of and suffocate in its own irrelevance” (G&Z 60)]. The
inexpressibility of the absolutes of ethics through propositional language engenders an
urge to seek such expression through art, lending art its ethical relevance.
Broch explains that our intellects make clear to us the limits of knowledge
attainable through rational and empirical means, but point to a “spirit” whose imperative
it is, according to Broch, for every person to understand:
in dieser Haltung, dieser so überaus logischen Haltung wirkt noch der Geist, ein
Agens, ein Übergeordnetes, das nicht mehr zum Arbeitsgebiet gehört und vom
Arbeitsgebiet nicht erfaßt werden kann, trotzdem aber vorhanden ist und gewußt
wird. Und auf dieses Wissen kommt es letztlich an. Es enthält die Legitimation,
mehr noch, die Aufforderung, nicht abzulassen und nach dem Geist zu fragen.
(KW 9/2, 200)
in this view, this extremely logical view, the spirit is still at work, as agens, as a
higher power that no longer belongs to the sphere of reason and which cannot be
understood by it, but which is nonetheless present, and known to it. And
ultimately it is this knowledge that matters, for it contains both the legitimation
and, even more, the demand that we never give up our inquiry into the spirit.
(G&Z 64)
Broch agrees with Wittgenstein’s assessment that the absolute cannot be said
directly, but can be shown, or pointed to, in both the objects of the world and a kind of
meta-language that should be discarded once it is climbed. Der Tod des Vergil is Broch’s
attempt to express what cannot be said, and just as in Wittgenstein’s ladder, the
implication, at least from the novel’s main character, Virgil, is that the novel should be
destroyed, though Wittgenstein might suggest that throwing it away after reading it
would suffice. One apparent difference between Wittgenstein and Broch is the emphasis
that Broch places on the role of death, or more precisely, the reckoning of one’s
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proximity to death. Whereas Wittgenstein suggests that the happy man is not afraid of
death, Broch inverts this order by suggesting that the person who has become reconciled
with his death and accepted its inevitability, experiences a serene happiness.
In “Das Böse im Wertsystem der Kunst” (1933) [“Evil in the Value-System of
Art”], Broch exclaims, the “Antlitz des Todes ist der große Erwecker! (KW 9/2, 124)
[“countenance of death is the great awakener!” (G&Z 8)].130 For Broch, seeing life, that
is, your personal existence in the world, in contrast to death, provides an impetus to value
both your own existence, and to look for the things that are worthy of being imbued by
you with value. Death is the
einzige Pforte, durch die das Absolute in seiner ganzen magischen Bedeutsamkeit
ins reale Leben einzieht […] weil der Tod in seiner unvorstellbaren Lebensferne
dennoch von so nächster Lebensnähe ist, daß er die Seele des Menschen
unablässig mit seinem physischen Sein und metaphysischen Dasein erfüllt […]
eben in dieser Humanität zum Akt der Wertzetzung und Wertbildung sich
erhoben hat. (KW 9/2, 125)
only gateway through which the absolute enters in to real life in all its magical
meaningfulness […] because death in its unimaginable remoteness from life is
nonetheless so near to life that it continuously fills the human soul with its
physical presence and its metaphysical existence […] in this humanity, human
existence is elevated to the act of value setting and value creating. (G&Z 9)
The narrator gives the account of Virgil’s meditative view of the world sub specie
aeternitatis:
er befand sich in einem Bereich, in dem nur noch die Anzahlen, die Ordnungen,
die Zusammenh nge des noch Irdischen galten, gleichsam bloß die Erkenntnisse,
die von jenen Seinsgebilden und ihrer einstmaligen Gestaltung ausgingen, und es
war Geschehen und Erkenntnis und Sicht und Aussage in einem einzigen
leuchtenden Wahrhaben, es war unbegreifliche Nacktheit der Schöpfungsvielfalt,
bar ihrer Inhalte, dennoch vollz hlig, war die Allheit jedweden Geschehens und
jedweder Geschehensmöglichkeit […] Es war der Bereich des schlechthin
Unendlichen. (KW 4, 189-90)
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he found himself in a region in which only the quantities, the arrangements and
the correlations of earthly things were valid, likewise only the knowledge
emanating from them and their erstwhile forms, and it was occurrence and
knowledge, perception and exposition in one single, gleaming possession of truth,
it was an unimaginable exposure of the creation’s multiplicity, empty of content
but complete, the integration of everything that had occurred or could occur […]
He was in the realm of the infinite. (Untermeyer trans., 199)
But immediately following these words the narrator explains that Virgil’s
meditative state of mind still does not open a ‘path to the good.’ This would seem to
contradict Wittgenstein’s claim that “the good life is the world seen sub specie
aeternitatis” (NTB 83e). The narrator of Der Tod des Vergil, and let’s assume Broch, hold
that a view of the world sub specie aeternitatis is not sufficient to ensure the good life, it
is however necessary. That is to say, even if one acquires a view of the world from
eternity, and is able to transcend the forces that natural needs impose upon our willing,
one is only in the right vantage point to grasp the good, i.e., the absolute, it doesn’t mean
that one will. The narrator explains that during Virgil’s meditative trance, good and evil
appear with equal ‘impressiveness’ and ‘illumination.’ The trance left Virgil in a
paradoxical state of ‘seeing-blindness’ and ‘hearing-deafness.’ This would at first glance
appear as if the novel is jibberish and that Broch is content writing paradoxical nonsense.
However, I think there is something Wittgensteinian in these words, not the Tractarian,
but the latter Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein explains in Philosophical Investigations that a
thing can be seen, while not being seen for what it is or what it could be. Seeing the
duck-rabbit drawing as a duck is one way of seeing it; it is possible to stare directly at the
drawing and fail to be able to see it as a rabbit. The same can be said, for Broch, of good
and evil. It is possible to see social phenomena and the happenings of the world from a
synoptic viewpoint, removed from interaction with them, and still fail to ‘see’ them as
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they are, or to perceive good and evil. What is needed to imbue the perception with good
or evil is the contribution of our minds through apperception. We hold our perception of
an object or event against the ‘repository’ of our beliefs, previous judgments, and feelings,
Broch implies.
An Angel appears to Virgil on his journey to the temple to visit Caesar. The
Angel exhorts Virgil: “Tritt ein zur Schöpfung, die einstmals war und wieder ist […]
deine Zeit ist da!” (KW 4, 218) [“Enter into the Creation that once existed and again
exists […] your time has come!” (Untermeyer trans., 229-30)]. Broch says that the novel
is supposed to represent the ‘totality of life’ and contains more meaning than the sum of
its parts. This idea is suggestive of Broch’s criticism of the reductive agenda of logical
atomism/positivism in which a ‘protocol sentence’ is thought to be the building block of
all higher order meaning. Broch alludes to Joyce’s Ulysses as an example of this striving
for totality; for Broch it exemplifies a “scharfe Drang zur Selbstbewußtwerdung” (KW
9/1, 67) [“an intense urge toward self-awareness” (G&Z 70)]. It ‘probes,’ according to
Broch, “in sie hineingeahnten Konturen der neuen abzutasten und solcherart zu der
geahnten neuen Weltsicht” (KW 9/1, 241) [“into its newly inferred inner contours, and
hence to feel its way to an intuited new vision of the world” (HHT 157)]. The intuited
view of the world sub specie aeternitatis affords a new “Seinsrealität” (KW 9/1, 257)
[“reality of being” (HHT 169)], in so far as it is able to grant the perspective that makes
art, and for Broch, religion, meaningful to us. Further, it grants us a perspective in which
we are able to discern the “Absolutheit des Lebenswertes” (KW 9/2, 126) [“absoluteness
of life’s value” (G&Z 10)], which, Broch explains, is at the top of the hierarchy from
which we deduce the intricate and often precariously balanced web of particular values.
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But such awareness does not come, according to Broch, through argumentation
alone, with straightforward propositions claiming X or ~X. Rather it comes through nontruth-bearing language that points to ineffable truths. Though such meaning and
perspective cannot be said, it can still be approached by means of written language. In
order to do this, philosophers in the twentieth century became increasingly apt to engage
in various forms of intellectual experimentation; namely, through ‘Gedankenexperimente.’
Der Tod des Vergil considered as a “Gedankenexperiment”
One of the more prominent twentieth-century novelists in the German literary
canon and Nobel Prize laureate, Thomas Mann, called Broch’s Tod der Vergil “eines der
ungewöhnlichsten und gründlichsten Experimente” (HBB 305) [one of the most unusual
and thorough experiments (my translation)]. Broch also used the word ‘experiment’ to
describe Der Tod des Vergil, insisting that it was not a novel.131 Referring to the various
conversations involving Virgil, Broch said
Die Gespr che waren ein Experiment, u. z. eines, das mir wegen seiner
Schwierigkeit nicht geglückt ist […] ich wollte die Argumente hiezu aus dem
tiefsten Unbewußten der handelnden Personen hervorholen, wollte also sozusagen
ihre Seelen selber sprechen lassen […]. (MHB 225)
The conversations were an experiment, one that, because of its difficulty, was not
achieved […] I wanted to pull the arguments out the deepest subconscious of the
persons involved; I wanted, one might say, to let their souls speak. (my
translation)
But to what extent are these experiments philosophical? What problems or questions are
solved? And what is achieved in such experimentation?
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Broch says that Der Tod des Vergil is not a novel, and doesn’t really fit into any pre-existing categories:
“Der Vergil ist kein Roman und ist überhaupt nichts, was sich in eine der bestehenden Kategorien (auch
nicht in die Joycesche) einreihen läßt” (MHB 228).
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Thought experiments acquired a prominent role in twentieth-century philosophy
due in part to Wittgenstein’s use of them in the Philosophical Investigations. For
example, he begins the PI with a thought experiment consisting of builders who are able
to communicate in a primitive language simply by uttering a word that represents an
object; the meaning of the word is the object for which it stands. From there
Wittgenstein explores the ramifications of such a language, eventually showing that the
builder thought experiment presents a view of language that is far narrower than how
language is actually used. Wittgenstein shows that the builders’ language is too primitive,
and that an error is made in assuming the builder’s language works in the same way as
most human languages. In Pseudo-Problems: How Analytic Philosophy gets done (1993),
Sorensen explains that Wittgenstein believed “that there is an ineffable insight to be
attained by first feeling the problem and then working through it. Something is shown”
(14). A successful thought experiment has a way of elucidating a problem or conundrum
that the philosopher may choose to resolve by proposing an alternative thought
experiment or through argumentation. Either way the problem itself, not just the
resolution, is intellectually suggestive, implies Sorensen. Sorensen quotes Wittgenstein:
“[i]n philosophizing we may not terminate a disease of thought. It must run its natural
course, and slow cure is all important” (Zettel §382). Sorensen is combating the
supposition that the philosopher who attempts to solve a pseudo-problem is a fool.
Insight is gleaned by showing the contours and structure of a pseudo-problem. It shows
the conceptual confusion that led to the philosopher asking the question in the first place,
and the inevitable dead end that results will often lead the philosopher to hone the
question so that it might ultimately be answered. Sorensen points to the evolution of

!

%-+

neurology out of phrenology, astronomy out of astrology, chemistry out of alchemy as
examples of clusters of pseudo-problems that eventually spawned fruitful question asking.
Likewise, Virgil suggests that only “im Irrtum wird der Mensch zum Suchenden” (KW 4,
97) [in error does one become a searcher (my translation)], and further, “der Mensch
braucht die Erkenntnis der Vergeblichkeit” (KW 4, 97) [one needs the knowledge of
futility (my translation)]. The frustration of an unanswerable question, imply Virgil and
Sorensen, serves as an impetus to improve the method in which the questions are raised
and answered. This leads to methodological innovations that are capable of yielding
greater clarity, which in turn expose pseudo-problems for what they are.
Sorensen’s point about methodological innovations often occurring upon the
recognition of a pseudo-problem, or pseudo-science, relates well to Broch’s theory of the
novel. Broch believes the methodologies inherent in literary writing can lead to true
insight just as easily as to folly and confusion. He comments in an unpublished letter to
Kurt H. Wolff dated September 5 1948: “[D]ie Quelle der wahren Entdeckung ist immer
das Methodologische” [The source of true discovery is always methodological (my
translation)].132 Nowhere in Broch’s writing is his method as eccentric or original as in
Der Tod des Vergil; however, even in his earliest writings Broch was willing to push the
envelope to develop new ways of writing. An example of this comes already in 1917
when he writes the novella “Eine methodologische Novelle.” In Erzählen zwischen
Hilbert und Einstein: Naturwissenschaft und Literatur in Hermann Brochs ‘Eine
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methologische Novelle’ and Robert Musils ‘Drei Frauen,’ Ruth Bendels133 compares
Broch’s novella to a scientific experiment: “‘Eine methodolische Novelle’ scheint sich an
ihrem Beginn dem Anspruch eines naturwissenschaftlichen Experiments und der reinen
Konstruktion stellen zu wollen” (220) [“A methodological Novella” appears at its
beginning to want to pose under the pretense of a scientific experiment and pure
construction” (my translation)]. But in an unpublished letter written nearly two decades
later, Broch explains that after reading the novella, he’s embarrassed by his old work,
calling the novella “scheußlich” [disgusting] (Bendels 76). Broch does not, however,
abandon the belief that literature can be a vehicle for grasping elusive thoughts, in other
words, as a “Klarifikationsmittel” [means for clarification] (MHB 236), which he
explicitly calls his Tod des Vergil.
But what do thought experiments achieve? And can there be different types of
thought experiments, akin to Broch’s experimentations in literary methodology?
Sorensen suggests that one class of thought experiments “serves as self-conscious
preference-revealing devices” (Sorensen 93). Another type of thought experiment for
Sorensen is the “Rearrangement Model.” In this type of thought experiment, information
is “made more digestible by changing its form” (99). Another model is the “cleansing
model.” According to this model one is led to recognize a flaw in one’s reasoning, and
repairs the flaw.
Poetry cannot go beyond truth because there is nowhere to go; it can achieve truth
by yielding coherent thoughts, but the alternative is only incoherent thoughts, which is
not some place beyond truth. Some truths may very well be verified by the ‘reality’ of
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one’s personal consciousness, ‘I feel X towards Y,’ and poetry offers the reader a path to
bring variety and change to the reality of her consciousness that is not given directly
through experience with the world.
The narrator of Der Tod des Vergil describes the enlightening process of aesthetic
perception: “es war Erfühlen, es war Erspüren, es war Erwissen und darüber hinaus sogar
ein Erkennen, es wurde ihm zum Erkennen, ja zum Selbsterkennen, da ihm aus dem
Raum seines tiefsten Vor-Wissens, in den er hineingehalten war, ein letztes Begreifen
[find quote and finish it] […] (KW 4, 120) [“it was such an intensification of feeling, of
experiencing and of knowing that it became enlightenment, an enlightenment that came
to be perception, yes even self-perception, flooding up to him from the deepest repository
of the prescience in which he was held” (Untermeyer trans., 126). The ‘repository of
prescience’ contributes the additive to thought that imbues a proposition with meaning
beyond its literal sense; this repository can not be taught, but only acquired through time,
and the novel is one such experience of time in which one may acquire and create just the
right kind of repository of thoughts from which a new perception may spawn.
According to Jürgen Heizmann, “Virgil recognizes the danger that all this artistry
is possibly nothing but aesthetic frivolity” (192). Heizmann also mentions that Nietzsche
viewed poets as counterfeiters (193). But, according to Heizmann, Broch’s novel is
supposed to “light up the blindspots of science” (195).134 Heizmann says that Broch
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But that is not to suggest Broch’s goal is a scientific one, but a philosophical one, which he
distinguished from understanding the world: “die Absicht des Philosophen ist nimmer, und nimmer kann
sie es sein, Aussagen über die empirisch erfahrbaren Dinge der Welt zu machen […] sondern seine Einsicht
in die Struktur der Welt ist eine Einsicht der inneren Erfahrung und in die Natur des Menschen […] nicht
die Frage ‘Wie ist die Welt?’ ist aufgegeben, sondern die nach dem Verhalten […] (KW 9/2, 192) [“The
philosopher’s insight is never, and never can be, making propositions about the empirically experienced
things of the world […] but insight into the structure of the world insofar as it relates to the inner
experience and nature of mankind […] the question is not ‘How is the world?’ but how do we relate to it
[…] (my trans.)].
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thinks literature can “liberate men from the putative certainty of their concepts (Broch
would say: from their sleepwalking), to invigorate them to seek and test, and to bring
them to self-contemplation” (199). This is done differently than in philosophical
reflection because the content and form of a literary work create new phenomena of
experience in the mind of the reader, creating new and unique opportunities to create or
modify perceptions, or in Broch words: “Hat die Philosophie ihren Erkenntnisgrund
verloren, so ist es heute ihre Pflicht, sich ihn wieder zu verschaffen” (KW 4, 325) [“If
philosophy has lost its ground of perception its present duty is to regain it” (Untermeyer
trans., 347)]. And further Broch adds, “Philosophie ist nicht in der Lage, ihren eigenen
Erkenntnisgrund zu erzeugen” (KW 4, 326) [“philosophy [is] not in a position to produce
its own ground of perception” (Untermeyer trans., 347)]. Broch calls his procedure of
creating new perceptual fields ‘phenomenological’ (KW 10/2, 248).
In The Problem of Autonomy in the Works of Hermann Broch, Halsall emphasizes
Broch’s belief that art, or at least the kind that Broch wishes to promote, yields ethical
nutrition for its perceiver.135 Yet, Halsall reminds us, art maintains autonomy from
service to this end. Kitsch, on the other hand, is bad art because it is composed in service
of some ulterior end. The prima facie paradox in Broch’s thinking is his belief that artists’
creativity should not take consideration for the utility of their works, hence maintaining
artistic autonomy, yet that such work done in the right spirit will yield
“exemplifizierenden Gehalt” [exemplifying content] (KW 6, 11-23). But what is that? I
interpret this as being, among other things, an exemplification of the various ingredients
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Halsall’s work is helpful in making connections between Broch and historical figures such as
Kierkegaard, Kant, Derrida, etc. For his discussion on Broch’s aesthetic autonomy, see Robert Halsall, The
Problem of Autonomy in the Works of Hermann Broch (Berlin: Peter Lang, 2000) 43-68.
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that constitute the good life. These ends, that is to say, the various states of affairs—
physical, mental, and spiritual—which together form the best kind of life for which one
might hope, are themselves simultaneous phenomena, and in some cases sui generis.
Hence the connection between a musical structure of the Der Tod des Vergil and the
various features of the plot and setting.
While some of the impetus behind Broch’s theoretical works is to show the
philosophical value of literature, it would be inaccurate to suggest Broch was an
unreserved advocate for the intellectual value of literature. Broch’s conviction regarding
the philosophical value of a literary text wavers; and during the years of the Third Reich
(in which he wrote Der Tod des Vergil), Broch takes a distinctly cynical tone towards the
value of literature as a vehicle for self-enlightenment. Broch’s own turn toward political
science and psychology in his final, and never completed, intellectual treatise on mass
psychology suggests that he no longer sees literature with the seriousness he once took it.
Poetry as Deception
Lützeler explains that Broch’s turn against literature corresponds roughly with the
rise of fascism and seizing of power by the Nazis.136 Broch’s most productive literary
phase was between 1928 and 1933, but Broch’s “negative aesthetics,” as Lützeler
explains, begins shortly thereafter, as Broch becomes “a judge who condemns the poet’s
occupation, an iconoclast in the picture gallery of literature,” Lützeler continues (“AGC”
23). Lützeler points to several passages in Broch’s personal correspondence between
1936 and 1939 to support his claim: according to Broch, “literary […] work has become
superfluous” (KW 13/1: 392); and “the artistic is superfluousness in this age” (KW 13/2,
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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See Paul Michael Lützeler, “The Avant-Garde in Crisis: Hermann Broch’s Negative Aesthetics in Exile,”
Hermann Broch: Literature, Philosophy, Politics: The Yale Broch Symposium 1986. Ed. Stephen D.
Dowden (Columbia: Camden House, 1988) 14-23.
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24); and finally, “I have therefore made a big reversal and am dealing more and more
with political topics […]” (KW 13/2: 97). But Broch’s work on political theory was
largely futile and soon he would return to literature by drafting a short story “Die
Heimkehr des Vergil” [The Return of Virgil], despite maintaining his negative outlook on
aesthetics.
Both ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ aesthetics are given voice in Der Tod des Vergil.
Broch’s cynicism towards literature is mirrored in the character of Virgil and expressed
by the narrator, yet Augustus, Plotius, and Lucius all advocate on literature’s behalf. For
instance, against literature you have the narrator, who refers to a “scheinwirkliche
Zwischenreich der Dichtung” (KW 4, 176) [“sham-real interrealm of poetry”
(Untermeyer trans. 183)]. Later the narrator equates the “Platte und Literarische” (KW 4,
236) [“the trivial and the literary” (Untermeyer trans. 251)], and describes entering
“einem literarischen Nirgendwo” [“a literary no-man’s land”], which is the realm of
sophistry and empty aestheticism, “das nicht einmal die äußerste Oberfläche einer
Oberfläche ist, die an nichts grenzt, an keine Himmels-, an keine Erdentiefe, höchstens an
den Hohlraum der Schönheit” (KW 4, 236) [“which did not touch even the surface, that
encompassed nothing, neither the depths of heaven nor of earth, at most only the empty
province of beauty” (251)]. But why then would Virgil commit himself to writing the
Aeneid? And what did Virgil hope to achieve? The narrator explains that Virgil
abandoned his profession as a medical doctor to pursue the career of a poet, believing
poetry was the cure to society’s ills. The narrator calls this Virgil’s
verlogene Hilfeleistungs-Hoffnungen, mit denen er seitdem sein Dichtertum
ausgestattet hatte, wider besseres Wissen hoffend es werde die Macht der
Schönheit, es werde des Liedes Zauberkraft den Abgrund der Sprachstummheit zu
guter Letzt überbrücken und ihn, den Dichter, zum Erkenntnisbringer in der
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wiederhergestellten Menschengemeinschaft erhöhen […] solch überheblich eitle
Ehrgeizträume und solch sträfliche Überschatzung des Dichtertums! (KW 4, 128)
delusive hope of helpfulness with which he had subsequently decked out his
profession as poet, hoping against his inner conviction that the might of beauty,
that the magic of song, would finally bridge the abyss of incommunication and
would exalt him, the poet, to the rank of perception-bringer in the restored
community of men […] such vain and presumptuous dreams of grandeur, a
flagrant overestimation of poetry! (Untermeyer trans., 134-35)
This passage is autobiographical of Broch’s own experience, but does not show the full
extent to which Broch and Virgil detest the sophistry exhibited by the poet.
The narrator goes on to explain Broch’s own aesthetical/ethical theory through the
existential turbulence of Virgil’s own experiences as a poet. According to the narrator,
Virgil became ‘seduced’ by the allure of poetry’s beauty and became fixated by the
object produced: the poem; but lost his fixation on the spirit from which the poem
originates. The vital truth of one’s own spirit is the ‘content’ of one’s perceptual reality,
that is to say, the “selbsterkennende Wissen um die eigene Seele” (KW 4, 133) [“selfperceptive knowledge of the individual soul” (Untermeyer trans., 140)]. But the poem,
by contrast, is the ‘empty form’ in which the soul strains, unsuccessfully, to express the
subjective truths, which it alone possesses.137 The result is ‘intoxication’ on the part of
the poet, or the reader of a poem, that elevates the words of the poem, but that does not
revere the spirit that created it. A lack of ‘fidelity’ ensues in which art is reduced to “Unkunst” [un-art] and poetry to mere “Literatentum” (KW 4, 134) [“literarity” (Untermeyer
trans., 140-41)].
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Similarly, Broch explains in “Geist und Zeitgeist”: “Denn die gemeinsame Wurzel aller Philosophie,
alles ethischen Wollens, alles Erkennens, aber auch die alles Dichtens ist das Wissen um die menschliche
Seele” [KW 9/2, 194) [“For the common root of all philosophy, all ethical volition, all learning, but also of
all literature, is knowledge of the human soul” (G&Z 58)].
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For the narrator, “echte Kunst” (KW 4, 133) [“real art”], or in this case real poetry,
aspires to embody humanity and brings the poet and the reader of a poem a sense of
affiliation and membership in the broader human community. The opposite of this
solidarity--that which is achieved through “un-art”--is a loneliness that becomes
exacerbated to an increasing level of despair in which the artist becomes “blind für die
Welt” (KW 4, 134) [“blind to the world”] and to the “Göttliche in ihr und im
Nebenmenschen” (KW 4, 134) [“divine quality in the world and in fellow-man”
(Untermeyer trans., 141)]. The artist begins to see himself as a god/creator figure,
according to the narrator, and idolizes himself, and craves recognition and worship from
those who view (or read) his art. The concern for ‘effect’ is an indication that the artist is
attempting to win his way out of his isolated loneliness by attracting the superficial
attention of the ‘mob,’ but he has forfeited true art and betrayed the mission of a renewed
spirit, which alone can bring him into authentic communion with humanity, explains the
narrator. Such ‘kitsch,’ or ‘un-art,’ is all too familiar to the poet Virgil who feels as if
his duty to art has been compromised:
er wußte um diese Vertauschung und Umwendung […] des Unheilswegs, der ihn
von der Heimaterde zur Großstadt geführt hatte, vom werktätigen Schaffen bis
hinab zur selbstbetrügerischen Schönrednerei, von der Verantwortungspflicht der
Menschlichkeit bis hinab zu einem verlogenen Scheinmitleid, das die Dinge von
oben herab betrachtet und zu keiner wirklichen Hilfe sich aufrafft […] der Weg,
nein, der Absturz in die Pöbelhaftigkeit und dorthin, wo sie am ärgsten ist, ins
Literatentum! […] mochte er […] sagen müssen, daß er ein nichtswürdig
armseliges Literatenleben geführt hatte […] [ein] Wortemacher. (KW 4, 135-36)
He knew all about this substitution and reversion […] this erring path which had
led him from his native fields to the metropolis and from the work of his hands to
self-deceptive rhetoric, from a humane and responsible sense of duty to a pretense
of compassion, which observed things from above and aroused itself to no real
help […] the way, no, the fall into vulgarity and there where vulgarity is at its
worst, into literarity! […] he had to admit to himself […] that he had pursued a
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worthless, wretched, literary life […] [a] mere phrase-maker. (Untermeyer trans.,
142)
Such cynicism towards literature, and the literary life, is not confined to a few passages in
Der Tod des Vergil, but is a theme throughout it.138 The topic dominates the conversation
between Virgil and his poet-friends Lucius and Plotius who come to visit him, and whom
Virgil requests to burn the Aeneid.
But Plotius and Lucius provide the voice in defense of poetry and literature
against Virgil’s assaults. For instance, after Virgil implies that his poetry is deceptive,
and less ‘honest’ than the testimony of a child, Lucius counters by suggesting that
‘honesty’ is not the point of art. Virgil doesn’t fully embrace Lucius’s comments, but
suggests in reply that art must aim “auf das Wesentlichste im Menschenleben” (KW 4,
238) [“toward the essential in human life” (Untermeyer trans. 253)]. In this sense Virgil
is not suggesting that literature must be restricted to merely the most realistic
representations of human phenomena, but that its value is measured commensurate with
the degree in which it ‘expresses’ the ‘human element.’ But Plotius calls Virgil’s
response “Rhetorengewäsch” (KW 4, 238) [“rhetorical bilge” (Untermeyer trans. 254),
and Lucius adds that “[f]ür die Kunst genügt solch billige Ehrlichkeit keineswegs” (KW
4, 239) [“cheap honesty suffices in no way for art” (Untermeyer trans. 254)]. Lucius
continues to suggest that literature has the unique ability to ‘exalt’ human elements; he
points specifically to the ‘exalted love’ between Dido and Aeneas in the Aeneid. For
Lucius, the petty love affairs of the average person are not an adequate substitute for the
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It’s also a theme throughout much of his theoretical writings, one example of such cynicism towards
rhetoric is the following: “das Rhetorische kennt keine Zwiesprache, kein Argument, kein Gegenargument,
es stammt nicht aus den Sphären des Intellektes, es stammt aus der Dunkelheit […] (KW 9/2, 178) [“The
rhetorical knows no dialogue, no argument or counterargument, it comes not from the sphere of the
intellect, but from darkness” (G&Z 43)].
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enchanted, exalted love between Dido and Aeneas. Only the genius of the poet, thinks
Lucius, can adequately burst through to ‘unknown realms’ of the human spirit, and
through the limitations we each face in our own lives. The narrator suggests that Lucius
is trying to defend the “Ewigkeitswert der Äneis” (KW 4, 226) [“immortal worth of the
Aeneid” (Untermeyer trans. 241)], but that Virgil is mocking him for doing so.
The notion that a thing might be or appear ‘enchanted,’ is a problem for Broch
and Wittgenstein.139 On the one hand the notion is suggestive of sensationalism, magic,
and superstition, yet if the term can be salvaged from these associations, it’s suggestive of
something essential to Broch and the Wittgenstein’s comments in Culture and Value. In
Waste Lands and Silly Valleys: Wittgenstein, Mass Culture, and Re-Enchantment (2009),
Saler suggests that during the interwar period Wittgenstein was concerned with
disenchantment as a “preliminary step toward re-enchanting the world” (60).
Conclusion
The dream of Virgil’s meditative philosophical ruminations is of a ‘redeemed’
world governed by an agape love of fellow man; the world prophesied in Broch’s
Platonic/Judeo-Christian belief system in which the divine descends to earth, and truth is
spoken in a mystical language unlike anything known to humankind. The
“wiedererstehenden, niemals gehörten, immer ersehnten Sprache der Auferstehung” (KW
4, 202) [“re-animated, the never-heard, the forever-yearned-for language of a new life”
(Untermeyer trans. 213)]: such a new life is one in which there is an accord, and a
“Welteneinheit, […] Weltenordnung, [und] Weltenallerkenntnis” (KW 4, 203) [“worldunity, world-order, [and] world-comprehension” (Untermeyer trans. 213)]. The narrator
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Vergil is accused of being Caesar’s enchanter: “der Zauberer vom Caesar” (KW 4, 33). This has a
negative connotation in the story.
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intimates that approaching this new life is “die letzte Lösung der Weltenaufgabe” (KW 4,
203) [“the final resolution of the earthly task” (Untermeyer trans. 213)], which is death.
Death makes the reality of this dream of a new life more apparent to Virgil; for the
reckoning of death frees one from “Rausch” [“intoxication”] and “Haß” [“hatred”] (KW
4, 203 [Untermeyer trans. 214]). He hears the fading of his own heartbeat, and in it a
voice that is “außerhalb jeglicher Sprache” (KW 4, 203) [“beyond any speech”
(Untermeyer trans. 214)], and more ‘compelling.’ In the instant of hearing his own
fading heartbeat he is able to perceive the “Erkenntniseinheit” (KW 4, 203) [“unity of
perception” (Untermeyer trans. 214)] of his ‘being’ that is unattainable through ‘human
speech’ or earthly symbols. Only through this experience is one capable of achieving an
awareness of the “Grenzjenseitigkeit” (KW 4, 204) [“sublime” (Untermeyer trans.
214)]140 that he had vainly attempted to achieve through poetry.
But as Steinberg points out, as Virgil finally believes that he is perceiving the
universe, and his life within it, he is suffering from “his final illusion” […] (HHT 26).
This final illusion is captured by an impressive final sentence that includes 272 words, 52
commas, two semicolons, and one colon, and brings the novel to a close. In it the
narrator describes Virgil’s physical journey in a boat from a foreign shore to Virgil’s
home shore, as well as Virgil’s psychological journey which is driven not by the force of
wind, but by an ‘inner necessity.’ The psychological journey is also a metaphysical and
spiritual journey to the afterlife and eternity. The sentence attempts to capture the
simultaneity of events as the physical, metaphysical, earthly, and spiritual merge and lose
their discrete boundaries to which they are inextricably defined in our everyday earthly
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A more literal translation of “Grenzjenseitigkeit” is “Grenz” or ‘border’ and “Jenseitigkeit” or
‘otherworldliness;’ so together, the ‘otherworldliness beyond borders.’
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existence. Virgil’s illusion consists of a “rein[es] Wort” [“pure word”] that remains
above all “Verständigung und Bedeutung” [understanding and meaning] and has no
beginning or end, and that has the power to destroy or create (KW 4, 453-4). The pure
word, the narrator explains, hovers over the universe, and over “[das] Nichts” (KW 4,
454) [the nothing]; Virgil’s boat was driven on by the earthly word in pursuit of the pure
word, but the closer he came, the more elusive was the pure word. The closer his boat
came to the home shore, the rougher the seas became; commensurately, the words which
had provided the impulse for his writing, became “unerfaßlich unaussprechbar”
[incomprehensibly unspeakable] (KW 4, 454). The last words of the novel suggest the
final realization of a dying poet; namely, that the ‘pure word,’ and the comprehension of
totality, are “jenseits der Sprache” [“it was the word beyond speech” (Untermeyer trans.,
482)] (KW 4, 454). The dying Virgil ends his life in silence, muted, aware of his
inability to attain the mystical through language; the same realization that Wittgenstein
makes at the end of the Tractatus: “Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent”
(90).
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